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Abstract 
One of the most dramatic public-policy failures in biomedical research is the lack of incentives for industry to develop new 
therapeutic uses (“indications”) for existing drugs once generics are available.  Policymakers and commentators are well 
aware of this “problem of new uses,” but fail to appreciate its magnitude.  Over the past decade, this gap in the incentives 
for pharmaceutical R&D has become one of the greatest barriers to medical progress.  Recent technological advances have 
allowed researchers to identify hundreds of potential new indications for older drugs that could address critical unmet 
medical needs.  And researchers are poised to discover hundreds more.  Developing new indications for existing drugs is 
much faster, cheaper, and less risky than developing new drugs, and therefore offers the single most promising avenue for 
delivering  new  medical  treatments  to  the  public.    However,  pharmaceutical  companies  invariably  lose  interest  in 
developing new uses for existing drugs when patients have access to low-cost generics. This article explores the nature and 
source of this gap in the incentives for developing new medical treatments, showing that it ultimately stems from a simple 
information problem.  At present, the government encourages drug development by granting firms temporary monopoly 
rights that block generic manufacturers from making or selling imitations of their drugs.  The government also makes 
available an alternative type of monopoly protection for new indications that applies to the act of taking or administering a 
drug for a new therapeutic use.  The latter monopoly rights could provide the appropriate incentives for developing new 
uses of existing drugs.  However, pharmaceutical companies cannot enforce these rights without knowing when physicians 
prescribe the drug for the patented indication as opposed to some other use.  If the government established an infrastructure 
for pharmaceutical companies to monitor the prescribed indications when pharmacists fill a prescription, those firms 
would possess the information necessary to enforce patents on new indications, thereby solving the problem of new uses.  
This article argues that the government  could  easily  create  such  an  infrastructure  through  the  expanding  use  of  e-
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Society’s investments in pharmaceutical R&D are subject to a profound distortion. The 
pharmaceutical industry spends tens of billions of dollars each year on clinical trials for new 
drugs.1  Yet it spends almost nothing on trials to establish new therapeutic uses (“indications”) of 
existing  drugs  that  are  off  patent.2   Over  the  past  few  years,  researchers  have  uncovered 
hundreds of potential new indications for older drugs, many of which would be breakthrough 
medical treatments if they prove effective.3  But the public needs someone to test these potential 
new indications in clinical trials to evaluate their safety and efficacy.4  Although these clinical 
trials are costly, developing a new use for an existing drug is far less expensive, time-consuming 
                                                              
1 See Kenneth A. Getz, Sizing Up the Clinical Research Market, CENTERWATCH 3 (2010).   
2 See Philip Walson, Generic and Therapeutic Orphans, 1 GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 39 (2012).   
3 See infra notes and text accompanying notes 274-286.  
4 See JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS _ (2004) 
(discussing the crucial importance of evaluating new treatments in clinical trials for medical practice); infra notes and 
text accompanying notes 129-142.     3 
and risky than developing a new drug.5  Investigating new uses for existing drugs therefore may 
be  the  public’s  best  chance  at  making  significant  progress  in  the  fight  against  disease.6  
Unfortunately, the government has proven unwilling or unable to provide the necessary funding 
to test these new indications in clinical trials,7 and pharmaceutical companies lack incentives to 
develop new indications for drugs once generics are available.8  Consequently, nearly all of these 
potential new medical treatments remain untested hypothesis.  This gap in the incentives for 
pharmaceutical innovation is known as the “problem of new uses.”9  
The  current  legal  infrastructure  of  drug  patents  and  regulatory  exclusivity  periods  is 
designed  to  promote  the  development  of  new  drugs,  not  new  uses  for  existing  drugs.    The 
pharmaceutical industry’s business model revolves around patent rights and exclusivity periods 
that prevent generic manufacturers from making or selling their drug.  By blocking generics from 
the market, these rights effectively provide pharmaceutical companies with temporary monopoly 
protection over all of the drug’s indications.  Once those rights expire, pharmaceutical companies 
quickly lose their market share to generics.  As a result, their incentive to develop new indications 
also  expires,  though  many  indications  may  remain  untested  and  often  undiscovered.    The 
government cannot encourage the development of these new uses by again granting the power to 
exclude generic manufacturers.  That would deny the public access to low-cost generics for the 
off-patent indication and unduly reward the pharmaceutical firm, breaking the link between the 
social value of the new use and the incentives for developing it.  
The  appropriate  incentive  for  developing  a  new  indication  is  the  right  to  charge 
consumers using the drug for the patented indication.  The current system actually gives firms 
this legal right, but not the power to enforce it.  The government grants “new use” patents that 
provide a monopoly over the act of taking or administering a drug for a new indication.  This 
legal right has little meaning, however, unless the pharmaceutical company can detect when 
patients use a generic drug for the patented indication, and pharmaceutical companies almost 
never have that information.  In short, the government provides firms with the appropriate legal 
right for incentivizing development of new indications, but no infrastructure to enforce that right.  
This gap in the incentives for pharmaceutical innovation is a widely recognized problem.  
Given  the  lack  of  protection  for  new  indications  of  FDA-approved  drugs,  pharmaceutical 
                                                              
5 See Michael J. Barratt & Donald E. Frail, Introduction, in DRUG REPOSITIONING: BRINGING NEW LIFE TO SHELVED 
ASSETS  AND  EXISTING  DRUGS  1  (Michael  J.  Barratt  &  Donald  E.  Frail,  Eds.  2012);  infra  notes  and  text 
accompanying notes 289-303.   
6  See  Thomas  A.  Hemphill,  The  NIH  Promotes  Drug  Repurposing  and  Rescue,  55  RESEARCH  TECHNOLOGY 
MANAGEMENT 6, 6-7 (2012); infra Section V.   
7 See Tudor I. Oprea & J. Mestres, Drug Repurposing: Far Beyond New Targets for Old Drugs, 14 AAPS J. 759, 762 (2012); 
Scott J. Weir et al., Repurposing Approved and Abandoned Drugs for the Treatment and Prevention of Cancer through Public-Private 
Partnership, 72 CANCER RES. 1056, 1056-57 (2012); see infra notes and text accompanying notes 157-196. 
8 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 717, 718 (2005); see infra 
notes and text accompanying notes 197-259.   
9 Eisenberg, supra note 8.    4 
companies rarely (if ever) test drugs for new therapeutic uses once generics are on the market. 
Indeed, they often stop testing drugs for new indications long before the patent term expires 
because the necessary clinical trials for a new indication take many years to complete and firms 
need time on the market to recoup their R&D investment.10  The problem has been written off as 
essentially unsolvable – an inevitable byproduct of motivating pharmaceutical innovation with a 
temporary right to exclude generics from the market.11  
This article shows that the magnitude of the problem is far greater than legal scholars and 
policymakers have recognized.  Over the past decade, this seemingly minor gap in the incentives 
for pharmaceutical innovation has become one of the greatest impediments to medical progress.  
Recent scientific advances now permit researchers to rapidly screen existing drugs for potential 
new therapeutic uses.12  Although researchers are just beginning to use these new screening tools, 
they have already uncovered a wealth of potential new treatments for critical unmet medical 
needs.13   These  discoveries  have  created  tremendous  excitement  in  the  biomedical  research 
community  about  the  prospects  of  “repurposing”  (or  “repositioning”)  existing  drugs  for  new 
uses,14 with hundreds of research articles and opinion pieces on the new screening technologies 
and potential new uses for existing drugs published in medical journals over the past five years.15  
There is hope that developing new uses for existing drugs could “convert cancer into a treatable 
chronic disease.”16  There is also a growing “expectation that a substantial percentage of rare 
diseases  if  not  all  8000  rare  diseases  might  be  treatable  with  drugs  in  the  current 
pharmacopeia.”17  However, without private industry to fund clinical trials on the safety and 
efficacy of a drug for the new indication, the benefits are likely to go untapped.   
A  less  obvious  but  equally  severe  consequence  of  the  hole  in  the  incentives  for 
pharmaceutical innovation is the loss of a dramatically less expensive path for developing new 
medical treatments. The costs of identifying and developing new drugs have escalated to levels 
                                                              
10 See  TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN,  PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT: MAKING  THE MOST  OF 
EACH  AND  EVERY  BRAND  123-30  (2012);  ALISON  SAHOO,  INDICATION  EXPANSION:  OPPORTUNITIES  FOR 
SUCCESSFUL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT 48-65 (2007); infra notes and text accompanying notes 245-249.   
11 See Arti K. Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives – a New Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 491, 
492 (2012); Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 
_ (2013); Eisenberg, supra note 8; Henry Grabowski, et al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?, 67 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373, 382 (2012); Christopher-Paul Milne & Jon B. Bruss, The Economics of Pediatric Formulation 
Development for Off-Patent Drugs, 30 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2133, 2136 (2008).   
12 See Ruili Huang et al., The NCGC Pharmaceutical Collection: A Comprehensive Resource of Clinically Approved Drugs Enabling 
Repurposing and Chemical Genomics, 3 SCI TRANSL MED. 80ps16 (2011).   
13 See infra notes and text accompanying notes 274-286.   
14 See  Ramaiah  Muthyala,  Orphan/Rare Drug Discovery Through Drug Repositioning,  8  DRUG  DISCOV  TODAY  THER 
STRATEG. 71 (2011).   
15 See infra notes 261-288.  
16 Carlos M. Telleria, Drug Repurposing for Cancer Therapy, 4 J. CANCER SCI. THER. ix (2012) 
17 Muthyala, supra note 14, at (“Some believe that the more obvious winners have already been found.”).     5 
that are now widely viewed as unsustainable.18  As a result, pharmaceutical companies are scaling 
back  their  R&D  investments  and  fewer  medical  treatments  are  reaching  the  market. 19  
Developing new indications requires only a fraction of the cost, time and risk required to develop 
a new drug.20  If pharmaceutical companies had an incentive to pursue these opportunities, they 
could take a chance on innovative therapies that have a higher risk of failure but offer hope of 
genuine medical breakthroughs.  They would also be inclined to pursue treatments for smaller 
markets or poorer populations for which developing new drugs had previously been unprofitable.  
The  inability  to  enforce  patents  on  new  indications  once  generics  enter  a  market  distorts 
pharmaceutical investment away from these opportunities.  
This article analyzes the underlying source of the problem and identifies a simple solution 
that has been overlooked in the burgeoning literature. The inability to enforce new-use patents 
once  generics  are  on  the  market  ultimately  stems  from  a  simple  information  problem: 
pharmaceutical companies do not know when patients are using a drug for a patented indication 
or some other use.  If they had that information, they could require pharmacists to dispense the 
brand-name drug for the patented indication.  The growing utilization of electronic prescribing 
and  computerized  medical  records  provides  an  infrastructure  that  could  overcome  this 
information  problem.    Physicians  can  submit  the  indication  for  a  drug  when  they  write  a 
prescription, and if insurers and pharmaceutical companies both have limited access to patients’ 
(de-identified) medical records, they can police the accuracy of reported indications in most cases. 
With a few minor policy changes, the government could transform electronic prescribing into a 
tool that permits the enforcement of new-use patents, addressing one of the most dramatic public 
policy failures in pharmaceutical innovation.   
Part II of the Article examines the economics of de novo (new) drug development and the 
legal rights that pharmaceutical companies depend upon to block generic manufacturers from 
making or selling imitations of their new drugs.  Part III discusses the importance to society of 
testing FDA-approved drugs for new indications and the government’s failure to adequately fund 
those clinical trials.  Part IV analyzes the lack of incentives for firms to develop new indications 
for a drug once generics are on the market.  Part V shows that the social costs of this gap in the 
incentives for pharmaceutical innovation are far greater than previously assumed and are getting 
worse.  Finally, Part VI proposes a solution to this problem of new uses.   
 
 
II.  INCENTIVES  TO  CREATE  NEW  MEDICAL  TREATMENTS  THROUGH  THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW DRUGS 
                                                              
18 See Michael D. Rawlins, Cutting the Cost of Drug Development, 3 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 360, 360 (2004); infra 
notes and text accompanying notes 310-321. 
19 See Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MISSOURI L. 
REV. 645, 646-47 (2011); see infra notes and text accompanying notes 310-328.   
20 See SAHOO, supra note 10.   6 
The pharmaceutical industry, perhaps more than any other industry, depends on legal 
barriers to imitation to generate a return on their investment.  Nowhere else in our economy will 
firms spend in excess of $1 billion to bring a single product to market that rivals can imitate for 
fractions of a cent on the dollar.  Recognizing the need for protection to sustain these investments, 
Congress crafted an industry-specific system of drug patents and regulatory exclusivity periods to 
incentivize  pharmaceutical  innovation.    It  designed  the  system  to  provide  pharmaceutical 
companies with temporary monopoly protection over new drugs to encourage their development, 
while  eventually  allowing  low-cost  generics  onto  the  market.21   Although  controversial  and 
flawed,  the  system  can  fairly  take  credit  for  generated  immense  gains  in  social  welfare  by 
incentivizing the development of new medical treatments.22  
 
A.  The Extremely High Costs and Uncertainty of Developing New Drugs 
Pharmaceutical R&D is an incredibly expensive and time-consuming process with a high 
risk of failure.23 The pharmaceutical industry is the most R&D-intensive sector of the global 
economy. 24   Most  large  pharmaceutical  companies  invest  several  billion  dollars  in  R&D 
annually.25  The pharmaceutical industry as a whole now spends over $100 billion a year on 
R&D – more than any other industry in the world.26  It also spends a higher percentage of its 
total  sales  revenue  on  R&D  than  any  other  industry.27   These  massive  investments  in  R&D 
produce surprisingly few new products each year. The FDA approves twenty-seven novel drug 
                                                              
21 See H.R. Rep. 98-857(II), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1984 (describing the Hatch-Waxman Act 
as a “bill [that] allows drug manufacturers to use an abbreviated new drug application  (ANDA)  when  seeking 
approval  to  make  generic  copies  of  drugs  that  were  approved  by  the  FDA,”  and  that  “encourages  drug 
manufacturers to assume the increased costs of research and development of certain products which are subject to 
premarket clearance by restoring some of the time lost on patent life while the product is awaiting FDA approval”); 
see also  Alfred B. Engelberg,  Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived their Usefulness?,  39  J.L. & 
TECH. 389, 389 (1999).  
22 See  Benjamin  N.  Roin,  Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability,  87  TEX. L. REV.  503,  507-15  (2009) 
(reviewing the evidence on the importance of patents for incentivizing pharmaceutical R&D and the social-welfare 
gains attributable to that innovation).   
23 See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 
25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 420 (2006); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180-83 (2003); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, R&D Costs and Returns to New 
Drug  Development:  A  Review  of  the  Evidence,  in  THE  OXFORD  HANDBOOK  OF  THE  ECONOMICS  OF  THE 
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 21-34 (Patricia M. Danzon & Sean Nicholson eds. 2012).  
24 E.U.  JOINT  RESEARCH  CENTRE,  DIRECTORATE-GENERAL  FOR  RESEARCH  AND  INNOVATION,  EU  R&D 
SCOREBOARD: THE 2012 EU INDUSTRIAL R&D INVESTMENT SCOREBOARD (EU R&D SCOREBOARD) 49 tbl. 5.2 
(2012).   
25 See Martin Grueber & Tim Studt, Industrial R&D—Life Sciences, R&D MAGAZINE, 2012 GLOBAL R&D FUNDING 
FORECAST 14 (2011).  
26 See EU R&D SCOREBOARD, supra note 24, at 44 fg. 5.1 (reporting that the global pharmaceutical industry spent 
approximately €90 billion on R&D in 2011).  
27 See STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 21 (2d Ed. 2007).     7 
compounds (i.e., “new molecular entities” or “NMEs”) annually on average,28 along with around 
twice that number of non-NME drug approvals (i.e., new formulations, new dosages, and new 
uses of existing drugs).29  The majority of the industry’s R&D spending goes to its de novo drug 
development programs to produce the handful of novel drug compounds that reach the market 
every year.30  
The high cost of de novo drug (i.e., new drug) development is largely attributable to high 
failure  rates,  lengthy  R&D  times,  and  the  sheer  costs  of  clinical  trials  required  for  FDA 
approval.31  Novel drug compounds must proceed through four main stages of R&D to reach the 
market:  drug  discovery,  preclinical  development,  clinical  development,  and  FDA  approval.32  
The  drug-discovery  and  preclinical-development  stages  together  take  three  to  seven  years  to 
complete on average, and have a stunningly low success rate.33  For every novel drug compound 
entering the market, pharmaceutical companies have usually tested between 5,000 and 10,000 
compounds in drug discovery and around 250 compounds in preclinical development.34  The 
select few drug compounds that emerge from this process advance to the clinical development 
stage, where firms attempt to establish their drug’s safety and efficacy in human trials.  Novel 
                                                              
28  See  FDA:  Summary  of  NDA  Approvals  &  Receipts,  1938  to  the  Present,  at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/ProductRegulation/SummaryofNDAApprovalsReceipts193
8tothepresent/default.htm;  INTERNATIONAL  FEDERATION  OF  PHARMACEUTICAL  MANUFACTURERS  & 
ASSOCIATIONS, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND GLOBAL HEALTH: FACTS AND FIGURES 7 (2011); Bernard 
Munos, A Forensic Analysis of Drug Targets from 2000 through 2012, _ CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS _ 
(forthcoming 2013) (finding that between 2000 and 2012, the FDA approved 27 New Molecular Entities each year 
on average (excluding imaging agents)). 
29 See Joseph  A.  DiMasi,  Trends in Post-Approval Pharmaceutical R&D: Dissecting the Data on Line Extensions  (2007)  at 
http://www.ifw-kiel.de/konfer/esf-ifw/newtech_1007/dimasi.pdf.  
30 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO), RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
2 (2006) (noting that “incremental improvements on existing drugs,” or “non-NMEs[,] constitute about two-thirds of 
the drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration but account for only about one-third of the industry’s 
R&D spending (by some estimates)”); Bruce Booth & Rodney Zemmel, Prospects for Productivity, 3 NATURE REV. 
DRUG DISCOVERY 451, 451 (2004) (“Although supplemental indications and new formulations of existing products 
do  receive  considerable  development  spending  in  many  companies,  the  majority  of  R&D  spending  today  still 
supports the discovery and development of new molecular entities.”).  
31 See  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, 
BUSINESS, REGULATORY,  AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED  AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
EFFORTS 6-7 (2006); Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time-to-Market of Inventions, 61 
UCLA L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2014) (noting that R&D times for new drugs are among the longest of any invention).    
32 See GAO, supra note 31, at 6-7.  
33 See GAO, supra note 31, at 6; Woodcock, supra note 34, at 4.    
34 See GAO, supra note 31, at 6 (“Most compounds fail during these first two stages [of drug discovery and preclinical 
testing], according to PhRMA, only 5 in every 10,000 compounds, on average, successfully completes these two 
stages.  In  general,  these  two  stages  typically  take  a  total  of  6½  years  to  successfully  complete  for  a  particular 
compound.”);  Janet  Woodcock,  Today’s Biomedical Innovation: ‘Lost in Translation’?,  Apr.  26,  2012,  at  4,  available at 
http://www.qb3.org/sites/qb3.org/files/pictures/docs/Woodcock%202012%200426%20UCSF%20Innovation%
20Lost%20in%20Translation.ppt  (noting  that  pharmaceutical  companies  typically  screen  and  evaluate  between 
5,000 and 10,000 distinct compounds during the drug-discovery phase, and 250 compounds during preclinical 
development, for each novel drug compound that reaches the market).    8 
drug compounds must complete three separate phases of clinical trials for FDA approval.35  This 
process is notoriously expensive, takes five to nine years to complete on average,36 and has a high 
risk of failure, since 80 to 90 percent of novel drug compounds entering clinical trials fail to reach 
the market.37  From start to finish, the entire process of de novo drug development usually takes 
twelve to sixteen years.38   
For all these reasons, the cost of de novo drug development is incredibly expensive. A 
2007 study estimated that the average capitalized cost of successfully developing a novel drug 
compound is approximately $1.2 billion – a figure that includes out-of-pocket R&D expenses, the 
costs of capital, and the sunk costs of failed drug candidates.39  Roughly half of the total costs 
were attributable to the drug-discovery and preclinical-development stages, while the other half 
came  from  the  clinical-development  stage  necessary  to  satisfy  the  FDA’s  safety  and  efficacy 
standards.40  More recent studies estimate that the average capitalized cost of developing a new 
drug has risen to between $1.5 and $1.8 billion.41 Although these estimates of the costs of de 
novo drug development are controversial,42 there is little doubt that developing a novel drug 
compound is extraordinarily costly.43 
                                                              
35 See supra notes 39 & 43.  
36  See  Kenneth  I.  Kaitlin,  The  Landscape  for  Pharmaceutical  Innovation:  Drives  of  Cost-Effective  Clinical  Research, 
PHARMACEUTICAL OUTSOURCING, May 2010, at 3605.  
37 See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug Development: Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 87 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 272 (2010) (finding that between 1993 and 2004, approximately 19% 
of the drugs that entered clinical trials ultimately made it to the market); Navjot Singh et al., The Anatomy of Attrition, 
in  INVENTION  REINVENTED:  MCKINSEY  PERSPECTIVES  ON  PHARMACEUTICAL  R&D  58  (Rodney  Zemmel  & 
Mubasher Sheikh, eds. 2010) (reporting that “more than 90 percent of compounds that enter Phase I trials are 
destined to fall out of the development pipeline”).  
38 See GAO, supra note 31, at 1; Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Development in the United States from 1963 to 1999, 69 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 286, 292 fg. 6 (2001).  
39 Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL 
& DECISION ECON. 469, 469 & 475 (2007); see also Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Spending on New Drug 
Development, 19 HEALTH ECON. 130, 138 (2010) (estimating that it costs $1.214 billion on average to develop a new 
drug); Ben Hirschler, Drug Industry Treading Water on R&D Productivity, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 2012 (estimating that it costs 
$1.1 billion on average to develop a new drug).  
40 See DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 39, at 469; DiMasi et al., supra note 23, at ; Steven M. Paul et al., How to 
Improve R&D Productivity: the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grant Challenge, 9 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOV. 203, 206 (2010); cf. 
THOMSON REUTERS, 2012 CMR INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL R&D FACTBOOK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
fg. 5 (2012) (reporting that the distribution of R&D costs between preclinical research (including drug discovery) and 
clinical research varies by therapeutic class).  
41 See Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., The R&D Cost of a New Medicine, Office of Health Economics (2012); Paul et al., 
supra note 40, at 203.   
42 Some cost estimates for pharmaceutical R&D are controversial because they are based on non-public information. 
See Steve Morgan et al., The Cost of Drug Development: A Systematic Review, 100 HEALTH POLICY 4, 11 (2011).  However, 
the published studies using publicly available data on pharmaceutical R&D expenditures produce similar (albeit 
much rougher) estimates of the average capitalized cost of drug development. See Adams & Brantner, supra note 23, 
at  420;  Adams  &  Brantner,  supra  note  39,  at  138;  OFFICE  OF  TECHNOLOGY  ASSESSMENT  (“OTA”), 
PHARMACEUTICAL  R&D:  COSTS,  RISKS,  AND  REWARDS,  OTA-H-522  (1993).  A  few  commentators  remain 
adamant  that  the  published  studies  of  pharmaceutical  R&D  costs  grossly  overestimate  the  true  costs  of  drug   9 
 
B.  The Ease of Imitation by Generics 
Pharmaceutical companies’ R&D investments are highly susceptible to imitation and free 
riding by generic manufacturers.  This vulnerability is particularly acute for investments in small-
molecule drugs,44 which make up over 90 percent of the drugs on the U.S. market, and roughly 
65  percent  of  the  recent  drug  approvals.45   Generic  manufacturers  can  quickly  imitate  these 
drugs  with  minimal  or  no  investment  in  drug  discovery,  preclinical  development  or  clinical 
trials.46   When  generic  manufacturers  enter  the  market,  they  typically  set  steeply  discounted 
prices, which largely eviscerates a pharmaceutical company’s revenue streams from a drug.47    
Generic manufacturers generally skip almost all of the costly R&D involved in de novo 
drug  development.    Most  small-molecule  drugs  are  relatively  easy  to  reverse  engineer  and 
duplicate, 48  and  as  a  result,  generic  manufacturers  can  simply  copy  the  drugs  that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
development. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES AND HOW THEY DECEIVE US 37-51 
(2004);  Donald  W.  Light  &  Rebecca  Warburton,  Demythologizing  the  High  Costs  of  Pharmaceutical  Research,  6 
BIOSOCIETIES 34 (2011); Public Citizen, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against the Drug Industry’s R&D ‘Scare Card’ (2001). 
However, many of the criticisms leveled against these studies are difficult to reconcile with basic financial principles. 
For example, these critics argue that it is inappropriate to consider the costs of capital when calculating the total 
costs of drug development for private investors. See ANGELL, supra at 45; Light & Warburton, supra at 8.  
43 Reports from academic research centers on the costs of industry-sponsored clinical trials are consistent with the 
reported high costs of clinical drug development. See Kristy Beal et al., Budget Negotiation for Industry-Sponsored Clinical 
Trials, 99 ANASTH. ANALG. 173 (2004); Jeanne Erdmann, Researchers Facing Increasing Costs for Clinical Research, With 
Few Solutions, 97 J. NAT. CANCER INST. 1492 (2005).  
44 See Janet Woodcock et al., The FDA’s Assessment of Follow-On Protein Products: A Historical Perspective, 6 NAT. REV. 
DRUG DISCOVERY 437, 437-38 (2007). At present, the pharmaceutical industry’s R&D investments in the newer 
large-molecule drugs (“biologics”) are slightly less vulnerable to free riding than its investments in small-molecule 
drugs  because  biologics  are  harder  to  imitate.    See  Katherine  Bourzac,  The  Science  of  Biosimilars,  2  CANCER 
DISCOVERY 295, 295 (2012).  However, the barriers to imitating biologics should greatly diminish as technological 
improvements  eventually  allow  generic  manufacturers  to  satisfy  the  FDA’s  “biosimilarity”  requirements  with 
minimal or no clinical studies.  See Steven A. Berkowitz et al., Analytical Tools for Characterizing Biopharmaceuticals and the 
Implications for Biosimilars, 11 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 527, 527 (2012); Woodcock, supra at 442.  In the long 
run, therefore, pharmaceutical companies’ vulnerability to free-riding imitation in the biologics market should more 
closely resemble their vulnerability to such competition in the small-molecule markets.  See Craig Wheeler, Momenta 
Pharmaceuticals’ Management Presents at 38th Annual dbAccess Health Care Conference (Transcript), Seeking Alpha, May 29, 
2013;  KARSTEN DALGAARD  ET  AL.,  BIOSIMILARS SEVEN YEARS ON: WHERE  ARE WE  AND WHAT'S NEXT?  5-
7 (2013); BAIN & COMPANY, BIOSIMILARS: A MARATHON, NOT A SPRINT 2 (2008).   
45 See Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 8 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 959 (2009) 
(“Of the 1,222 NMEs that have been approved since 1950, 1,103 are small molecules and 119 are biologics.”); 
Munos, supra note 28, at _ (finding that between 2000 and 2012, 65% of the NMEs approved by the FDA were 
small-molecule drugs).  
46 See  MARTIN  A.  VOET,  THE  GENERIC  CHALLENGE:  UNDERSTANDING  PATENTS,  FDA  &  PHARMACEUTICAL 
LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT  xxii  (2005)  (“Generic  companies  have  no  expense  for  discovery  or  development  or 
marketing of drugs.”).   
47 See Richard G. Frank & Erica Seiguer, Generic Drug Competition in the U.S., in BUSINESS BRIEFING: PHARMATECH 56, 
56–58 (2003).   
48 See  Arvind  K.  Bansal  &  Vishal  Koradia,  The Role of Reverse Engineering in the Development of Generic Formulations, 
PHARMATECH.COM (2005); Bourzac, supra note 44, at 295 (“Conventional drugs are small molecules with defined   10 
pharmaceutical  companies  identify  as  therapeutically  valuable.    This  allows  generic 
manufacturers to avoid the difficult and expensive drug-discovery and preclinical-development 
stages  of  de  novo  drug  development.  Moreover,  generic  manufacturers  avoid  the  cost  and 
uncertainty of the clinical development stage, because the FDA approves generic drugs based on 
the clinical-trial data submitted in support of the brand-name drug.  Generics still need FDA 
approval to enter the market, but Congress established an abbreviated regulatory pathway for 
these  products  in  the  Drug  Price  Competition  and  Patent  Term  Restoration  Act  of  1984 
(“Hatch-Waxman Act”).49  Under Hatch-Waxman, generic manufacturers can enter the market 
based on the clinical-trial data submitted in support of the brand-name drug50 if they can show 
(1) that their drug contains the same active ingredient as the brand-name drug,51 (2) that it is 
“bioequivalent” to that brand-name drug,52 and (3) that it will have the same label as the brand-
name drug.53  So long as generic manufacturers can copy the brand-name drug and its label, 
they can avoid the costly clinical development stage.   
As  a  result,  generic  drugs  are  much  faster  and  cheaper  to  develop  than  novel  drug 
compounds.  While pharmaceutical companies spend over $1 billion to successfully develop a 
single new drug, generic manufacturers can usually imitate those products for only a few million 
dollars.54  And while de novo drug development takes twelve to sixteen years on average, the 
average development time for generic drugs (including the time needed to setup manufacturing 
facilities) is about two to three years.55   
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
chemical structures,” and once their structure is known, chemists “can reliably make a generic chemical drug whose 
structure and behavior will be identical to the original”).  Reverse engineering controlled-release drugs can be much 
more challenging than reverse engineering immediate-release drugs, although much of the challenge stems from the 
difficulty of designing around the pharmaceutical companies’ patents on the precise formulations of those drug-
delivery systems. See Salah U. Ahmed & Venkatesh Naini, Generic Oral Controlled Release Product Development: Formulation 
and Process Considerations, in ORAL CONTROLLED RELEASE FORMULATION DESIGN AND DRUG DELIVERY: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 321-22 & 332 (Hong Wen & Kinam Park eds. 2010). 
49 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) 
(codified as amended 21 U.S.C. §355 (1994)); see also Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 540 U.S. _ (2013).  
50 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv), (j)(8)(B).  
51 See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(ii).  
52 See 21 U.S.C. §§355(j)(2)(A)(iii)-(iv). The FDA defines “bioequivalence” as “the absence of a significant difference in 
the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or pharmaceutical 
alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the same molar dose under similar 
conditions in an appropriately designed study.” 21 CFR § 320.1. As an alternative to showing of bioequivalence, the 
generic manufacturer can “show that the route of administration, the dosage form, and the strength of [its] drug are 
the same as those of the listed [branded] drug.” 21 U.S.C. §§355(j)(2)(A)(iii).  
53 See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(v). But see infra text accompanying note _ (explaining that generic manufacturers are 
permitted to exclude any patented indications from their drug label so long as it still contains at least one of the 
FDA-approved indications for the drug).  
54 See  Big  Generic  Pharma,  ECONOMIST,  vol.  376,  Jul.  30,  2005,  at  58;  FEDERAL  TRADE  COMMISSION  (FTC), 
EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 14 (2009). 
55 See Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 93, 96 (2004); Sandoz 
Biopharmaceuticals, Biosimilar Development, at http://sandoz-biosimilars.com/biosimilars/development.shtml (“For a   11 
Once generics drugs become available, they quickly drive down prices and capture most 
of the market for the brand-name drug.56  The typical retail price for a generic drug is between 
15 and 25 percent of the brand-name drug price.57  Pharmaceutical companies have trouble 
competing at these prices.58  By some estimates, they usually lose about 80 percent of their sales 
to generic manufacturers within the first four to six weeks of generic entry.59  This switch to 
generic drugs usually occur fastest for top selling drugs,60 where insurers have more to gain by 
implementing policies that will encourage patients to switch to the low-cost generics for drugs 
with higher sales volume.   
 
C. The Need to Delay Generic Entry to Encourage Firms to Develop New Drugs 
Given the high costs of de novo drug development and rapid loss of their market share 
following generic entry, pharmaceutical companies normally require a lengthy period of market 
exclusivity to recoup their R&D investments.61  Some new drugs generate very high returns,62 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
small-molecule generic, … development may be completed in 2-3 years, at a cost of USD 2-3 million.”); cf. Jean O. 
Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: ‘Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering?’, NBER 
Working Paper 6366, 21 & 39 tbl.4 (1998) (finding that throughout the 1980s and 90s in India, when patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals in India was extremely weak, “the introduction lag [for generics] was typically four or 
five years,” and “since executives of Indian firms stated in interviews that they usually waited to see the extent of a 
new  drug's  acceptance  internationally  before  investing  heavily  in  process  development,  this  implies  very  quick 
imitation by Indian firms.”).  
56 See CBO, supra note 30, at 16.   
57  See  United  States  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA),  Facts  About  Generic  Drugs  (2012)  at 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggenericdrugs/uc
m167991.htm#_ftnref3; GAO, supra note 31, at 1.  
58 Cf. Prabir Basu et al., Analysis of Manufacturing Costs in Pharmaceutical Companies, 3 J. PHARM. INNOVATION 30, 36 
(2008) (reporting that the average costs of goods sold for brand-name drugs is approximately 27 percent).  
59 See  Rich  Silver,  A  Wall  Street  Perspective  on  Generics,  2007  GPhA  Annual  Meeting,  at  6  (2007)  available  at 
http://www.gphaonline.org/AM/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentFileID=593. Some estimates point to a slightly 
more gradual erosion of brand-name drug sales to generics, such as a 70 percent drop in market share within six 
months of generic entry. See Datamonitor, US Most Susceptible to Brand Erosion Post Patent Expiry, Jan. 13, 2011, at 
http://about.datamonitor.com/media/archives/5293. On the other hand, one study found that in states that did 
not require patient consent for generic substitution between 2006 and 2007, Merck lost over 98% of its Zocor 
(simvastatin) sales for Medicaid patients to generic competitors within six months of its patent expiration. See William 
H. Shrank et al., State Generic Substitution Laws Can Lower Drug Outlays Under Medicaid, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1383, 1387 
(2010).  
60 See CBO, supra note 30, at 16.  
61 See  Henry  G.  Grabowski,  Patents  and  New  Product  Development  in  the  Pharmaceutical  and  Biotechnology  Industries,  in 
SCIENCE & CENTS: EXPLORING THE ECONOMICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 99 (John V. Duca & Mine K. Yücel eds. 
2003);  Henry  G.  Grabowski  &  John  Vernon,  The  Distribution  of  Sales  Revenues  from  Pharmaceutical  Innovation,  18 
PHARMACOECONOMICS Suppl. 1, 21 (2000); United States Department of Health and Human Services, Expanding 
the  Use  of  Generic  Drugs,  ASPE  Issue  Brief,  12-13  (2010),  at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.shtml.  
62 See Eric David et al., Pharmaceutical R&D: the Road to Positive Returns, 8 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 609, 610 
(2009);  Henry  Grabowski  et  al.,  Returns  on  Research  and  Development  for  1990s  New  Drug  Introductions,  20S 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 11, 22-23 (2002); THOMSON REUTERS, THE ECONOMIC POWER OF ORPHAN DRUGS 10   12 
but the majority generate returns that are less than the average total development costs for novel 
drug compounds.63  Consequently, for pharmaceutical companies to break even on their R&D 
investments,  the  market  exclusivity  period  must  be  long  enough  for  the  profits  from  the 
commercial winners to offset the losers.  
The optimal length of market exclusivity for encouraging de novo drug development is 
subject to controversy.64  Nevertheless, a few scholars have produced estimates of the optimal 
market-exclusivity length for new drugs by comparing the average total R&D costs for novel drug 
compounds  to  the  average  net  returns.    Their  studies  suggest  that  the  average  novel  drug 
compound needs between 9 to 16 years of market exclusivity for pharmaceutical companies to 
reach the breakeven point on their R&D investment.65  Qualitative evidence – i.e., statements 
from  industry  insiders  and  accounts  from  the  trade  literature  –  suggest  that  pharmaceutical 
companies generally do not develop a new drug unless they expect at least 10 years of market 
exclusivity over the product.66   
 
D. Promoting  New  Drug  Development  with  Temporary  Monopoly  Rights  to 
Delay Generic Entry 
Since generic manufacturers only need a few years to develop and mass-produce low-cost 
imitations of brand-name small-molecule drugs,67 pharmaceutical companies would have trouble 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
(2012).  Pharmaceutical companies obviously have trouble predicting which drugs will be successful, or else they 
would avoid the commercial failures.  See David et al., supra at 610 (“Perhaps no one can consistently identify top-
quartile drugs. Indeed, our analysis shows that, in any given small-molecule portfolio, only ~2% of drugs will be top-
quartile sellers, whereas ~54% will be fourth-quartile sellers.”). 
63  RODNEY  ZEMMEL  &  MUBASHER  SHEIKH,  INVENTION  REINVENTED:  MCKINSEY  PERSPECTIVES  ON 
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D (2010); see also David et al., supra note 62, at 610; VALENTINA SARTORI ET AL., VALUE-
DRIVEN  DRUG  DEVELOPMENT—UNLOCKING  THE  VALUE  OF  YOUR  PIPELINE  3  exh.1  (2011);  Grabowski  & 
Vernon, supra note 61, at 24; Grabowski et al., supra note 62, at 22-23.  
64 See Josh Bloom & Els Torreele, Should Patents on Pharmaceuticals Be Extended to Encourage Innovation?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
23, 2012.    
65 Several published academic studies estimate that for the average small-molecule NME, firms need 13 to 16 years 
of sales revenue (without generic competition) to reach the break-even point on their R&D investment. See Henry 
Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between Innovation and Competition, 7 NAT. REV. DRUG 
DISCOVERY 479, 484 (2008); Henry Grabowski et al., Data Exclusivity for Biologics, 10 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 
15 (2010). These studies were supported in part through grants from the pharmaceutical industry. An unpublished 
academic study supported by Teva Pharmaceuticals, the world’s large generic manufacturer, found that firms reach 
break-even  point  on  the  average  drug  after  nine  years.  See  ALEX  M.  BRILL,  PROPER  DURATION  OF  DATA 
EXCLUSIVITY  FOR  GENERIC  BIOLOGICS:  A  CRITIQUE  8-10  (2008),  at 
http://www.tevadc.com/Brill_Exclusivity_in_Biogenerics.pdf (estimating that a seven-year exclusivity period would 
be sufficient for biologic drugs under the assumption of limited price competition in those markets following patent 
expiration). The author of this study used the same economic model as the other studies, but assumed lower costs of 
capital (10% instead of 11.5%-12.5%) and higher contribution margins (60% instead of 50%). Id.  
66 See Roin, supra note 22, at 552 n.259, 557 & n.290, 566 & n.335 (discussing how pharmaceutical companies are 
generally unwilling to develop new drugs without strong patent protection). 
67 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 54-55.     13 
recouping  their  R&D  investments  in  these  products  without  legal  barriers  to  imitation. 
Pharmaceuticals is one of the few industries where patent scholars widely agree that firms rely 
heavily  on  such  legal  barriers  to  appropriate  the  returns  from  their  R&D  investments.68 
Recognizing this need for protection, Congress devised an elaborate system of drug patents and 
regulatory exclusivity periods to promote the development of new drugs.69  
Pharmaceutical companies typically rely on product patents covering their drugs’ active 
ingredient  and  formulation  as  their  primary  legal  barrier  for  protection  against  generic 
competition.70   The  patent  system  will  protect  any  newly  discovered  drug  that  is  novel, 
nonobvious and useful,71 giving firms a monopoly over the drug that expires 20 years after they 
file the patent application.72  Product patents on the active ingredient in a drug are usually the 
strongest form of patent protection.73  FDA regulations effectively prevent generic manufacturers 
from designing around these patents, since they cannot modify the brand-name drug’s active 
ingredient without undermining their product’s regulatory status as a generic, thereby subjecting 
themselves to the FDA’s extensive clinical-trial requirements.74  Pharmaceutical companies can 
                                                              
68 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS 
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 88-89 (2008) (noting the great importance of patents in the pharmaceutical industry in 
comparison to most other industries); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION  (FTC), TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
PROPER  BALANCE  OF  COMPETITION  AND  PATENT  LAW  AND  POLICY  14  (2003)  (concluding  that  patents  are 
“critical” to innovation in the pharmaceutical industry); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT 39-41 (2004) (noting that patents provide incentives for costly drug development that would not 
otherwise occur).  
69 See supra note 21. 
70 See Roin, supra note 22, at 545-56; William T. Comer, Introduction, in 8 COMPREHENSIVE MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 
4 (John B. Taylor & David J. Triggle eds. 2007) (“[T]he composition of matter patents, plus synthetic process and 
formulation patents, [are] king of intellectual property and sole protector of a [drug] product in the market place.”).  
A patent on the active ingredient in a drug covers “the molecule or ion, excluding those appended portions of the 
molecule that cause the drug to be an ester, salt … responsible for the physiological or pharmacological action of the 
drug substance.” Pfizer Inc., v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs. Ltd., 359 F.3d 1361, _ (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a)). 
A  patent  on  the  formulation  of  a  drug  covers  the  combination  of  the  drug’s  active  ingredient  and  its  inactive 
ingredients (or “excipients”) that affect the delivery of the active ingredient. See Furrow, supra note , at 294-96; 
THOMAS, supra note 75, at 39. 
71 Id. at 516 & n.56 (discussing the threshold requirements for patenting drugs).  Following the Supreme Court’s 
2013 decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. , there might be a fourth eligibility requirement 
when patenting a new drug: does it exist anywhere in nature? 569 U.S. __ (2013). In Myriad Genetics, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a set of patents claiming certain isolated DNA strands because the “location and order of the 
nucleotides existed in nature before [the patentee] found them.” Id. at. It is unclear whether this rule applies to non-
DNA product patents, but if it does, any compound found in nature may be unpatentable, even if the existence of 
the natural compound was unknown prior to its patenting.  
72 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
73 See VOET, supra note 46, at 35 (“The best pharmaceutical patent is a compound patent.”).   
74 See  21  C.F.R.  314.127(a)(3)  (“FDA  will  refuse  to  approve  an  abbreviated  application  for  a  new  drug  [if]  … 
information submitted with the abbreviated new drug application is insufficient to show that the active ingredient is 
the same as that of the reference listed drug.”); FTC, supra note 68, ch. 3, page 7 (“[D]rug substance patents are 
typically  the  most  valuable  for  the  brand-name  company,  because  they  are  much  more  difficult  for  potential 
competitors (including generic companies) to design around than formulation or method of use patents.”).     14 
also use product patents on their drug’s formulation for protection to block generics from the 
market.75  However, these formulation patents are only effective if they are broad enough to 
prevent  generic  manufacturers  from  designing  around  the  patented  formulation  without 
undermining their generic drug’s status as “bioequivalent” to the brand-name drug.76  Enforcing 
a product patent is also easy because the FDA requires generic manufacturers to disclose their 
drug’s  chemical  composition  to  the  pharmaceutical  company,  allowing  for  the  automatic 
detection of infringement.77   
Pharmaceutical companies can also block generic entry with process patents that cover a 
method of using their drug under some circumstances.78  Federal law expressly allows for the 
patenting of “any new and useful process” that involves “a new use of a known … composition of 
matter.”79 These  new-use  patents  give  firms  a  legal  monopoly  over  the  act  of  taking  or 
administering a particular drug for a particular indication.80 Since generic manufacturers are 
neither taking nor administering them to patients, they do not directly infringe these patents.81 
However, generic manufacturers will indirectly infringe a new-use patent if they “actively induce 
infringement” by patients, pharmacists or physicians.82 The FDA requires generic manufacturers 
to list on their label at least one of the approved indications for the brand-name drug.83 Since the 
label  instructs  physicians  and  patients  in  how  to  use  the  drug,  courts  hold  the  generic 
manufacturer  liable  for  inducing  infringement  if  their  label  covers  a  patented  indication.84 
Consequently,  if  pharmaceutical  companies  have  protection  over  every  FDA-approved 
indication for their drug, they can effectively exclude generics from the market with new-use 
                                                              
75 See JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 39 (2005).  
76 See Rasma Chereson, Bioavailability, Bioequivalence, and Drug Selection, in BASIC PHARMACOKINETICS 8-2 (Michael C. 
Makoid ed. 1996) (describing efforts by generic manufacturers to design around formulation patents on brand-name 
drugs). 
77 See 35 U.S.C. 271(e)_.  
78 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _-_. 
79 Congress set the boundaries of patentable subject matter to encompass “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter,” and defined “process” as including “a new use of a known … composition 
of matter, or material.”  35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b) & 101 (2012).   
80 See THOMAS, supra note 75, at 44-46.  
81 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, _ n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that “there is no evidence in the 
record that [the generic manufacturer] has directly practiced or will ever practice any of the methods claimed in the 
[new use] patent, … [which] is hardly surprising — pharmaceutical companies do not generally treat diseases; 
rather, they sell drugs to wholesalers or pharmacists, who in turn sell the drugs to patients possessing prescriptions 
from physicians.”).   
82 See Warner-Lambert Co., 316 F.3d at ; 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent 
shall be liable as an infringer.”).   
83 See 21 C.F.R. 314.127(a)(7).  
84 See AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex Corp., 633 F.3d 1042, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding that a generic manufacturer “had 
the requisite specific intent to induce infringement because [it] included instructions in its proposed label that will 
cause at least some users to infringe the asserted method claims”).    15 
patents.85  
Although product patents and method-of-use patents provide strong legal barriers against 
generic competition for many new drugs, many others fall through the cracks.86  Some new drugs 
are  unpatentable  because  a  prior  disclosure  –  usually  in  a  journal  article  or  older  patent 
application – renders them non-novel or obvious.87  Over the years, academic researchers and 
pharmaceutical  companies  have  disclosed  millions  of  distinct  compounds  with  potential 
therapeutic value, and the vast majority of these compounds have never been tested in humans.88  
Later scientific advances or chance discoveries sometimes reveal that these known compounds 
are promising drug candidates, but because of the prior disclosures,  they can be difficult or 
impossible patent effectively.89  Other drugs receive insufficient patent protection to motivate 
their development because the patent term is too short.90  Pharmaceutical companies file their 
patents relatively early in R&D,91 and thus lose a significant portion of the 20-year term while 
developing  their  drugs. 92   The  government  gives  pharmaceutical  companies  patent-term 
extensions to partially compensate for this loss of patent life.93  Even with these extensions, some 
                                                              
85 See Anna Volftsun & Sandra Lee, The Future Of Skinny Labels, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT, vol. 8 (2011); See 
Richard B. Smith, Repositioned Drugs: Integrating Intellectual Property and Regulatory Strategies, 8 DRUG DISCOV TODAY 
THER STRATEG. 131, 131-32 (2011).   
86 See Roin, supra note 22, at 515-45 (discussing how countless potentially valuable new drugs are no longer novel or 
nonobvious, and thus are unpatentable, due to prior disclosures of the compound in the academic literature or older 
patent  filings);  Benjamin  N.  Roin,  Drug  Patent  Length  (2009),  at  http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-
workshops/faculty-workshop- secure/roin.workshop.paper.summer.2009.pdf (arguing that the current patent term is 
insufficient for drugs that require lengthy clinical trials to demonstrate efficacy, including treatments for early-stage 
cancer and cancer prevention); Eric Budish et al., Do Fixed Patent Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from Cancer Clinical 
Trials, NBER Working Paper No. 19430 (2013), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w19430 (finding that the fixed 
patent term distorts R&D investments away from treatments for early-stage cancer and cancer prevention because 
they require lengthy clinical trials which erode a substantial portion of the firm’s patent life).  
87 See Roin, supra note 22, at 515-45.    
88 Cf. Paul D. Leeson & Stephen A. St. Gallay, The Influence of the ‘Organizational Factor’ on Compound Quality in Drug 
Discovery, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 749, 751 box.1 (2011) (finding that the 18 largest pharmaceutical 
companies  filed  a  total  of  14,335  drug  patents  published  between  2000  and  2009,  and  these  patents  together 
disclosed 791,722 unique compounds along with some of their potential therapeutic uses).    
89 See Roin, supra note 22, at 515-45.    
90 See Roin, supra note 86; Budish et al., supra note 86.    
91 GRAHAM L. PATRICK, AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 257 (3d Ed., 2005); see also Stephen T. 
Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications: How the PTO’s Proposed New Rules Undermine an Important 
Part of the U.S. Patent System with Hundreds of Years of History, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 556, 557 (2006). 
92 See Michael K. Dunn, Timing of Patent Filings and Market Exclusivity, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 487, 488 
(2011).   
93 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 187, 187-90 (1999) (discussing the legislative history of the patent-term extensions provided in Hatch-
Waxman for drug patents).  Once their drug is approved in the U.S., firms can extend the term of their patent by the 
sum of (1) one-half of the time the firms spent testing the drug in clinical trials, and (2) the full amount of time the 
FDA spent reviewing their new drug application.  However, the total amount of time added back to the patent life 
cannot exceed five years, and in no case can the extension result in the drug having an effective patent life of more 
than 14 years.  See 35 U.S.C. § 156.    16 
drugs take so long to develop that they would have little or no patent life remaining when they 
finally reach the market,94 including many drugs for disease prevention or for treating early-stage 
disease.95  
Since the patent system does not adequately protect all new drugs, Congress also grants 
firms regulatory exclusivity periods that run concurrently with their patent rights (if any) over 
those products.96  These regulatory exclusivity periods operate as a guaranteed minimum term of 
protection against generics,97 but different types of drugs receive different lengths of regulatory 
exclusivity.  When Congress established the abbreviated drug-approval pathway for generics of 
small-molecule drugs in 1984, it made that pathway unavailable to generic manufacturers for the 
first five years after the FDA approves a new drug.98  This five-year term of “data exclusivity” 
prevents generic manufacturers from entering the market unless they can produce all of the 
necessary preclinical and clinical data to support a new drug application, effectively defeating the 
purpose of being a generic.99  Drugs approved for so-called “orphan” indications – i.e., diseases 
with small markets – automatically receive a seven-year term of market exclusivity.100  When 
                                                              
94 See Roin, supra note 86; Budish et al., supra note 86.   
95 See, e.g.,  Jay  Cohn  et  al.,  Unconventional End Points in Cardiovascular Clinical Trials: Should We Be Moving Away from 
Morbidity and Mortality?, 15 J. CARDIAC FAILURE  199, 201 (2009); Stephen I. Rennard, The Many ‘Small COPDs’: 
COPD Should Be an Orphan Disease, 134 CHEST 623 (2008); Tom Rooney, Head of Translational Research in the 
Neurodegeneratives Diseases Group at Sanofi S.A., Addressing the R&D Challenges, at Facing the Future: Developing 
an  EU  Strategy  on  Alzheimer’s,  Sept.  21,  2011,  available  at 
http://www.theparliament.com/fileadmin/theParliament/pdfs/ThomasRooney.pdf;  Rena  Conti,  Balancing  Safety, 
Effectiveness, and Public Desire: The FDA and Cancer, ISSUE BRIEF #615, 2, April 2003; Frank L. Meyskens Jr. et al., 
Regulatory Approval of Cancer Risk-Reducing (Chemopreventive) Drugs: Moving What We Have Learned into the Clinic, 4 CANCER 
PREV. RES. 311 (2011); Zaven S. Khachaturian et al., A Roadmap for the Prevention of Dementia: The Inaugural Leon Thal 
Symposium, 4 ALZHEIMERS DEMENT. 156 (2008).   
96 See Engelberg, supra note 21, at 406 (noting that during the negotiations leading to the passage of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, pharmaceutical companies were concerned the threat of generic competition would discourage the 
development of unpatentable drugs, and, “[b]eyond question, the five-year non-patent exclusivity, which effectively 
guaranteed that every new drug would have an exclusive marketing period of about seven years … whether or not it 
enjoyed any patent protection was the key to the compromise”).   
97 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical 
Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 481-86 (2003).  
98 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii). To qualify for this protection, new drugs cannot contain any active ingredients 
already approved by the FDA for use in humans.  Id.  Drugs containing one or more active ingredients previously 
approved by the FDA receive a three-year term of data exclusivity.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).  
99 See THOMAS, supra note 75, at .  
100 See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a).  An orphan indication is one that “affects fewer than 200,000 people in the United 
States,” or for which “there is no reasonable expectation that costs of research and development of the drug for the 
indication can be recovered by sales of the drug in the United States.” See 21 C.F.R. § 316.20(b)(8) (interpreting 21 
U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)).  Some commentators argue that these exclusivity periods have proven too short to incentivize 
the  development  of  most  new  drugs.    See  Roin, supra  note 22,  at  545-55 (showing that despite the guaranteed 
minimum term of protection through data exclusivity, pharmaceutical companies systematically screen through their 
pipeline  to  exclude  drugs  lacking  strong  patent  protection,  revealing  that  five  years  is  generally  insufficient  to 
motivate the development of a new drug); _ .  A broad coalition of patient-advocacy groups is currently lobbying to 
provide for longer exclusivity terms.  See MODDERN Cures Act Reintroduced, DRUG DISCOVERY & DEVELOPMENT, 
Sept.  13,  2013,  at  http://www.dddmag.com/news/2013/09/moddern-cures-act-reintroduced;  Marc  Boutin,   17 
Congress  created  the  regulatory  pathway  for  biosimilars  in  2010,  pharmaceutical  companies 
negotiated  for  –  and  received  –  an  automatic  twelve  years  of  data  exclusivity  over  their 
biologics.101   
In addition to their established exclusivity periods, pharmaceutical companies sometimes 
use creative litigation tactics or regulatory maneuvering to delay generic entry for as long as 
possible.102  These tactics are known as “evergreening.”103  Most of these tactics have proven 
unsuccessful,104 although they attract a great deal of attention from courts and commentators.105   
In the end, pharmaceutical companies usually manage to keep generics off the market for 
somewhere between 10 and 15 years following the initial FDA approval of their drug.106  The 
average effective patent life for new drugs – the time from FDA approval to generic entry – has 
remained unchanged at 11 to 12 years for much of the past three decades.107  With an increasing 
number of drugs going off-patent, generic manufacturers have gradually come to dominate the 
overall  market  for  prescription  drugs.    In  1984,  when  Congress  formally  established  the 
regulatory pathway for generic drugs, roughly 19% of the prescriptions filled in the U.S. were for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
MODDERN  Cures  Act  –  H.R.  3497  Modernizing  Our  Drug  and  Diagnostics,  at 
http://www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/NHC_Files/Pdf_Files/2013_VHLC_MODDERN.pdf.  
101 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002(a)(2)(k)(7)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 
807 (2010).  
102 See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 948 (2011).  
103 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 
348-49 (2007).   
104 See id.  These evergreening strategies often involve relying on peripheral patents filed late in a drug’s R&D or 
following  its  initial  FDA-approval.    See  Kate  S.  Gaudry,  Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs,  29 
NATURE: BIOTECHNOLOGY 876 (2011); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make A Drug? 
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 299 (2010).  However, 
these later-filed patents tend to be quite narrow, and generic manufacturers can often design around them easily.  See 
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents, 8 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 613 (2011). 
A recent study by Hemphill and Sampat finds little evidence that these patents affect the date of generic entry.  See 
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Weak Patents Are a Weak Deterrent: Patent Portfolios, the Orange Book Listing 
(2011), at http://conference.nber.org/confer/2012/IPKE/sampat.pdf.  
105 See, e.g.,  Michael  A.  Carrier,  A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product 
Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009 (2010); Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 281 (2011); Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2013); 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (FTC), GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 
(2002); Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management after KSR v. Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
275 (2008); Daniel I. Gordin, Staving Off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Strategies to Protect Blockbuster 
Franchises, FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823 (2008); Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 102, at 948; C. Scott Hemphill & Baven 
N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012); 
David  E.  Korn,  A New History of 180-Day Exclusivity,  64  FOOD & DRUG L.J.  335  (2009);  David  W.  Opderbeck, 
Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303 (2010); Arti K. 
Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives – a New Battle in the Drug-Patent Wars, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 491 (2012). 
106 See  Henry  Grabowski  &  Margaret  Kyle,  Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals,  27 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 497 fg. 4 (2007); Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 105, at 328.  
107 See Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 106, at 497 fg. 4; Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 105, at 328.     18 
generics.108  That figure was up to 49% by the year 2000, and reached 80% in 2011.109 
 
III.  CREATING NEW MEDICAL TREATMENTS BY DEVELOPING NEW USES FOR EXISTING 
DRUGS 
Most of the academic and policy literature regarding pharmaceutical innovation focuses 
on de novo drug development.110  Indeed, scholars have often assumed that the discovery and 
development of novel drug compounds (i.e., NMEs) is the only important form of pharmaceutical 
innovation.111  This perception is wrong.  The initial FDA-approval of a new drug is only the first 
milestone in its development.  New drugs invariably have other potential therapeutic uses (i.e., 
indications), and the subsequent development of these new indications often provides the public 
with immense social value.112  The testing necessary to establish the safety and efficacy of new 
indications  is  very  expensive.    Government  funding  for  these  clinical  trials  is  available,  but 
extremely  limited  and  becoming  even  scarcer.    Consequently,  the  public  primarily  relies  on 
industry for the development of new indications.   
 
A.  FDA-Approved Drugs and their Potential New Uses 
The drug-development process does not end when the FDA approves a new drug for 
marketing. The FDA’s initial approval of a drug generally covers only one specific therapeutic 
                                                              
108 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO), HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS 
AFFECTED PRICES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 27 (1998).   
109 See CBO, supra note 108, at 27; PhRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE  (2012).  
110 See generally Dana Goldman & Darius Lakdawalla, Intellectual Property, Information Technology, Biomedical Research, and 
Marketing of Patented Products, in 2 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 825 (__ eds. 2012) (surveying the economic 
literature); add survey for legal literature.  
111 See Ernst R. Berndt, et al., The Impact of Incremental Innovation in Biopharmaceuticals: Drug Utilisation in Original and 
Supplemental Indication, 24 Suppl. 2 PHARMACOECONOMICS 69, 70 (2005) (noting that “Many analysts implicitly or 
explicitly exclude such supplemental or secondary approvals when measuring research output, presumably on the 
grounds that they are perceived as constituting trivial forms of innovation”). For example, Michelle Boldrin and 
David  Levine  cite  the  “54  percent  of  FDA-approved  drug  applications  involved  drugs  that  contained  active 
ingredients  already  in  the  market”  as  “evidence  of  redundant  research  on  pharmaceuticals,”  reflecting  the 
assumption that new indications for the same drug are not valuable.  See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, 
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 231 (2007).  
112 See R.N. Spivey, et al., New Indications for Already-Approved Drugs: Time Trends for the New Drug Application Review Phase, 
41 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 368, 368-69 (1987) (citing various examples of new indications for 
FDA-approved  drugs  resulting  in  large  public  health  benefits).  Several  studies  have  found  that  the  efforts  by 
pharmaceutical companies to develop new indications for their drugs typically generate large social returns. See 
Berndt et al., supra note 111, at 69; Joshua Cohen et al., Role of Follow-On Drugs and Indications on the WHO Essential 
Drug List, 31 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 585 (2006); Joseph A. DiMasi, Innovating by Developing New 
Uses of Already-Approved Drugs: Trends in the Marketing Approval of Supplemental Indications, 35 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 
808, 809 (2013); Henry Grabowski, et al., Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
373,  377-78  (2012)  (noting  that  many  researchers  “have  documented  the  significant  benefits  to  patients  from 
supplemental indications”).   19 
use.113  New drugs inevitably have other potential indications for which they might be safe and 
effective beyond the one initially listed on their label.114  Although some of these new indications 
are closely related to the original FDA-approved use,115 others involve the treatment of unrelated 
diseases.  
Most  FDA-approved  drugs  will  have  potential  new  indications  for  the  treatment  of 
entirely different diseases from their established uses.116  Although pharmaceutical companies 
specifically engineer and test new drugs to treat a particular condition, their biological effects are 
inevitably complex and multidimensional.117  The vast majority of drug compounds operate by 
targeting biological pathways that may affect the progress or symptoms of a range of diseases,118 
and almost all drugs have “off-target” activity on other biological pathways that may affect a 
different set of diseases.119  Consequently, it is common that a drug designed to treat one disease 
                                                              
113 Cf. Gordon D. Schiff, et al., Principles of Conservative Prescribing, 171 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1433, 1436 
(2011)  (“Even  indications  for  drugs  approved  by  the  US  Food  and  Drug  Administration  must  be  viewed  with 
caution: while the drug was shown to be effective for the specific indication studied, those patients or situations might 
not match your patient. Prescribers need to better understand the precise niche for each drug.”).   
114 See Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 393 (2009) (explaining that 
“[s]ponsors  may  focus  their  initial  clinical  development  on  narrowly  defined  subgroups  within  a  given  disease 
population that is expected to accrue the greatest benefit from the drug,” but “[o]nce the drug is approved for the 
narrow indication, its real-world use is typically much broader than the clinical trial population”); Mark Ratner & 
Trisha Gura, Off-Label or Off-Limits?, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY  867, 870 (2008) (“‘You develop every drug 
knowing that medicine will advance and physicians may then use it for many other things.’”) (quoting Sara Radcliffe, 
vice president of Science & Regulatory Affairs for the Biotechnology Industry Organization). 
115 See  TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN,  PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT: MAKING THE MOST OF 
EACH  AND  EVERY  BRAND  123-30  (2012);  ALISON  SAHOO,  INDICATION  EXPANSION:  OPPORTUNITIES  FOR 
SUCCESSFUL LIFECYCLE MANAGEMENT 48-65 (2007).  Closely related indications typically involve treatments for 
the same disease at a different stage, in a different subset of patients, or at a different dosage. They may also involve 
treatments for close variants of the disease.  
116 SAHOO, supra note 115, at 66-85; 
117 See  Fabrice Moriaud et al.,  Identify Drug Repurposing Candidates by Mining the Protein Data Bank,  12  BRIEFINGS IN 
BIOINFORMATICS 336 (2011) (“[A ]single drug often interacts with multiple targets.”); Michael J. Keiser et al., 
Predicting New Molecular Targets for Known Drugs, 462 NATURE 175 (2009) (reporting that “several lines of evidence 
suggest that drugs may have many physiological targets.”). 
118 See  Peter  Csermely,  et  al.,  Structure  and  Dynamics  of  Molecular  Networks:  A  Novel  Paradigm  of  Drug  Discovery  :  A 
Comprehensive Review, 138 PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 333, 337-43 (2013); Joseph Loscalzo & Albert-Laszlo 
Barabasi, Systems Biology and the Future of Medicine, 3 WIRES SYSTEMS BIOLOGY MEDICINE 619, 620 (2011) (noting 
that  many  diseases  are  treated  through  the  “same  intermediate  pathophenotypes  (e.g.,  anti-inflammatory  or 
antithrombotic therapies for acute myocardial infarction).”); Silpa Suthram, et al., Network-Based Elucidation of Human 
Disease Similarities Reveals Common Functional Modules Enriched for Pluripotent Drug Targets,  6  PLOS COMPUTATIONAL 
BIOLOGY e1000662, 6 (2010) (finding that the average drug target is associated with treating 42 diseases).   
119 See Asher Mullard, Drug Repurposing Programmes Get Lift Off, 11 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 1, 2 (2012) (“It is 
essentially impossible to develop a drug with such extreme specificity that it will not have some kind of off-target 
activity.”);  Camille  G.  Wermuth,  Selective Optimization of Side Activities: the SOSA Approach,  11  DRUG  DISCOVERY 
TODAY  160,  160-61  (2006)  (noting  that  “almost  all  drugs  used  in  human  therapy  show  one  or  several 
pharmacological side effects,” which indicates that “if [drugs] are able to exert a strong interaction with the main 
target they can, in addition, interact with other biological targets,” and that “[m]ost of these targets are unrelated to 
the primary therapeutic activity of the compound.”).    20 
will have potential new indications for treating one or more entirely different conditions.120  
There are many examples of drugs that were originally developed for one indication and 
later “repurposed” (or “repositioned”) as treatments for one or more entirely different diseases. 
The  drug  Tarceva  (erlotinib)  is  illustrative  of  how  the  drug-development  process  continues 
following the initial regulatory approval. It was originally developed to treat non-small-cell lung 
cancer121 but subsequently approved for pancreatic cancer,122 and is currently being tested for 
breast and ovarian cancers.123 There is also growing interest in the potential to use Tarceva as 
treatment for psoriasis, type-1 diabetes, Hepatitis C, and a several other non-cancer diseases.124  
Similarly, the antiepileptic lamotrigine later received FDA approval as a maintenance therapy for 
Bipolar  I  Disorder, 125 and  has  been  investigated  as  a  treatment  for  a  variety  of  other 
neuropsychological  conditions.126 The  drug  interferon-alpha  was  originally  approved  to  treat 
hairy  cell  leukemia,  but  its  label  now  includes  indications  for  Non-Hodgkin’s  Lymphoma, 
metastatic melanoma, hepatitis C, and several other diseases.127 As these examples suggest the 
continuing expansion and refinement of therapeutic uses for FDA-approved drugs is of critical 
importance to the practice of medicine.128  
 
B.  The Need for Clinical Trials to Determine the Safety and Efficacy of New 
Uses 
                                                              
120 See Joseph A. DiMasi, supra note 112, at 808; Prashant Nair, Drug Repurposing Gets a Boost as Academic Researchers Join 
the Search for Novel Uses of Existing Drugs,  110  PNAS  2430,  2431  (2013)  (“While  the  involvement  of  government 
institutions in the effort to find new uses for known drug compounds has generated a drumbeat of publicity for the 
initiatives, the idea of repurposing is old hat in the drug industry.”). A 2009 study found that the average drug has 18 
separate indications for which physicians sometimes prescribe it. See Surrey M. Walton, et al., Developing Evidence-
Based Research Priorities for Off-Label Drug Use, Effective Health Care Research Report No. 12, at 5 (2009), available at 
effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/reports/final.cfm. 
121 See CDER, NDA 21-743, Nov. 18, 2004, available at www.fda.gov.  
122 See CDER, NDA 21-743/S-003, Nov. 2, 2005, available at www.fda.gov. 
123  See  Umang  Swami,  et  al.,  Eribulin—A  Review  of  Preclinical  and  Clinical  Studies,  81  CRITICAL  REV. 
ONCOLOGY/HEMATOLOGY 163 (2012) 
124 See Marvin B. Brooks, New Uses for Old Drugs?, Erlotinib and Gefitinib, Small-Molecule EGFR Inhibitors, 12 BRITISH J. 
DIABETES  &  VASCULAR  DISEASE  195  (2012);  Tobias  R.  Overbeck  &  Frank  Griesinger,  Two  Cases  of  Psoriasis 
Responding  to  Erlotinib:  Time  to  Revisiting  Inhibition  of  Epidermal  Growth  Factor  Receptor  in  Psoriasis  Therapy?,  225 
DERMATOLOGY 179 (2012).  
125 See FDA, Lamictal Labeling Changes Overview 2 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov.  
126 See Meir Bialer, Why are Antiepileptic Drugs Used for Nonepileptic Conditions?, 53(Suppl. 7) EPILEPSIA 26, 28-29 (2012); 
Leslie Citrome, Adjunctive Lithium and Anticonvulsants for the Treatment of Schizophrenia: What is the Evidence?, 9 EXPERT 
REV. OF NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 55 (2009). 
127  See  Product  Information,  Intron  A,  Interferon  alfa-2b,  Recombinant,  at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2011/103132s5161lbl.pdf.  
128 See  Ratner  &  Gura,  supra  note  114,  at  869;  Bernard  Ravina,  et  al.,  Funding Evidence: The National Institute of 
Neurological Disorders and Stroke Clinical Trials Program, 1 NEURORX 317, 321-22 (2004).    21 
Although not legally required,129 clinical trials are generally necessary to demonstrate the 
safety and therapeutic efficacy of an existing drug for a new indication.  Without such clinical 
data for a new indication, physicians generally are much less likely to prescribe the drug for that 
new use, particularly if it involves an entirely different disease.130  Although the FDA does not 
prohibit off-label prescribing for these types of new indications, it does prohibit pharmaceutical 
companies from marketing their drugs for any off-label uses.131  If there is no pharmaceutical 
company to promote a new indication, and no published clinical studies reporting findings on its 
safety and efficacy, many physicians might never learn about it.132  Assuming physicians are 
aware of the new indication, the principles of evidence-based medicine – which caution against 
prescribing  treatments  without  sound  evidence  to  support  that  use133 –  have  become  an 
increasingly important part of physician culture over the past two decades.134  Moreover, almost 
all insurers now limit their coverage of prescription drugs to indications that are either approved 
by the FDA or listed in one of the pharmaceutical compendium.135  Insurers possess a number of 
highly effective tools to enforce their indication-based restrictions on prescribing.136  
                                                              
129 The FDA regulates the distribution and promotion of drugs, but not the practice of medicine. Once it approves a 
new drug for a particular indication, physicians are free to prescribe it for other indications not listed on the label. See 
William B. Schultz, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Food and Drug Administration, Promotion of Unapproved Drugs 
and Medical Devices, Statement before the Senate Committee of Labor and Human Resources, Feb. 22, 1996, available 
at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm115098.htm.  
130 See GUNTER UMBACH, SUCCESSFULLY MARKETING CLINICAL TRIAL RESULTS: WINNING IN THE HEALTHCARE 
BUSINESS  (2006)  (describing  the  importance  of  clinical-trial  results  –  and  their  presentation  –  in  promotional 
activities). The threat of tort liability can also discourage physicians from prescribing drugs for indications that have 
not been adequately tested in clinical trials. See P.G. Casali, Executive Committee of ESMO: the Off-Label Use of Drugs in 
Oncology, 18 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1923, 1923-24 (2007); Christopher M. Wittich, et al., Ten Common Questions (and 
Their Answers) About Off-label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINICAL PRACTICE 982, 986-87 (2012). 
131 See 21  C.F.R.  §202.1(e)(4)(i)(a);  C.  Lee  Ventola,  Off-Label Drug Information, Regulation, Distribution, Evaluation, and 
Related Controversies, 34 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 428 (2009) (reviewing the history of FDA regulations on off-
label promotion and some of the current changes that have been made to those rules in response to repeated legal 
challenges under the first amendment).  
132 See Grabowski, et al., supra note 112, at 375-77 (reviewing the empirical literature on the effects of industry drug 
promotion). Even when there is strong scientific evidence to support the particular use of a drug, physician uptake 
can be slow and limited without planned promotional efforts or other policies to incentivize proper prescribing 
practices.  See  Roin,  supra  note  22,  at  563-64;  cf.  Randall  S.  Stafford  et  al.,  Long-Term and Short-Term Changes in 
Antihypertensive  Prescribing  by  Office-Based  Physicians  in  the  United  States,  48  HYPERTENSION  213,  216  (2006)  (“The 
recorded trends in the prescribing of thiazide diuretics after the release of ALLHAT results suggest that the impact 
of evidence alone can be short-lived unless augmented by efforts that encourage widespread adoption of evidence-
based medicine.”).  
133 See Gordon Guyatt, et al., Evidence Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420 
(1992).  
134 See Bradley F. Marple, Evidence-Based Medicine: Adjusting to a Culture Shift in Health Care, ENT TODAY, Oct. 2008. 
135 See Cohen, et al., supra note 114, at 393-97;  
136 See infra notes and text accompanying notes _-_; Casali, supra note 130, at 1924 (“At the very least, physicians may 
be facing more red tape in order to prescribe off-label drugs. … More simply, third party payers … might just refuse 
to reimburse some off-label drugs, at their discretion.”). In certain fields, such as psychiatry, insurers are often 
prohibited from using some of these tools for discouraging off-label prescribing. See Stuart Wright, Memorandum   22 
Some  new  indications  work  their  way  into  medical  practice  without  any  supporting 
evidence  from  clinical  trials, 137 but  this  type  of  prescribing  is  generally  thought  to  be 
problematic.138   Off-label  prescribing  for  untested  indications  is  most  worrisome  when  the 
indication  is  for  an  entirely  different  disease,  since  there  may  be  little  or  no  sound  clinical 
evidence supporting that use of the drug.139  Some of these untested indications are probably 
beneficial  to  patients,  but  others  are  probably  ineffective  and  even  harmful. 140  Many 
commentators suspect that this type of off-label prescribing causes more harm than good,141 and 
there are constant calls for investments in clinical trials to test these indications.142  
 
C. The High Cost of Clinical Trials 
Establishing the safety and efficacy of new indications for FDA-approved drugs in clinical 
trials requires a substantial investment of both time and resources, especially when seeking FDA-
approval  for  the  new  indication.143   At  the  very  least,  these  development  programs  involve 
running phase III studies on the new indication.144  Completing these clinical trials usually takes 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Report: Ensuring that Medicare Part D Reimbursement is Limited to Drugs Provided for Medically Accepted Indications, OEI-07-08-
00152, Department of Health & Humans Services, at 2-3 & 5 (2011).  
137 In a 2006 study looking at prescriptions for the 500 most commonly prescribed drugs, the authors found that 
approximately 21 percent of prescriptions were for off-label indications, and that three-fourths of these off-label 
prescriptions (i.e., 15 percent of total prescriptions) were not “scientifically supported.” See David C. Radley, et al., 
Off-label Prescribing Among Office-based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006).  
138 See  JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS,  AND COSTS  OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS  _ 
(2004); Casali, supra note 135; David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1025 (2006); Philip M. Rosoff & Doraine Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal Regulation of 
Physicians’ Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 653 (2011); Schiff et al., supra note 113; Walton et al., 
supra note 120, at 8 (“It is not at all clear, however, that evidence of efficacy in a clinically proximate indication is 
sufficient to support common use for the other indication.”).  
139 See Schiff et al., supra note 113, at 1436.  
140 See Rosoff & Coleman, supra note 138, at 653.  
141 See, e.g.,  Adriane  Fugh-Berman & Douglas Melnick, Off-Label Promotion, On-Target Sales,  5  PLOS MED  (2008) 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050210. 
142 See Casali, supra note 135; CENTER FOR MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRESS, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR DESIGNING CLINICAL TRIALS FOR ‘NEW INDICATIONS’ OF APPROVED ONCOLOGY DRUGS FOR TREATMENT 
OF LATE STAGE DISEASE 6-7 (2010); C. Daniel Mullins, Recommendations for Clinical Trials of Off-Label Drugs Used to 
Treat Advanced-Stage Cancer, 30 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 661 (2012); Walton et al., supra note 120.  A more common 
form of off-label prescribing for untested indications involves uses that are closely related to drugs’ FDA-approved 
indication. Id. at 8. These treatment choices are less controversial, although experts are uncertain about whether (or 
how often) the inference of efficacy in clinically proximate indications is justified. Id.; see also Schiff et al., supra note 
113, at 1436. 
143 See Tudor I. Oprea et al., Drug Repurposing from an Academic Perspective, 8 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY THERAPEUTIC 
STRATEGY 61, 61 (2011).  
144 See Tudor I. Oprea & J. Mestres, Drug Repurposing: Far Beyond New Targets for Old Drugs, 14 AAPS J. 759, 762 (2012) 
(explaining that firms can often skip phase I and IIa clinical trials when repurposing an FDA-approved drug for a 
new indication). In most cases, new indications that are closely related to the drug’s established uses are the least 
expensive  to  develop  because  physicians  and  regulators  also  weigh  the  earlier  clinical  trials  for  the  original   23 
several years or longer, and depending on their size, can cost tens or even hundreds of millions of 
dollars.145 In some cases, firms may also be required to complete phase I and II trials as well.146 
Although this process is much less expensive and risky than developing a new drug,147 total costs 
can still run in the hundreds of millions of dollars.148  
In each instance, the cost of clinical trials for new indications depends in part on whether 
the sponsor is planning to seek FDA approval for that new use. FDA regulations for clinical trials 
significantly increase the administrative costs of those studies with requirements for additional 
testing, recordkeeping and reporting.149 Putting together an application for FDA approval of a 
new  indication  is  also  very  costly.150 The  filing  fee  alone  for  these  applications  is  over  $1 
million.151 Sponsors can avoid these additional costs and still run a successful trial that might be 
published in a well-respected, peer-review journal. However, these clinical trials are generally 
thought  to  be  much  less  reliable  than  the  ones  used  to  support  FDA  approval  for  a  new 
indication.152 The  FDA  forces  sponsors  to  conduct  more  rigorous  trials,153 and  it  (mostly) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
indication. See John King, Can a Drug Live Forever?, 9 R&D DIRECTIONS _ (2003) (“Modifying indications or doing 
other novel clinical uses with the product take the longest’” to develop, especially “[a]s one moves farther away from 
[the original indication], where we have most of our information”). 
145 See  ELLERY  &  HANSEN,  supra  note  115,  at  124;  SAHOO,  supra  note  115,  at  28  (estimating  a  total  cost  of 
approximately $300 million for establishing a new disease indication for an already-approved drug); cf. NCI Will No 
Longer Accept R01 and P01 Applications for Phase III Clinical Trials of Medical Interventions and Cancer Imaging Modalities, THE 
ASCO  POST,  Jun.  17,  2013,  at  http://www.ascopost.com/ViewNews.aspx?nid=5242  (“In  general,  medical 
intervention phase III clinical trials require more time than allowed by a single 5-year funding cycle associated with 
R01 and P01 awards.”).  
146 See Curtis R. Chong & David J. Sullivan, New Uses for Old Drugs, 448 NATURE 645, 646 (2007).  
147 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 31-43.  
148 See supra  note  145;  SAHOO,  supra  note  115,  at  59  (“Because  of  the  relatively  greater  resources  required  to 
demonstrate efficacy in an entirely new therapeutic area compared with expanded usage of the drug for its original 
indication or a closely-related variant of the originally approved indication (indication extension), care must be taken 
to select new therapeutic applications that will provide an acceptable return on investment.”).  
149 See IOM, CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 153, at 68-69 (“‘[O]ur estimate from working with those sites is 
that  about  35  percent  of  the  costs  that  accrue  for  a  clinical  trial  relate  to  regulatory  issues  and  regulatory 
compliance.’”); Jeanne Erdmann, Researchers Facing Increasing Costs for Clinical Research, With Few Solutions, 97 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 1492 (2005) (commenting on the “tremendous regulatory requirements” associated with conducting 
clinical trials that hopefully will be submitted to the FDA to support the approval of a new indication for an FDA-
approved drug).   
150  See  Mark  Hovde,  Management  of  Clinical  Development  Costs,  in  CLINICAL  TRIALS  OF  DRUGS  AND 
BIOPHARMACEUTICALS 90 (Chi-Jen Lee et al. eds.  2006).    
151 Department of Health and Human Services, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2014, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 46980, 46981 (proposed Aug. 2, 2013) (setting the FDA application fees for drug approvals at $2,169,100 for 
applications  requiring  clinical  data,  and  $1,084,550  for  supplemental  applications  requiring  clinical  data  or 
applications not requiring clinical data).   
152 See Harold C. Sox, Evaluating Off-Label Uses of Anticancer Drugs: Time for a Change, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 353, 
354 (2009)  .  
153 See  INSTITUTE  OF MEDICINE (IOM), IMPROVING  THE QUALITY  OF CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS: WORKSHOP 
SUMMARY 78-79 (2008) (hereinafter “CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS”).   24 
prevents  sponsors  from  distorting  their  study  results  with  biased  trial  designs  and  selective 
reporting, which is thought to be a serious problem in the peer-review literature.154 Consequently, 
most experts express a strong preference for sponsors to complete the FDA-approval process for 
new indications of drugs,155 although the costs make it impractical for indications with very small 
markets.156  
 
D. Inadequate Government Funding for Clinical Trials on New Uses 
The NIH certainly has the capacity to run clinical trials testing new indications.  However, 
it does not have nearly enough funding to pursue clinical trials for all the promising indications.  
Following a decade of budget cuts forcing the agency to scale back funding for clinical trials, the 
public is increasingly reliant on private industry to establish new indications for drugs. 
The NIH is very well situated to develop new indications for existing drugs, where there is 
no  need  to  create  a  novel  drug  compound  and  put  it  through  the  costly  and  scientifically 
challenging  process  of  preclinical  development.  When  researchers  identify  a  potential  new 
indication for a drug that is already on the market, the NIH can move directly into clinical trials. 
It has access to a wealth of highly qualified clinical researchers at NIH and university hospitals 
that can carry out this research without industry support157 – particularly if they do not need to 
comply with the FDA’s administrative requirements or put together an application for FDA 
approval of the new indication. As a result, many scholars have argued that the NIH should 
become much more active in funding clinical trials for new uses of drugs.158  
The NIH has a relatively limited budget for clinical research, but it has always used some 
of that funding for clinical trials on new indications.159 Given the high costs of those trials, the 
agency understandably is quite cautious in funding them, and strongly prefers pharmaceutical 
companies to pay for the clinical trials establishing new indications for existing drugs.160 However, 
                                                              
154 See  Gisela  Schott  et  al.,  The Financing of Drug Trials by Pharmaceutical Companies and Its Consequences,  107  DTSCH 
ARZTEBL INT'L 279 (2010); Lenard I. Lesser et al., Relationship Between Funding Source and Conclusion Among Nutrition-
Related Scientific Articles, 4 PLOS MED. e.5 (2007). 
155 See Ratner & Gura, supra note 114. 
156 See Ratner & Gura, supra note 114, at 869 (noting that in the field of oncology, “it simply costs too much to obtain 
full FDA approval in multiple cancers,” since “[e]ach would cost $700 million and would take 3–5 years”).  
157 See IOM, CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 153. 
158 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 105.  
159 See IOM, CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS, supra note 153, at 75 (noting that the National Cancer Institute (NCI) tends 
to fund clinical trials “to extend the indications of already approved drugs”); Ravina, et al., supra note 128, at 321-22 
(explaining that because “[t]he pharmaceutical industry, which proﬁts from developing new agents, cannot always 
be expected to be the sole sponsor of postmarketing studies for new indications,” the “NINDS is currently supporting 
trials in several diseases for new uses of an FDA-approved intervention,” although the examples given were all 
comparative-efficacy trials).  
160 See  Michael  Privitera,  Large  Clinical  Trials  in  Epilepsy:  Funding  by  the  NIH  versus  Pharmaceutical  Industry,  68 
REVIEWS/EPILEPSY RES. 19-94 (2006); John C. Reed, et al., The NIH’s Role in Accelerating Translational Sciences, 30   25 
the NIH recognizes that industry is often unwilling to test potential new indications that are 
worthwhile  investments  from  the  public’s  perspective,161 and  does  its  best  to  provide  the 
necessary funding.162  
Unfortunately, the government either does not or cannot offer adequate financial support 
for this research.163  Despite the evidence that publicly funded clinical trials generate large social 
returns on average,164 the government spends only about one tenth of what the pharmaceutical 
industry spends on drug trials. 165 This small pool of funding must cover a variety of clinical-
research areas that private industry often shuns, ranging from proof-of-concept trials for novel 
drug targets to comparative-efficacy studies.166 Since the NIH funding environment is largely 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
NATURE BIOTECHNOLGY 16, 18 (2012) (“Clearly, resources must be deployed cautiously when projects reach the 
clinic due to the high costs associated with clinical trials.”); Salim Yusuf, et al., Sensible Guidelines for the Conduct of Large 
Randomized Trials,  5  CLINICAL TRIALS  38,  38  (2008)  (noting  that  randomized  and  controlled  clinical  trials  are 
“extremely  expensive,”  and  their  high  costs  can  “prevent  the  conduct  of  important  trials  of  generic  questions, 
especially those that are not supported by industry”). The NIH makes it more difficult to receive grants for large or 
complex clinical trials (or any grant request exceeding $1.5 million) by imposing additional layers of administrative 
review on those applications. See Francis S. Collins, National Institute of Health Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request, Testimony 
before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations, March 28, 
2012.  
161 See supra text accompanying notes _-_ & infra text accompanying notes 243-259  (describing some of the market 
failures that lead pharmaceutical companies to underinvest in clinical trials for new indications on their patented 
drugs).  
162 See IOM, TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: 
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 21 & 48 (2010) (hereinafter “TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH”). 
163 See Alan L. Buchman, The State of Clinical Research in America, Symposium and Meeting Reports, The American 
Federation  for  Medical  Research  (2010);  WM.  KEVIN  KELLY  &  SUSAN  HALABI,  EDS.,  ONCOLOGY  CLINICAL 
TRIALS: SUCCESSFUL DESIGN, CONDUCT, AND ANALYSIS ix (2010) (“Current and future trainees are challenged by 
enormous clinical demands, a highly competitive funding climate and an administrative bureaucracy that can delay 
activation of a research study for months and sometimes years while the science moves on.”); Roxanne Nelson, 
Funding  Cuts  Threaten  Modernization  of  Cancer  Research,  MEDSCAPE  TODAY  NEWS,  Jun.  1,  2013,  at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/805163.   
164 See S. Claiborne Johnston, et al., Effect of a US National Institutes of Health Programme of Clinical Trials on Public Health 
and Costs, 367 LANCET 1319, 1324 (2006) (reviewing a series of eight clinical trials carried out by the US National 
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Strokes, and finding that they “generated major health benefits,” “with an 
overall net benefit of the programme of $15.2 billion at 10 years,” equating to a “yearly return on investment [of] 
46%”); Bhaven N. Sampat, The Impact of Publicly Funded Biomedical and Health Research: A Review, in MEASURING THE 
IMPACTS OF FEDERAL INVESTMENTS IN RESEARCH: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY 159-69 (NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES 2011) (reviewing the literature).  
165 Kristy Beal et al., Budget Negotiation for Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials, 99 ANASTHESIA & ANALGESIA 173, 173 
(2004); Kenneth A. Getz, Sizing Up the Clinical Research Market, CenterWatch 3 (2010) (reporting that in 2008, private 
industry spent $35.3 billion on clinical trials for investigational drug and device treatments compared to $3.0 billion 
spent by the U.S. federal government); Olivera Vragovic, Developing Budgets for Research Projects with a Focus on 
Phase  III  Clinical  Trials,  Boston  University  &  Boston  Medical  Center  (2010),  at 
http://www.bumc.bu.edu/crro/files/2010/01/Vragovic-6-17-09.pdf  (noting  that  “Big  Pharma”  spends 
approximately $26 billion on clinical trials annually, compared to approximately $2.9 billion spent by the U.S. 
government).  
166 Charlie Schmidt, Cooperative Groups Say NCI Trials Funding Inadequate; Some Turn to Industry, 99 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INST. 830 (2007) (“While industry-sponsored trials focus chiefly on new-drug development, NCI’s trials tackle a 
broader social agenda, fueled by cancer prevention, quality-of-life issues for patients, and the competing benefits of   26 
zero-sum, proposals to increase funding for certain types of clinical research inevitably meet with 
resistance  from  the  other  areas  of  clinical  research. 167 The  demand  for  NIH  funding  is 
continually increasing relative to the supply in all of these fields,168 since advances in medical 
science open up new avenues of research faster than they close old ones. Consequently, the NIH 
appears to fund only a small fraction of the socially valuable clinical trials in need of public 
support.169  
There have been countless calls for the government to increase the NIH’s funding for 
clinical research,170 but the trend runs sharply in the other direction.171 The NIH’s budget fell by 
20  percent  in  real  dollars  since  2003,172 resulting  in  drastic  cuts  in  the  number  of  research 
projects it funds.173 These budget cuts have been particularly detrimental to the public sector’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
different treatments or treatment combinations.”); see also IOM, TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH, supra note 
159, at 21 (2010) (explaining that while industry funds clinical trials “largely to gain … (FDA) approval to market a 
new drug or a previously approved drug for a new indication, … the federal government conducts large clinical trials 
to answer medical questions unrelated to gaining regulatory approval for a new drug or therapy”); Nelson, supra note 
163 (explaining that while industry funds clinical trials to “obtain FDA approval to market a new drug or extend the 
label of an existing agent,” firms ignore a variety of other crucial areas of clinical research that the public must fund, 
including trials to “compare effective and promising regimens with each other,” trials for non-drug therapies “such 
as surgery, radiation therapy, and … specialties such as pathology,” and trials for “cancer prevention, screening, 
survivorship, and optimizing quality of life, all of which do not generate a lot of revenue”); Janet Woodcock, Today’s 
Biomedical Innovation: ‘Lost in Translation’?, QB3 Entrepreneurs’ Discussion, University of California, San Francisco, 
Apr. 26, 2012, at 11.  
167 See  IOM,  TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH,  supra  note  159,  at  26-27  (explaining  “that  because  NIH’s 
funding is relatively flat, if research site payments are increased [in one area], an equivalent decrease in funding in 
other areas will be necessary,” and that “[g]iven this zero-sum calculation, it will be politically difficult to increase 
payments” to any one area).  
168 See William R. Brinkley, et al., Increased Funding for NIH: A Biomedical Science Perspective, 12 FASEB J. 1431 (1998); 
NIH  Director’s  Panel  on  Clinical  Research  Report:  Executive  Summary  (1997),  at 
http://www.oenb.at/de/img/executive_summary—
nih_directors_panel_on_clinical_research_report_12_97_tcm14-48582.pdf (noting that the percentage of NIH grant 
applications that receive funding has been declining since the 1970s).  
169 See, e.g.,  S.  Claiborne  Johnston  &  Stephen  L.  Hauser,  Basic and Clinical Research: What Is the Most Appropriate 
Weighting in a Public Investment Portfolio?, 60 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 9A, 10A (2006) (noting that “[b]ased on the large 
returns for positive [clinical] trials, even if only 10% are positive, we are doing too few trials,” and since “trials have 
other important impacts,” “we almost certainly do too few trials”).  
170 See supra notes _ & _.     
171 See Matt Jones, Slow, Steady Decline in NIH Funding Leads Researchers to Fear Future Cuts, GENOMEWEB, Jul. 18, 2013, 
at  http://www.genomeweb.com/genomeweb-feature-slow-steady-decline-nih-funding-leads-researchers-fear-future; 
Rosanne Spector, The Competition: on the Hunt for Research Dollars, STANFORD MEDICINE, Fall 2012, at 10. 
172  See  Meredith  Wadman,  The  NIH  Faces  Up  to  Hard  Times,  NATURE,  Sept.  26,  2012, 
doi:10.1038/nature.2012.11458; Hamilton Moses III & E. Ray Dorsey, Biomedical Research in an Age of Austerity, 308 
JAMA  234,  235  (2012);  Bottom Line: Medicine’s Funding Pool is Drying Up,  STANFORD MEDICINE,  Fall  2012,  at  6 
(“Meanwhile,  the  U.S.  economy  is  stagnant,  which  …  means  there’s  little  chance  that  funding  for  biomedical 
research will return to the rapid growth it enjoyed in decades past. When adjusted for inflation, NIH funding is back 
to where it was a decade ago.”).  
173 See Wadman, supra note 172. These cutbacks have had a devastating effect on the academic biomedical research 
community. Id. at 10 (“[A]cross the country people are closing labs, retiring early. This is a crisis.”); Jones, supra note 
171 (describing how the “slowly tightening fiscal belts” are causing “historically low success rates [in NIH grants]   27 
capacity to carry out large phase III drug trials,174 since clinical-trial costs have skyrocketed as the 
NIH’s funding for that research fell.175 As a result, the NIH has dramatically cut back on the 
number of phase III drug trials it funds,176 and many of the established grant programs now 
cover less than half of trial costs, leaving academic research centers to make up the difference.177 
Following a 2007 workshop hosted by the Society for Clinical Trials, participants reported that 
“[t]here is widespread concern in the academic trials community that only studies supported by 
industry, plus a few trials funded through public or charity funds, are now practical.”178 NIH 
funding for clinical research fell significantly in the five years following that conference, and the 
NIH is scheduled to lose another 8.2 percent of its budget over the next five years.179 Given the 
federal government’s large budget deficit and long-run fiscal troubles, most experts anticipate 
that  NIH  funding  levels  will  stay  flat  or  decline  for  at  least  another  decade,  and  probably 
longer.180  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
build to a crescendo with the enacting of the sequestration,” such that many “people [are] essentially shutting their 
labs down, or shutting down particular areas of research”). 
174 See Lelia Duley et al., Specific Barriers to the Conduct of Randomized Trials, 5 CLINICAL TRIALS 40, 41 (2008) (“These 
[funding] restrictions form major barriers to the conduct of large trials.”); Mike Mitka, Scientists Warn NIH Funding 
Squeeze Hampering Biomedical Research, 297 JAMA 1867, 1867 (2007) (noting that between 2003 and 2007, the NIH’s 
budget had fallen 16 percent in real dollars, but since clinical trials “take years to complete, [and] are often subject to 
higher costs as they occur in health care settings facing higher inflationary pressures,” the NIH’s “purchasing power 
in clinical trials is 35% less than 4 years ago’”).  
175 See Roger Collier, Rapidly Rising Clinical Trial Costs Worry Researchers, 180 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 277 (2009); 
Schmidt, supra note 166, at 831-33; Yusuf et al., supra note 160, at 38.  
176 See  Jennifer  Couzin,  Tight Budget Takes a Toll on U.S.–Funded Clinical Trials,  315  SCIENCE  1202  (2007);  Steve 
Frandzel,  Revamping the NCI Clinical Trials Cooperative Groups,  6  CLINICAL  ONCOLOGY  _  (2011)  (explaining  that 
“continued lower funding levels—a consequence of the economic and political climate … means fewer clinical 
trials,” mostly through a “drop in the number of Phase III trials”); IOM, A NATIONAL CANCER CLINICAL TRIALS 
SYSTEM  FOR  THE  21ST  CENTURY:  REINVIGORATING  THE  NCI  COOPERATIVE  GROUP  PROGRAM  165  (2010) 
(hereinafter “NCI COOPERATIVE GROUP PROGRAM”) (recommending that in response to the funding shortages 
from public sources, “the total number of trials undertaken by the Cooperative Groups should be reduced to a 
quantity that can be adequately supported”); Schmidt, supra note 166, at 832 (“Buckling under financial pressure, the 
cooperative groups have begun to eliminate some trials while making other painful cuts. Studies directed toward rare 
cancers— including sarcoma, some childhood tumors, and head-and-neck cancers—are particularly vulnerable.”); 
Spector, supra note 173, at 9 (describing the increasing difficulty of receiving public grants to fund clinical research). 
The NIH is not alone in reducing its funding for large phase III drug trials. The analogous funding bodies in most 
other developed countries have done the same thing. See Duley et al., supra note 174, at 41. 
177 Schmidt, supra note , at 830; see also Jeanne Erdmann, Researchers Facing Increasing Costs for Clinical Research, With Few 
Solutions,  97  J.  NAT’L  CANCER  INST.  1492,  1492  (2005);  IOM,  RARE  DISEASES  AND  ORPHAN  PRODUCTS: 
ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 247-48 (2010) (hereinafter “RARE DISEASES”) (noting that most of 
the  grants  available  for  clinical  trials  on  rare  diseases  are  insufficient  for  running  trials  that  comply  with  FDA 
regulations, including the grants that come from the FDA);  
178 Duley et al., supra note 174, at 41; see also J. Hearn & R. Sullivan, The Impact of the ‘Clinical Trials’ Directive on the Cost 
and Conduct of Non-Commercial Cancer Trials in the UK, 43 EUROPEAN J. CANCER 8, 12-13 (2007). 
179 See OMB REPORT PURSUANT TO THE SEQUESTRATION TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2012 (P. L. 112–155), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/stareport.pdf.  
180 Steve Usdin, Lost in Translation, BIOCENTURY, Feb. 14, 2011 (“noting “that the chances of obtaining new money 
for science for the foreseeable future are slim to none,” and researchers are “fighting an uphill battle just to achieve   28 
The biomedical research community is trying to generate public support for increased 
funding,181 but it may be an uphill battle. There appears to be a fundamental problem in the 
political economy of biomedical research funding, which may prevent the government from ever 
adequately  supporting  that  research.  Indeed,  the  recent  NIH  budget  cuts  have  merely 
accelerated a trend dating back to the mid-1960s of declining government support for R&D (as a 
percentage  of  GDP)  and  the  concomitant  shift  to  industry  funding.182 Although  there  are 
compelling public policy reasons to support the NIH and its clinical research programs,183 the 
political incentives to fund this research are relatively weak.184 The benefits from government-
funded R&D take many years to arrive, which is well beyond the relevant political time-horizon 
for most elected officials.185 Inadequate government support for R&D can cause significant harm, 
but those harms are largely invisible to voters, since they cannot observe innovations that do not 
exist because of inadequate government funding. In a world where legislators are under pressure 
to reduce the budget deficit without increasing taxes or cutting entitlement programs, cuts to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
flat funding”); see also Spector, supra note 173, at 10-11 (“The widespread assumption is that U.S. federal spending for 
medical research will stay flat, or maybe continue to drop. … ‘Institutions across the nation are coming to grips with 
the new normal.’”).  
181 See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, Researchers and Advocates Gather in Washington, D.C., to Protest Cuts to Medical Research, Science 
Insider,  Apr.  8,  2013,  at  http://news.sciencemag.org/health/2013/04/researchers-and-advocates-gather-
washington-d.c.-protest-cuts-biomedical-research  (“Thousands  of  scientists  and  patient  advocates  poured  into  a 
square in downtown Washington, D.C., today to hold what organizers billed as the largest-ever rally to call for more 
funding for biomedical research.”).   
182 The past ten years greatly accelerated this trend in the field of clinical research, but did not change its trajectory. 
See  Linda  Bressler,  Industry  Collaboration  in  Cancer  Clinical  Trials,  in  ONCOLOGY  CLINICAL  TRIALS:  SUCCESSFUL 
DESIGN, CONDUCT, AND ANALYSIS 315 (WM. Kevin Kelly & Susan Halabi, eds., 2010) (“In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the majority of research funding to universities came from the government, with private industry providing less than 
5%  of  research  funding.  The  sources  of  funding  have  shifted  considerably,  and  by  the  early  2000s,  for-profit 
companies were providing financial support for 70% of clinical drug trials conducted at academic medical centers.”). 
The same basic pattern holds true for government R&D spending more generally.  See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE (CBO), FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT vii-viii, 3-7 (2007) (noting that “[s]ince 
[1964], with the exception of a period in the 1980s—when an expansion of national defense activities prompted 
more funding for research and development—federal R&D spending has generally declined as a share of GDP”).  
183 See supra note 164.  
184 See LINDA R. COHEN & ROGER G. NOLL, THE TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 55-63 (1991) 
185 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEORGE WASHINGTON 
L. REV. 1, 13 (2008). This distortion affecting the incentives for elected officials to finance R&D is well known in the 
political economy literature. As Linda Cohen and Roger Noll explain:  
From the perspective of the elected official, the implication of retrospective evaluation is that, all else being 
equal … , a project with earlier realization of politically relevant benefits will be preferred to longer-term 
projects.  That  is,  to  the  extent  that  citizens  heavily  discount  future  plans  of  programs  and  engage  in 
retrospective evaluations, they create an incentive for political officials to be too impatient in evaluating 
proposed programs. Because R&D projects are usually long term, they will normally face an uphill struggle in 
the battle for budgets with operating programs that provide current benefits.  
COHEN & NOLL, supra note 184, at 61.    29 
“discretionary”  R&D  spending  may  be  inevitable. 186  This  dynamic  helps  explain  why 
Congressional  leaders  consistently  express  strong,  bipartisan  support  for  biomedical  research 
funding at the same time as they slash the NIH’s budget.187  
This political economy problem may be particularly severe in the government’s support 
for the discovery and development of new treatments for unmet medical needs. As the U.S. 
government takes on a greater share of the nation’s health care costs, there is growing political 
resistance to public support for this type of biomedical research,188 since it gives rise to new 
treatments that tend to be expensive.189 In the 2010 Affordable Care Act, Congress authorized 
(and encouraged) the NIH to redirect a significant portion of its budget to research cost-savings 
strategies in health care, comparative efficacy trials, and cost-effectiveness studies.190 And as a 
recent article in JAMA explains, this “conflict over research goals … is certain to increase as the 
nation struggles with aging, cost, deficits, and taxation.”191  
There is a growing consensus within the academic clinical research community that the 
public must find alternative funding sources for public sector research, including clinical trials for 
new indications.192 At present, private industry is one of the few viable options,193 and university 
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prioritization of research needs can be seen in the recent increased interest in comparative effectiveness research 
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192 See Joseph Loscalzo, The NIH Budget and the Future of Biomedical Research, 354 N ENGL. J. MED. 1665, 1666 (2006) 
(arguing  that  even  if  the  government  begins  funding  clinical  research  adequately,  given  Congress’s  inability  to 
maintain a steady level of funding, “it would be preferable for academic medical centers to cease relying so heavily 
on the NIH for research funding”); Spector, supra note 173, at 13 (“Ultimately, however, unless the federal grants 
boom again — and no one interviewed for this article was counting on that, or even expecting it — medical research 
must find other sources of support or risk atrophy.”).  
193 Moses & Dorsey, supra note 172, at 2342 (explaining that because of “the reduction in federal funding, which is 
now approaching a decade in duration, … [n]ew private sources of research support are needed.”); see also Eastman, 
supra  note  194,  at  (“NCI  cooperative  groups  are  going  to  be  turning  more  and  more  to  industry  for  research 
funding.”);  Jennifer  L.  Kellen,  3Clinical  Trials  Budgeting  Methods  &  Best  Practices,  University  of  California  San   30 
researchers are already turning to the pharmaceutical industry.194 Of course, industry acts with a 
profit motive, so relying on it for clinical trials can come at the expense of carrying out socially 
valuable research that would not be profitable for pharmaceutical companies.195 To maximize 
the portion of the NIH budget that can go to socially valuable but unprofitable research, NIH 
officials and academic research centers increasingly emphasize the need to hand-off projects to 
industry at the earliest possible stage to conserve scarce NIH resources for the research that 
industry will not fund.196   
 
 
IV.  THE FAILURE  TO INCENTIVIZE  THE DEVELOPMENT  OF NEW USES  FOR EXISTING 
DRUGS 
Pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to invest in developing a new indication without 
some  form  of  monopoly  protection.197 As  discussed  in  Section  III,  it  can  cost  tens  or  even 
hundreds of millions of dollars to generate the knowledge that a particular drug is a safe and 
effective  treatment  for  a  specific  condition  in  a  certain  subset  of  patients.198 To  recover  that 
investment, pharmaceutical companies must sell the drug for its new indication at a price far 
above their marginal production costs.199 This pricing strategy is impractical when other firms 
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cooperative groups, represents the kind of independent research most dear to our society,’” and the studies “funded 
by  the  pharmaceutical  industry  …  may  not  address  the  types  of  questions  that  the  cooperative  groups  have 
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196 See  Barbara  J.  Culliton,  Interview: Extracting Knowledge From Science: A Conversation With Elias Zerhouni,  _  HEALTH 
AFFAIRS W94, W97 (2006) (“Public-private partnerships permit the leveraging of the NIH’s clinical and scientific 
resources with a wide variety of private entities, … [which] we think will hasten the translation of basic discovery to 
medicine for the public.”); Reed et al., supra note 160, at 18-19 (“Clearly, resources must be deployed cautiously 
when projects reach the clinic due to the high costs associated with clinical trials. … In general, all efforts should be 
made to partner clinical-stage projects with the biopharmaceutical industry at the earliest opportunity….”).  
197 See SAHOO, supra note 115, at 41-42.  
198 See supra text accompanying notes 143-148. 
199 See F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1301-02 & 1317-18 (A.J. 
Culyer & J.P Newhouse, eds. 2000).     31 
can sell the exact same drug to patients for the identical indication.200 Indeed, clinical trials are 
the textbook example of an R&D investment firms do not make without monopoly protection, 
given  their  high  costs  and  vulnerability  to  free  riding.201 Since  the  public  largely  relies  on 
pharmaceutical companies to fund the clinical development of new indications,202 it must provide 
firms with some form of protection to motivate these investments.  
The government encourages firms to develop new drugs by offering them the power to 
exclude  generic  manufacturers  from  making  or  selling  the  patented  drug.    This  form  of 
monopoly protection is clearly inappropriate for encouraging the development of new indications 
since it would cover all the drug’s uses, including the ones already available to the public.  To 
provide  firms  with  an  appropriate  incentive  for  developing  new  indications,  the  government 
would need to offer monopoly protection that attaches to the act of taking or administering the 
drug for the new indication.   
Although  the  patent  system  currently  provides  firms  with  monopoly  rights  over  new 
indications,  those  legal  rights  are  difficult  or  impossible  to  enforce  without  knowing  which 
patients are using the drug for the patented indication as opposed to some other use.  Physicians 
and often insurers have this information, but pharmaceutical companies rarely have access to this 
type of data.  As a result, pharmaceutical companies only invest in developing new indications 
during the narrow window of time before generics enter the market.  This gap in the patent 
protection  for  drugs  is  the  single  most  widely  recognized  distortion  in  the  incentives  for 
pharmaceutical innovation203  – “the problem of new uses.”204  
 
A.  Ineligible for the Standard Monopoly Protection Offered to New Drugs 
When  Congress  established  the  existing  legal  infrastructure  of  drug  patents  and 
regulatory exclusivity periods, it designed the system to promote the discovery and development 
of new drugs, not new indications.205 The pharmaceutical industry’s entire business model hinges 
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upon acquiring temporary monopoly rights that block generic manufacturers from making and 
selling their drug.206 However, the government generally does not provide this form of monopoly 
protection for new indications of a drug, and for good reason. Monopoly rights that block generic 
entry give pharmaceutical companies control over the entire market for a drug.  This would 
allow firms to charge consumers supra-competitive prices for the drug’s old indications as well as 
the new.  
In the pharmaceutical industry, the standard form of monopoly protection for promoting 
drug development is the power to exclude generic manufacturers from making or selling that 
drug compound. As discussed in Section II, drug development is extraordinarily expensive and 
involves a high risk of failure.207 Since firms quickly lose their market position to generics soon 
after they enter,208 pharmaceutical companies depend on temporary monopoly rights to delay 
generic entry long enough for them to earn a profit from their R&D investments.  
The  government  provides  this  standard  monopoly  protection  through  three  different 
types of exclusionary rights: product patents, process patents, and regulatory exclusivity periods. 
Although each one offers a different set of legal rights, pharmaceutical companies use them for 
the same purpose.  The objective is always to achieve to delay the introduction of generic drugs 
onto the market.  One or more of these rights will almost always be available to pharmaceutical 
companies for a new drug.  Between their product or process patents and regulatory exclusivity 
periods, pharmaceutical companies usually enjoy between 10 and 15 years of standard monopoly 
protection over their new drugs before generics enter and usurp the market.209   
The government does not provide this standard form of monopoly protection for new 
indications  developed  after  a  drug’s  initial  approval.210   Pharmaceutical  companies  can  only 
patent a drug’s active ingredient and formulation once, and they invariably file these patents 
while  developing  the  drug  for  its  first  indication. 211   The  government  generally  allows 
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pharmaceutical  companies  to  obtain  patents  on  newly  discovered  indications  for  drugs.212  
However, as long as a drug has at least one FDA-approved indication that is off-patent, generic 
manufacturers  can  easily  design  around  (i.e.,  ignore)  these  new-use  patents  by  excluding  the 
patented  indications  from  their  label213 –  a  practice  known  as  “skinny  labeling.”214   Generic 
manufacturers use this same tactic to design around the regulatory exclusivity periods that are 
awarded for new indications.215  Pharmaceutical companies receive a three-year data exclusivity 
period for any newly approved indication of a drug,216 and a seven-year data exclusivity period 
for any new orphan indications,217 but generic manufacturers can still enter the market if they 
only list the off-patent indications on their label.218  
The  government’s  unwillingness  to  offer  firms  that  develop  new  indications  for  older 
drugs the standard monopoly protection is not an accident.219  Congress intentionally designed 
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217 See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc. 
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the existing legal infrastructure to provide temporary monopoly protection so consumers would 
eventually have access to low-cost generic versions of a drug.220  If pharmaceutical companies 
received the standard form of monopoly protection for developing new indications, they could 
delay the entry of generics for much longer than Congress intended, perhaps indefinitely in some 
cases.221   Although  delaying  generic  entry  may  increase  the  incentives  for  pharmaceutical 
innovation,  it  would  significantly  increase  the  nation’s  health  care  costs.222   Growing  use  of 
generic drugs has generated tremendous cost savings for consumers and the U.S. health care 
system.223  By one estimate, generic drugs saved the U.S. health care system more than a $1 
trillion over the past decade, and currently produce about $1 billion in savings every two days.224  
They  also  increase  consumers’  access  to  valuable  medications.225   Even  for  patients  with 
prescription drug insurance, the high prices of patented drugs can restrict patients’ access to 
those  treatments  because  of  the  various  cost-sharing  and  coverage  restrictions  imposed  by 
insurers.226   
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ECON. 95, 107-08 (2012); Grabowski et al., supra note 112; Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual 
Property Restrict Output? An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L. & ECON. 151, 178-79 (2012). Of course, some of the 
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Standard  monopoly  rights,  which  block  generic  entry  from  the  market  entirely,  are 
unsuitable  as  an  incentive  for  new  indications  because  they  allow  a  firm  to  charge  supra-
competitive prices for the drug’s old uses as well as the new.  The economic justification for 
promoting innovation with monopoly rights is to link the incentives for investing in R&D to the 
social value of the resulting inventions.227  As John Stuart Mill explained, the chief virtue of the 
patent system is that “the reward conferred by it depends entirely upon the invention’s being 
found useful, and the greater the usefulness the greater the reward.”228  When a firm develops a 
new  indication  for  a  drug,  the  social  value  of  its  R&D  investment  is  the  value  of  that  new 
indication, not the drug’s previously established uses. Granting the standard monopoly rights to 
encourage the development of new indications would break the link between the incentive for 
those  R&D  investments  and  their  social  value  by  giving  firms  control  over  a  drug’s  entire 
market.229  
 
B.  The Enforcement Problem with Monopoly Rights over New Uses 
The appropriate incentive for firms to develop a new indication for drugs is monopoly 
protection over the new indication only, thereby encouraging development of new uses without 
denying the public access to generics for old uses.  The patent system already offers monopoly 
rights suitable for encouraging the development of new indications – a right to the new use itself.  
However, firms cannot enforce these rights without knowing when a drug is being used for the 
patented use.  Since that information is rarely available to pharmaceutical companies, these 
patent rights typically have little or no economic value once generics are on the market.   
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To  provide  firms  with  the  appropriate  incentives  for  developing  new  indications,  the 
government  must  offer  them  monopoly  protection  that  does  not  involve  blocking  generic 
manufacturers from the entire market for a drug.  When a firm delivers a new indication to the 
public, and the public already had access to the drug’s older indications, the appropriate reward 
is a temporary monopoly right over the new use, not the drug itself. These rights require entirely 
different enforcement mechanisms. Unlike the standard form of monopoly protection, which 
attaches to the act of manufacturing and selling the drug compound, monopoly protection for 
new uses must attach to the act of taking or administering the drug for the new indication.    
The patent system seemingly provides this protection already by allowing firms to patent 
newly discovered indications of drugs.230  As discussed above, the researchers who discover a new 
indication  can  usually  patent  it,  giving  them  a  monopoly  right  over  the  act  of  taking  or 
administering a drug for that specific indication.231  These new-use patents cannot keep generics 
off the market if there are any other off-patent FDA-approved uses for the drug.232  However, 
they do give firms a legal right to charge patients – probably through their insurer – when they 
the  drug  for  the  patented  indication.233   If  pharmaceutical  companies  could  enforce  these 
monopoly rights, they could require pharmacists to dispense their own, higher-priced brand-
name drug instead of a low-cost generic when filling a prescription written for the patented 
indication.  Alternatively, the pharmaceutical companies might require patients (or their insurers) 
to pay them directly when they use a low-cost generic for a patented indication.  
However, enforcement of a new-use patent is only possible when the relevant parties 
                                                              
230 See ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 398-403 (5th Ed. 2011) 
(discussing the history of new-use patents, their current legal status, and limitations on their effectiveness).  
231 Of course, not all new indications will be patentable.  See supra note 212.  Normally, the government uses (or could 
use) regulatory exclusivity periods to fill in where the patent system fails to provide adequate protection to encourage 
the development of new drugs.  See supra notes and text accompanying notes 96-101.  However, these regulatory 
exclusivity  periods  are  only  meant  to  block  generic  manufacturers  from  the  market.    They  do  not  provide  an 
enforceable right against patients, insurers, pharmacists, or generic manufacturers that knowingly sell their drug to 
patients who will use it for a patented indication (so long as the patented indication is not listed on the generic’s 
label).  If the government wants to protect unpatentable new indications with regulatory exclusivity periods, it might 
need to change the nature of those monopoly rights to make them enforceable against these other parties.   
232 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 78-85.   
233 Patients (and physicians) could be held directly liable for infringing a new-use patent if they (self-)administer a 
low-cost generic for the patented indication.  See Eisenberg, supra note _, at 724.  However, as Rebecca Eisenberg 
notes, pharmaceutical companies would be reluctant to file patent infringement suits against patients and physicians, 
since suing your customers is often bad for business.  See id. at 724-25 (“[F]ew industries prosper by suing customers, 
and the marketing interests of the pharmaceutical industry are probably better served by soliciting physicians to 
write prescriptions than by suing them for contributory infringement of their patents.”). Moreover, enforcing a new-
use patent might be too costly if it requires filing a separate patent-infringement suit against each patient or physician 
who violates the patent.  Id. at 724 (“[I]t is less efficient to sue numerous patients and physicians than it is to sue a 
single manufacturer.”); see also ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 
400 (5th Ed. 2011).  Insurance companies, pharmacists and generic manufacturers would be a much more sensible 
target for these suits.  Under current law, pharmacists could probably be held liable for indirect infringement if they 
knowingly dispense a generic drug for a patented indication.  <case>  Establishing liability against the insurer or 
generic manufacturer might be more difficult, although pharmacists might require insurers to indemnify them from 
this potential liability as part of their reimbursement agreement.    37 
know that a patient is using the drug for the patented indication. Pharmacists, insurers and 
generic manufacturers will not be culpable for indirect infringement of a new-use patent without 
knowledge  that  a  patient  is  using  the  drug  for  a  patented  indication. 234    Moreover, 
pharmaceutical  companies  cannot  hold  patients  or  these  other  parties  liable  unless  they  can 
detect their infringing acts.  
Pharmaceutical  companies  almost  never  have  access  to  the  information  they  need  to 
enforce a new-use patent.235  When physicians prescribe a drug to a patient to treat a particular 
indication, the patient’s medical condition is confidential information.236  Physicians sometimes 
disclose the prescribed indication to pharmacists and insurers, especially when required as a 
condition for insurance coverage.237  However, they almost never share that information with 
pharmaceutical  companies.  Without  access  to  patient-level  information,  pharmaceutical 
companies cannot enforce their new-use patents to charge insurers when physicians prescribe an 
off-patent drug for a patented indication.   
 
C. The Problem of New Uses 
Without a viable enforcement mechanism for new-use patents, the current system fails to 
provide incentives for the development of new indications separate from the standard monopoly 
protection  awarded  to  new  drugs.  Because  that  monopoly  protection  is  temporary, 
pharmaceutical companies’ interest in testing their drugs for new indications is also temporary.  
                                                              
234 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. _ (2011).   
235 Pharmaceutical companies can sometimes purchase patients’ de-identified health records.  See Jordan Robertson, 
States’  Hospital  Data  for  Sale  Puts  Privacy  in  Jeopardy,  BLOOMBERG  NEWS,  Jun.  5,  2013,  at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/states-hospital-data-for-sale-puts-privacy-in-jeopardy.html (“”); Jim 
Avila  &  Serena  Marshall,  Your  Medical  Records  May  Not  Be  Private:  ABC  News  Investigation,  Sept.  13,  2012,  at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/medical-records-private-abc-news-
investigation/story?id=17228986&singlePage=true;  Carol  Eisenberg,  Drugmakers  Mine  Data  for  Trial  Patients, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK MAGAZINE, Nov. 3 2011, at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/drugmakers-
mine-data-for-trial-patients-11032011.html.  However, they cannot target the records of patients taking a particular 
drug.   
236 See 67 Fed. Reg. 53182.   
237 See ELIZABETH HARGRAVE & JACK HOADLEY, COVERAGE AND PRICING OF DRUGS THAT CAN BE COVERED 
UNDER PART B AND PART D, 11-14, MedPAC No. 07-6 (2007).  As noted in Section III, insurers generally limit 
their coverage for expensive, patented drugs to a specific set of indications.  See supra note 135.  Insurers enforce these 
coverage restrictions primarily with prior authorization requirements, under which the insurer will not cover the 
costs of a patient’s prescription unless the physician first submits a form to the insurer specifying the indication for 
the prescription and that it is covered by the plan.  See Bergeson et al., supra note 226, at 376 (“Members within the 
health plan who request prescriptions for medications requiring PA [Prior Authorization] must go through a specific 
process to receive approval. Typically, the member’s health care provider must submit a form, which is faxed to the 
health plan and evaluated by a staff pharmacist. The pharmacist then reviews this information in combination with 
the member’s pharmacy claims data to determine whether the member meets the criteria for the medication.”).  
Prior authorization requirements have become “nearly universal” in pharmacy benefit plans for expensive patented 
drugs.  See Ha T. Tu & Divya R. Samuel, Limited Options to Manage Specialty Drug Spending, Center for Studying Health 
System Change, Research Brief 22, at 8-9 (2012).    38 
Initially,  pharmaceutical  companies  usually  have  a  strong  interest  in  expanding  their 
drugs’ indications, since these “line extensions” can expand their sales.238 Consequently, they 
usually continue testing their drugs in clinical trials following the initial FDA approval.239  These 
investments  are  treated  as  part  of  the  broader  lifecycle  management  of  their  drugs,240 and 
provide a critical source of revenue for the industry241 as well as important treatments for unmet 
medical needs.242   
However, because of the all-or-nothing system of monopoly protection for drugs, the 
incentives for developing the various different indications of a drug tend to rise and fall together.  
The only monopoly rights that effectively encourage firms to invest in a drug’s development are 
ones  that  can  keep  generic  manufacturers  off  the  market  entirely.243   Although  this  form  of 
protection can provide a powerful incentive for developing a new drug, it bundles together the 
incentives for developing all the possible indications for each drug into a single, finite term of 
monopoly protection.  Once the core patents and regulatory exclusivity periods for a drug expire 
and it “goes generic,” firms lose control over sales of the drug for any of its possible indications – 
including  ones  that  have  yet  to  be  discovered  or  tested  in  clinical  trials.    Unless  the  new 
indication requires a different formulation, such that patients would be unable to use generics for 
                                                              
238 See  ELLERY  &  HANSEN,  supra  note  115,  at  123  (2012)  STEVEN  GIPSTEIN  ET  AL.,  OPTIMIZING  CLINICAL 
STRATEGY TO DRIVE LIFETIME BRAND VALUE 2 (2011) (arguing that “the majority of value creation arguably 
depends on lifecycle initiatives that build and expand the clinical profile of the brand. A strategic and sustained 
release of clinical data (e.g., to support broader use, new indications, pharmacoeconomic benefit) can significantly 
enhance and extend lifetime brand value, and payors are increasingly demanding such evidence of healthcare value 
to justify reimbursement”).   
239 See GIPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 238, at 3 (“Most clinical strategies include plans to invest in new indications, phase 
4 studies, and other trials.”). 
240 ELLERY & HANSEN, supra note 115, at xx (describing “lifecycle management” in the pharmaceutical industry as 
“the measures taken to grow, maintain, and defend the sales and profits of a pharmaceutical brand following its 
development in its first formulation and its first indication”).  
241 GIPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 238, at 2 (reporting that expanding drug indications “has become critical to [the] 
commercial success” of new drugs). 
242 See supra note 112.  Of course, the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop new indications for their 
drugs do not align perfectly with the public’s interest in maximizing the social value of those drugs.  Pharmaceutical 
companies typically capture only a small portion of the social value generated by their drugs.  See Dana P. Goldman, 
et al., The Value of Specialty Oncology Drugs, 45 HEALTH SERVICE RESEARCH 115 (2010) (finding that the manufacturers 
of  specialty  oncology  drugs  –  which  are  thought  to  be  among  the  most  “overpriced”  of  all  drugs  –  capture 
approximately 25 percent of the total value of the drug to patients on average); Tomas J. Philipson & Anupam B. 
Jena, Who Benefits from New Medical Technologies? Estimates of Consumer and Producer Surpluses for HIV/AIDS Drugs, Forum 
Health Econ. & Pol’y, vol. 9, art. 3 (2006) (finding that the innovators that developed and introduced HIV drugs 
“captured only 5% of the [U.S. domestic] social surplus arising from these new technologies”).  Consequently, they 
limit their investments to new indications with a lower risk of failure, larger market size, and higher reimbursement 
rate relative to what the public would prefer.  Moreover, because pharmaceutical companies do not capture the 
social value of information about adverse drug effects or inefficacy, they may be reluctant to test a new indication for 
one of their drugs if those trials might uncover harmful side effects, or if the trial outcome might be negative and 
physicians are already prescribing the drug off-label for that use.  See Eisenberg, supra note , at 718; Amy Kapczynski 
& Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, _ (2013). 
243 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 61-66.     39 
the patented new use, pharmaceutical companies will lack enforceable monopoly rights.244 
Given the limited term of protection, pharmaceutical companies’ willingness to develop 
new  indications  for  a  drug  quickly  fades  following  their  initial  approval.  The  clinical  trials 
necessary to establish the safety and efficacy of a new indication usually take at least a few years 
to complete, and often longer.245  Firms need time on the market to earn enough sales revenue 
from a new indication to recoup the costs of its development, but their patent clock is ticking, and 
their regulatory exclusivity periods started running when the FDA first approved the drug.246  In 
most cases, developing a new indication for a drug is not profitable unless the firm initiates the 
clinical trials relatively early in the drug’s lifecycle.247  After a drug has been on the market for 
four or five years, pharmaceutical companies tend to be very reluctant to invest in further clinical 
trials for new indications.248  Except in rare cases, they will have stopped running any clinical 
trials on their drugs at least a few years before the anticipated date of generic entry.249  
                                                              
244 In some cases, pharmaceutical companies must reformulate the existing drug to provide an effective treatment for 
the new indication. In other cases, the new indication of the drug may require a much higher dose than currently 
available for the drug’s original indication, or a lower dose that cannot be replicated by subdividing the generic 
version of the drug.  Under these circumstances, pharmaceutical companies may be able to control the market for 
the new indication with patents or regulatory exclusivity over the new formulation or dosage, while remaining 
insulated from price competition from generics sold for the old indication.  See AM Thayer, Drug Repurposing, 90 
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 15 (2012) (“Many firms avoid repurposing generic drugs, even if they can find 
novel  and  patentable  uses.    If  the  repurposed  drug  works  using  available  formulations  and  doses,  it  will  likely 
compete with low-cost generics prescribed off-label.  ‘You would never be able to commercialize it and make any 
money.’”); Susan Elvidge, Getting the Drug Repositioning Genie Out of the Bottle, 14 LIFE SCI LEADER 8 (2010) (“Drug 
repositioning can be based on marketed drugs that are off patent. This means that the active ingredients are easily 
available. However, if the dose required is similar to the dose used for an existing indication, physicians may simply 
choose to use the generic form, which is likely to be cheaper than the newly available, and possibly higher cost, 
branded  repositioned  drug.  ‘Because  of  this,  it  is  important  for  a  repositioned  drug  to  have  a  difference  in 
presentation. This may be a difference in delivery system or formulation, or a significant difference in dose’”); Smith, 
supra note 85, at 131 (“Regardless of the patent and regulatory exclusivities, success in this case will depend on an 
effective generic substitution barrier to prevent off-label use of the existing generic products. As long as inexpensively 
available  generics  can  be  prescribed  in  a  manner  that  achieves  the  same  clinical  result  as  the  more  expensive 
repositioned  product,  the  repositioned  product  will  probably  fail.  The  best  barriers  include  those  repositioned 
products having a formulation required for treatment of a new indication, and where existing generics cannot be 
substituted for the new formulation.”).  
245 See supra note 145.  
246 See ELLERY & HANSEN, supra note 115, at 49 (explaining that when firms are weighing whether to invest in clinical 
trials for a new indication, they invariably ask themselves, “How much time will we have to recover our investment 
in the line extensions before the primary patent expires?”); SAHOO, supra note 115, at 59.   
247 See ELLERY & HANSEN, supra note 115, at 120 & 124.  
248 See  id. at 126 (“[I]t must be remembered that developing a new indication takes a long time, and that trials must 
therefore be started early on in the brand life cycle even if the new indication is [to reach the market] as a late-stage 
lifecycle  management  (LLCM)  strategy.”);  cf.  GIPSTEIN  ET  AL.,  supra  note  238,  at  4  (“[W]e  have  found  that 
postponing the clinical development plan for a new indication by just 1 year would cost a company more value than 
could be obtained through hefty increases in launch price, reduction of R&D costs, or increases of peak share 
points.”).  
249 See  Grabowski,  et  al.,  supra note  112,  at  382; cf.  Haiden  A.  Huskamp,  et  al.,  Generic Entry, Reformulations, and 
Promotion of SSRIs, 26 PHARMACOECONOMICS 603  (2008) (finding that pharmaceutical companies’ promotional 
activities for their drugs decrease as patent expiration nears, and usually cease several years before generic entry).    40 
This gap in the incentives for drug development would not be a problem except that 
clinicians and researchers frequently uncover potential new uses for drugs long after their initial 
FDA approval.  In the past, clinicians were the most likely to discover these new indications,250 
oftentimes through pure serendipity, such as when patients reported that a drug helped resolve 
an  entirely  unrelated  condition.251   In  recent  years,  researchers  have  also  become  adept  at 
identifying potential new indications for drugs through laboratory work.252 As science advances 
and  researchers  learn  more  about  a  drug’s  clinical  effects,  they  usually  gain  a  much  better 
understanding  of  its  precise  mechanism(s)  of  action.253 These  insights  often  reveal  a  drug’s 
propensity to hit distinct biological targets that may affect other diseases.254  Moreover, scientific 
advances  are  continually  revealing  previously  unknown  commonalities  in  the  underlying 
                                                              
250 See  Harold  J.  Demonaco,  et  al.,  The  Major  Role  of  Clinicians  in  the  Discovery  of  Off-Label  Drug  Therapies,  26 
PHARMACOTHERAPY 323 (2006); Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 
NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 197 (2012) (“Even recently, it appears that many — perhaps most — new 
therapeutic uses of drugs have been discovered by motivated and observant clinicians working with patients in the 
real world.”).  
251 See Joel T. Dudley, et al., Exploiting Drug-Disease Relationships for Computational Drug Repositioning, 12 BRIEFINGS IN 
BIOINFORMATICS 303 (2011) (“Accidental discovery, unintended side effects or obvious follow on indications have 
led to new uses of such drugs.”); Tohru Mizushima, Drug Discovery and Development Focusing on Existing Medicines: Drug 
Re-Profiling Strategy, 149 J. BIOCHEM. 499 (2011); Xiaoyan A. Qu et al., Inferring Novel Disease Indications for Known Drugs 
by Semantically Linking Drug Action and Disease Mechanism Relationships, 10(Suppl. 5) BMC BIOINFORMATICS S4 (2009) 
(“Despite impressive successes shown by repositioned drugs, most of these are the result of ‘serendipity’, i.e. based on 
unexpected findings made during or after late phases of clinical study.”). Some clinicians also experiment with 
untested indications while treating patients for conditions with no established therapy. See, e.g., Tewodros Eguale et 
al., Drug, Patient, and Physician Characteristics Associated with Off-Label Prescribing in Primary Care, 172 ARCH. INTERNAL 
MED. 781 (2012) (“The reasons for the association of older drugs with off-label use include that these medications 
have been on the market longer, thereby creating the opportunity for experimentation and discovery of new uses by 
clinicians.”).  
252 See David Bradley, Why Big Pharma Needs to Learn the Three ‘R’s, 4 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 446 (2005) 
(citing numerous examples of “[p]otential new disease indications for, or improved versions of, existing drugs are 
cropping up in unlikely situations” through laboratory research); Sean Ekins et al., In Silico Repositioning of Approved 
Drugs for Rare and Neglected Diseases, 16 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 298 (2011) (“Analysis of the literature suggests that, 
by using HTS, there are many examples of FDA-approved drugs that are active against additional targets that can 
be used to therapeutic advantage for repositioning.”).  
253 Cf.  Oprea  &  Mestres,  supra  note  144  (“Overall,  the  lack  of  data  completeness  during  the  preclinical  phases 
together with the accumulation of safety and efficacy data during the various clinical phases offers a wealth of 
opportunities for drug repurposing.”).  
254 See Sarah L. Kinnings et al., Drug Discovery Using Chemical Systems Biology: Repositioning the Safe Medicine Comtan to Treat 
Multi-Drug and Extensively Drug Resistant Tuberculosis, 5 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY e1000423 (2009) (“Recent 
work on large scale mapping of polypharmacology interactions by Paolini et al. revealed the extent of promiscuity of 
drugs and leads across the proteome,” showing that “around 35% of 276,122 active compounds in their database 
had observed activity for more than one target,” and “a significant number (around 25%) had recorded activity 
across different gene families”); Mizushima, supra note 251, at 499 (“[W]e still do not understand the underlying 
mechanisms of action of many existing medicines, and as such the cellular responses that give rise to their main 
effects and side effects are yet to be elucidated. To this extent, identification of the mechanisms … [can] be used for 
developing existing drugs for use as medicines for the treatment of other diseases.”); Oprea & Mestres, supra note 
144, at 759 (“[T]he lack of completeness in the knowledge of drug–target interaction profiles, in particular for older 
drugs, creates opportunities for repurposing of already-approved drugs for novel therapeutic indications through the 
discovery of biologically and clinically relevant affinities for new targets, which play a determinant role in those 
indications.”).    41 
pathways for seemingly unrelated diseases, suggesting that treatments effective for one might 
work for the other.255   
Commentators now take for granted that pharmaceutical companies will never invest in 
clinical trials for new indications once generics are on the market.256  The information produced 
in clinical trials can have immense social value, but pharmaceutical companies earn their profits 
by selling drugs, not the information about whether to use a drug for a particular indication.257  
Firms pay for clinical trials to convince regulators to allow their drugs on the market; to convince 
physicians to prescribe them; and to convince insurers to include the drug on their formularies 
and pay a high price for it.  In short, firms use clinical trials to advertise the drugs they have a 
monopoly over.258 Once generics are poised to enter the market, pharmaceutical companies stop 
making  those  investments,  since  any  increase  in  sales  would  mostly  benefit  the  generic 
manufacturers.259  The lack of private sector investment in off-patent drugs is a glaring failure in 
the current system for promoting pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
 
V.  THE IMMENSE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE PROBLEM OF NEW USES 
The  lack  of  incentives  for  developing  new  indications  of  FDA-approved  drugs  is  a 
longstanding and well-known problem.  However, it received very little attention until recently. 
Over the past decade, this seemingly minor gap has become one of the greatest impediments to 
the development of valuable new medical treatments.  Recent technological advances suggest 
that the existing pharmacopeia could provide effective treatments for many – and perhaps most – 
unmet medical needs.  Moreover, developing new indications for existing drugs is by far the most 
efficient route of drug development. As a result, it could allow pharmaceutical firms to develop 
medical  treatments  for  smaller  markets  and  more  challenging  pathologies,  which  industry 
typically neglects in its de novo drug development programs. Creating a viable business model 
for the development of new indications would also help overcome the ongoing productivity crisis 
in the pharmaceutical industry, by providing an alternative to the increasingly unsustainable de 
novo model.  At the same time, it would offer the NIH an invaluable bridge across the “valley of 
death”  which,  for  the  past  several  decades,  has  largely  prevented  the  NIH  from  translating 
                                                              
255 See, e.g., Csermely et al., supra note 118, at 341 (“Human disease networks are expected to reveal more on the 
inter-relationships of diseases using both additional data-associations and novel network analysis tools,” and “[t]hese 
advances will not only enrich our integrated view on human diseases, but will also lead to the … identification of 
drug target candidates (including multi-target drugs, drug repositioning, etc.)”). 
256 See Grabowski, et al., supra note 112, at 382; Rai, supra note 105, at 492.   
257 See Eisenberg, supra note , at 718.  
258 See Joe Collier & Ike Iheanacho, The Pharmaceutical Industry as an Informant, 360 LANCET 1405 (2002); Lars Noah, 
Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for Defective Information in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1212 (1998). 
259 See Eisenberg, supra note .    42 
breakthroughs  from  basic  research  into  actual  medical  treatments.    Without  effective  patent 
protection for new therapeutic uses, all of these benefits are lost. 
 
A.  Losing a Wealth of New Medical Treatments 
Commentators have long recognized that private industry is unwilling to develop new 
indications for off-patent drugs.  But only recently has the tremendous range of new uses for 
existing drugs become apparent, revealing the true magnitude of this public policy failure.  As of 
2011, there were 2356 distinct FDA-approved drug compounds,260 the vast majority of which are 
off  patent.261   Using  new  screening  technologies,  researchers  have  identified  hundreds  of 
potential new uses for these off-patent drugs to treat unmet medical needs.262  Unfortunately, 
without  private  industry  to  finance  the  clinical  development  of  these  potential  new  medical 
treatments, the vast majority of them likely will never be tested.   
The recent discovery that the drug bexarotene, an FDA-approved therapy for cutaneous 
T-cell lymphoma, might also provide an effective treatment for Alzheimer’s disease highlights the 
potential social costs of this policy failure.263  Paige Cramer and co-authors reported in Science 
that  bexarotene  is  remarkably  effective  against  Alzheimer’s  in  several  important  preclinical 
models.264   Although  this  discovery  attracted  a  great  deal  of  attention,  it  remains  uncertain 
whether the treatment will work in humans.265  The clinical trials needed to test bexarotene for 
this indication would take 5 to 7 years and hundreds of millions of dollars.266  With only a few 
years of patent life remaining on bexarotene, finding industry sponsors for these trials will be 
difficult, if not impossible.267  
                                                              
260 See Ruili Huang et al., The NCGC Pharmaceutical Collection: A Comprehensive Resource of Clinically Approved Drugs Enabling 
Repurposing and Chemical Genomics, 3 SCI TRANSL MED. 80ps16 (2011). 
261 Cf.  Express  Scripts/Medco,  Estimated  Dates  of  Possible  First-Time  Generics/Rx-to-OTC  Market  Entry  (2012),  at 
https://host1.medcohealth.com/art/corporate/anticipatedfirsttime_generics.pdf  (listing  the  few  hundred  FDA-
approved  prescription  drugs  on  the  market  as  of  June  2012  that  lack  generic  competition  because  of  patent 
protection or regulatory exclusivity periods).   
262 See infra notes and text accompanying notes _-_.  
263 See Warren J. Strittmatter, Old Drug, New Hope for Alzheimer’s Disease, 335 SCIENCE 1447 (2012); Frank M. LaFerla, 
Clinical Success Against Alzheimer’s Disease with an Old Drug, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 570 (2012).  
264 See Paige E. Cramer et al., ApoE-Directed Therapeutics Rapidly Clear β-amyloid and Reverse Deficits in AD Mouse Models, 
335 SCIENCE 1503 (2012). 
265 See Strittmatter, supra note 263, at 1448; LaFerla, supra note 263, at 571-72.  
266 See Chuck Soder, Next Up for CWRU Docs’ Alzheimer’s Drug: Trials, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUSINESS, Apr. 16, 2012, 
at 20 (“If a phase I clinical trial was to start today, it still would take five to seven years [to] … finish testing the drug 
in Alzheimer’s patients and win FDA approval to start selling bexarotene for use in treating Alzheimer’s,” and 
“there’s no telling whether the drug will make it through clinical trials or whether the company will attract the 
‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ that will be needed to complete all of them”).   
267 See Guatam Naik, New Attack on Alzheimer’s: Cancer Drug Reverses Disease’s Symptoms in Mice; Human Tests to Start Soon, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2012 (“Patents on the drug [bexarotene]—and hence its profitability—will start to expire this 
year, one reason drug companies may be reluctant to jump on bexarotene as a possible Alzheimer’s treatment.”).    43 
The potential loss of a breakthrough treatment for Alzheimer’s disease would be a major 
public policy concern even if it were an isolated occurrence.268  However, recent advances in 
drug-screening technology show that Cramer’s discovery is the tip of the iceberg.  Historically, 
most  new  uses  for  existing  drugs  were  discovered  by  serendipity,  or  by  selectively  testing 
individual drugs in cell-based or animal disease models.269 Over the past decade, researchers 
have developed a variety of new computational tools to screen known-drug compounds in silico 
for  new  indications.270   Using  chemoinformatics,  genomic  screening,  and  literature  mining, 
researchers can now search for new medical treatments by utilizing large data sets of published 
information  about  diseases  and  known  drug  compounds,  including  data  about  genomic 
expression profiles, protein structures, drug structure similarities, disease pathways, phenotypic 
disease  networks,  drug-protein  connectivity  maps,  drug-disease  networks,  and  side-effect 
similarities.271  These screening tools have shown that existing drugs are much more likely than 
                                                              
268 See generally William Thies & Laura Bleiler, Alzheimer’s Association Report: 2013 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 9 
ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA 208 (2013) (discussing the social cost and disease burden of Alzheimer’s disease in the 
United States).  
269 See  Chong  &  Sullivan, supra  note  146,  at  645  (“[M]ost  successful  crossovers  have  been  the  result  of  chance 
observations or educated guesses,” and “individual labs were limited to screening perhaps hundreds of compounds”); 
Hee Sook Lee et al., Rational Drug Repositioning Guided by an Integrated Pharmacological Network of Protein, Disease and Drug, 6 
BMC SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 80 (2012) (“To date most repositioned drugs have been the consequence of serendipitous 
observations of unexpected efficacy and side effects of drugs in development or on the market.”); Yvonne Y. Li et al., 
A  Computational  Approach  to  Finding  Novel  Targets  for  Existing  Drugs,  7  PLOS  COMPUTATIONAL  BIOLOGY  (2011) 
e1002139. doi:10.1371/ journal.pcbi.1002139 (same); Qu et al., supra note 251, at S4-S5 (same).   
270 See Chong & Sullivan, supra note 146, at 645; Ekins et al., supra note 252, at _ (“To date, there are fewer such 
examples where in silico [computer simulation] approaches have derived new uses for approved drugs. However, 
with current technologies and databases, as well as a close integration with in vitro screening, this will change.”); 
Oprea & Mestres, supra note 144, at 759 (“Novel computational methods, which can estimate the target profile of 
small molecules with increasing levels of recall and precision, have significantly increased the scope of target space 
that  can  be  explored,  thus  facilitating  the  identification  of  new  targets  for  old  drugs.”);  Prashant  Nair,  Drug 
Repurposing Gets a Boost as Academic Researchers Join the Search for Novel Uses of Existing Drugs, 110 PNAS 2430, 2431 (2013) 
(“Advances  in  genomics  technologies  have  helped  basic  researchers  make  strides  in  addressing  some  of  th[e] 
challenges” of “nuanced understanding and intricate dissection of the often-interwoven genetic pathways underlying 
human  disease.”);  THOMSON REUTERS,  WHITE PAPER: KNOWLEDGE-BASED DRUG REPOSITIONING TO DRIVE 
R&D PRODUCTIVITY 7 (2012) (“The process of drug repositioning is greatly enhanced by using computational 
methods.”). 
271 See Sivanesan Dakshanamurthy et al., Predicting New Indications for Approved Drugs Using Proteochemometric Method, 55 J. 
MED. CHEM. 6832 (2012); Keiser et al., supra note 117; Predicting New Molecular Targets for Known Drugs, 462 NATURE 
175  (2009);  Wermuth,  supra  note  119;  Kinnings  et  al.,  supra  note  254;  Monica  Campillos  et  al.,  Drug  Target 
Identification Using Side-Effect Similarity, 321 SCIENCE 263 (2008); Zhichao Liu et al., In Silico Drug Repositioning – What 
We Need To Know, 18 DRUG DISCOV TODAY 110 (2013); Jiao Li et al., Building Disease-Specific Drug-Protein Connectivity 
Maps from Molecular Interaction Networks and PubMed Abstracts, 5 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY e1000450 (2009); 
Christos  Andronis  et  al.,  Literature  Mining,  Ontologies  and  Information  Visualization  for  Drug  Repurposing,  12  BRIEF 
BIOINFORM. 357-368 (2011); Justin Lamb et al., The Connectivity Map: Using Gene-Expression Signatures to Connect Small 
Molecules, Genes, and Disease, 313 SCIENCE 1929 (2006); Lun Yang & Pankaj Agarwal, Drug Repositioning Based on Clinical 
Side-Effects,  6  PLOS ONE  e28025  (2011);  Guanghui  Hu  &  Pankaj  Agarwal,  Human Disease-Drug Network Based on 
Genomic Expression Profiles, 4 PLOS ONE e6536 (2009); Yong Li & Pankaj Agarwal, A Pathway-Based View of Human 
Diseases and Disease Relationships, 4 PLOS ONE e4346 (2009); César A. Hidalgo et al., A Dynamic Network Approach for the 
Study of Human Phenotypes, 5 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY e1000353 (2009); Francesco Iorio et al., Discovery of 
Drug Mode of Action and Drug Repositioning from Transcriptional Responses, 107 PROC NAT’L ACAD SCI USA 146221 (2010); 
Joel T. Dudley et al., Drug Discovery in a Multidimensional World: Systems, Patterns, and Networks, 3 J. CARDIOVASCULAR   44 
the  average  novel  drug  candidate  to  be  active  in  multiple  targets,  pathways  and  cellular 
phenotypes – factors indicative of greater potential for multiple uses.272  Moreover, many of the 
most promising tools only work for existing drugs because they function by screening databases of 
published information about drugs’ observed clinical effects and known mechanisms of action.273  
Although researchers are just beginning to use these screening tools, they have already 
identified hundreds of potential new uses for drugs in the existing arsenal.274  These include 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
TRANSLATIONAL RES.  438  (2010);  Ekaterina  Kotelnikova  et  al.,  Computational Approaches for Drug Repositioning and 
Combination Therapy Design, 8 J. BIOINFORMATICS COMPUT. BIOL. 593 (2010); Simon J. Cockell et al., An Integrated 
Dataset for In Silico Drug Discovery, J. INTEGR BIOINFORM 116 (2010); Josef Scheiber et al., Gaining Insight into Off-Target 
Mediated Effects of Drug Candidates with a Comprehensive Systems Chemical Biology Analysis, 49 J. CHEM. INF. MODEL 308 
(2009); Soyang Ha et al., IDMap: Facilitating the Detection of Potential Leads with Therapeutic Targets, 24 BIOINFORMATICS 
1413 (2008); AP Chiang & AJ Butte, Systematic Evaluation of Drug-Disease Relationships to Identify Leads for Novel Drug Uses, 
86  CLIN.  PHARMACOL.  THER.  507  (2009);  V  Joachim  Haupt  &  Michael  Schroeder,  Old Friends in New Guise: 
Repositioning of Known Drugs with Structural Bioinformatics, 12 BRIEFINGS IN BIOINFORMATICS 312 (2011); Avi Ma’ayan et 
al., Network Analysis of FDA Approved Drugs and Their Targets, 74 MT. SINAI J MED. 27 (2007); William Loging et al., 
Cheminformatic/Bioinformatics Analysis of Large Corporate Databases: Application to Drug Repurposing,  8  DRUG DISCOVERY 
TODAY:  THERAPEUTIC  STRATEGIES  109  (2011);  Divya  Sardana  et  al.,  Drug Repositioning for Orphan Diseases,  12 
BRIEFINGS IN BIOINFORMATICS 346 (2011); S. Joshua Swamidass, Mining Small-Molecule Screens to Repurpose Drugs, 12 
BRIEFINGS IN BIOINFORMATICS 327 (2011).   
272 In fact, screening of the NIH’s collection of all approved and investigational drugs (the “NPC”) has shown that in 
200 tests for activity in different targets, pathways or cellular phenotypes, drugs within the NPC were more than 
twice as likely as molecular entities overall to show activity in any given test. Huang et al., supra note 260; see also 
Kinnings et al., supra note 254.   
273 This is the case, for example, with literature mining and side effect-similarity screening. See supra Andronis et al., 
supra note 271, at 358 (“Much of the knowledge covering modern biology and medicine is often buried in various 
forms of free-text documents.”); Campillos et al., supra note 271, at 263-64 (“Although unexpected activities derived 
from  off-targets  are  usually  unwanted  and  harmful,  they  can  sometimes  be  beneficial  and  have  led  to  new 
therapeutic  indications  for  drugs.  …  Therefore,  we  explored  side-effect  information  generated  from  the  use  of 
marketed drugs to infer molecular activities of drugs that are not implicit by their chemical similarity or the sequence 
similarity of their known targets.”); Li et al., supra note 271, at 1 (“[W]e developed a computational framework to 
build  disease-specific  drug-protein  connectivity  maps,  by  mining  molecular  interaction  networks  and  PubMed 
abstracts,” and show “how drug-protein molecular connectivity maps can be constructed to overcome data coverage 
and noise issues inherent in automatically extracted results.”); Liu et al., supra note 271, at ; Wermuth, supra note 119; 
Yang & Agarwal, supra note 271, at 1 (noting that many drug repositioning “strategies focus primarily on using 
preclinical  information.  Unfortunately,  clinical  therapeutic  effects  are  not  always  consistent  with  preclinical 
outcomes.  Recently, a systematic analysis observed that phenotypic screening exceeded target-based approaches in 
discovering  first-in-class  small-molecule  drugs.  Clinical  phenotypic  information  comes  from  actual  patient  data, 
which  mimics  a  phenotypic  ‘screen’  of  the  drug  effects  on  human,  and  can  directly  help  rational  drug 
repositioning.”).   
274 See Keiser et al., supra note 117, at 175 (“[A] statistics-based chemoinformatics approach [has been used] to 
predict  new  off-targets  for  878  purchasable  FDA-approved  small-molecule  drugs  and  2,787  pharmaceutical 
compounds.”); Ekins et al., supra note 252 (identifying a long list of new uses for existing drugs that have been 
identified but largely unconfirmed); Sean Ekins & Antony J. Williams, Finding Promiscuous Old Drugs for New Uses, 28 
PHARM RES.  1785  (2011)  (reviewing  studies  from  the  prior  six  years  on  the  screening  of  FDA-approved  drug 
libraries and reporting “a conservative estimate indicates at least 109 previously approved drugs have shown activity 
in vitro against additional diseases different than those for which the drugs were originally approved.”); Huang et al. 
supra note 260; Oprea & Mestres, supra note 144, at  (“Recent academic enthusiasm in this field has resulted in the 
publication of relatively long lists of drugs that could potentially be repurposed for a variety of indications, including 
tuberculosis, breast and prostate cancer, and myelogenous leukemia.”).   45 
possible  treatments  for  cancer,275 Alzheimer’s  disease,276 diabetes,277 stroke,278 tuberculosis,279 
maliaria,280 and a host of other unmet medical needs.281  Indeed, every recorded effort to screen 
                                                              
275 See Carlos M. Telleria, Drug Repurposing for Cancer Therapy, 4 J. CANCER SCI. THER. ix (2012); Luisa Cimmino & 
Iannis  Aifantis,  Fingerprinting  Acute  Leukemia:  DNA  Methylation  Profiling  of  B-Acute  Lymphoblastic  Leukemia  2  CANCER 
DISCOV.  976  (2012);  Daichi  Shigemizu  et  al.,  Using  Functional  Signatures  to  Identify  Repositioned  Drugs  for  Breast, 
Myelogenous Leukemia and Prostate Cancer, 8 PLOS COMPUT BIOL. e1002347 (2012); Bradley, supra note 252, at 446 
(childhood brain tumors, breast cancer, leukemia, and sarcomas); Jinesh S. Gheeya et al., Screening a Panel of Drugs 
with Diverse Mechanisms of Action Yields Potential Therapeutic Agents Against Neuroblastoma,  8  CANCER BIOL THER.  2386 
(2009); Ekins & Williams, supra note 274 (neuroblastoma, retinoblastoma); Christopher Antczak et al., Revisiting Old 
Drugs as Novel Agents for Retinoblastoma: In Vitro and In Vivo Antitumor Activity of Cardenolides, 50 INVEST OPHTHALMOL VIS 
SCI. 3065 (2009); Huafeng Zhang et al., Digoxin and Other Cardiac Glycosides Inhibit HIF-1alpha Aynthesis and Block Tumor 
Growth, 105 PNAS 19579 (2008); Sarah C. Garrett et al., A Biosensor of S100A4 Metastasis Factor Activation: Inhibitor 
Screening and Cellular Activation Dynamics, 47 BIOCHEMISTRY 986 (2008); Julie Blatt & Seth J. Corey, Drug Repurposing in 
Pediatrics and Pediatric Hematology Oncology, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 4 (2012); Naris Nilubol, et al., Four Clinically 
Utilized Drugs were Identified and Validated for Treatment of Adrenocortical Cancer Using Quantitative High-Throughput Screening, 
10 J. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 1 (2012); Li-Fan Zeng et al., Repositioning HIV-1 Integrase Inhibitors for Cancer Therapeutics: 
1,6-naphthyridine-7-carboxamide as a Promising Scaffold with Drug-Like Properties,  55  J.  MED.  CHEM.  9492  (2012);  Lisa 
Zhang et al., Quantitative High-Throughput Drug Screening Identifies Novel Classes of Drugs with Anticancer Activity in Thyroid 
Cancer Cells: Opportunities for Repurposing, 97 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRIN. METAB. E319 (2012); Mahadeo A. Sukhai et al., 
New Sources of Drugs for Hematologic Malignancies, 117 BLOOD 6747 (2011).  
276 See Paige E. Cramer et al., ApoE-Directed Therapeutics Rapidly Clear β-amyloid and Reverse Deficits in AD Mouse Models, 
335 SCIENCE 1503 (2012); Anne Corbett et al., Drug Repositioning for Alzheimer’s Disease, 11 NAT REV DRUG DISCOV. 
833  (2012)  (reporting  on  “the  outcomes   of  a  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  published  literature,  systematic 
evaluation and a formal consensus process by an  expert panel to identify licensed drugs  with the most robust breadth 
of evidence  to be considered as potential candidates for repositioning in Alzheimer’s disease. Fifteen licensed drug 
candidates were identified by consensus based on candidate therapies proposed by the expert panel.”).  
277 See  Denise  L.  Faustman  et  al.,  Proof-of-Concept, Randomized, Controlled Clinical Trial of Bacillus-Calmette-Guerin for 
Treatment of Long-Term Type 1 Diabetes, 7 PLOS ONE e41756 (2012); Domokos Gerö et al., Cell-Based Screening Identified 
Paroxetine as an Inhibitor of Diabetic Endothelial Dysfunction, 62 DIABETES 953 (2013); Bradley, supra note 252.  
278 See  David  C.  Hess  &  Susan  C.  Fagan,  Repurposing an Old Drug to Improve the Use and Safety of Tissue Plasminogen 
Activator for Acute Ischemic Stroke: Minocycline, 30 PHARMACOTHERAPY 55S (2010); Jennifer M. Plane et al., Prospects for 
Minocycline Neuroprotection, 67 ARCH NEUROL. 1442 (2010);67(12):1442-1448; Susan C. Fagan, Drug Repurposing for 
Drug Development in Stroke, 30 PHARMACOTHERAPY 51S (2010).   
279 See  Kinnings  et  al.,  supra  note  254;  Juan  Carlos  Palomino  &  Anandi  Martin,  Is Repositioning of Drugs a Viable 
Alternative in the Treatment of Tuberculosis?, 68 J. ANTIMICROB. CHEMOTHER. 275 (2013). 
280 See Ekins et al., supra note 252; Jing Yuan et al., Chemical Genomic Profiling for Antimalarial Therapies, Response Signatures, 
and Molecular Targets, 333 SCIENCE 724 (2011) (32 new potential antimalaria drugs); Jennifer L. Weisman et al., 
Searching for New Antimalarial Therapeutics Amongst Known Drugs, 67 CHEM BIOL DRUG DES. 409 (2006) (19 potential 
antimalarial therapeutics); Brian T. Grimberg & Rajeev K. Mehlotra, Expanding the Antimalarial Drug Arsenal—Now, but 
How?,  4  PHARMACEUTICALS (BASEL)  681 (2011); Anna Rosa Sannella et al.,  New Uses for Old Drugs: Auranofin, a 
Clinically  Established  Antiarthritic  Metallodrug,  Exhibits  Potent  Antimalarial  Effects  In  Vitro:  Mechanistic  and  Pharmacological 
Implications, 582 FEBS LETTERS 844 (2008).  
281 See  Ramaiah  Muthyala,  Orphan/Rare Drug Discovery Through Drug Repositioning,  8  DRUG DISCOV TODAY THER 
STRATEG. 71 (2011) (multidrug-resistant parasites, progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy, bacterial pathogens, 
drug-resistant infections and a range of neurological disorders); Ekins & Williams, supra note 274 (malaria and C. 
parvum); Ekins et al., supra note 252 (trypanosomal and Chagas disease); Plane et al., supra note 278 (spinal cord 
injuries  and  Parkinsons,  Alzheimer’s  and  Huntington’s  disease);  Qu  et  al.,  supra  note  251  (systemic  lupus 
erythematosus); Dakshanamurthy et al., supra note 271 (rheumatoid arthritis); Autumn S. Downey et al., Efficacy of 
Pyrvinium Pamoate Against Cryptosporidium Parvum Infection In Vitro and in a Neonatal Mouse Model, 52 ANTIMICROB AGENTS 
CHEMOTHER 3106 (2008) (c. parvum); Jill Heemskerk, Screening Existing Drugs for Neurodegeneration: the National Institute of 
Neurologic Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) Model, 25 RETINA S56 (2005) (Huntington’s disease, ALS); Peter B. Madrid et   46 
libraries of FDA-approved drugs for activity against a particular disease uncovered one or more 
potential new treatments for the condition.282  Many researchers now suspect that our current 
arsenal of drugs could provide effective medical treatments for most of the major remaining 
diseases,283 including cancer284 and Alzheimer’s disease.285  There is also hope that repurposing 
old drugs for new indications will allow researchers to identify effective treatments for most or all 
of the 8000 rare diseases, which together afflict 15 to 20 percent of the global population.286  
Unfortunately, because the new screening tools were unavailable when pharmaceutical 
companies first developed these existing drugs, they were not tested for other indications.287  Now 
that these drugs are off patent, firms lack the incentive to fund the necessary clinical research for 
potential  new  uses  identified  in  screening  by  NIH  and  academic  researchers,  and  the  vast 
majority of these promising candidates will likely remain untested hypotheses.  Over time, the 
number of off-patent drugs will increase, and the screening technologies for identifying potential 
new indications will get better.288  As a result, the social costs of this failure in the incentives for 
pharmaceutical R&D will continue to increase.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
al., A Systematic Screen of FDA-Approved Drugs for Inhibitors of Biological Threat Agents, 8 PLOS ONE e60579, at 3 (2013) 
(high containment and biodefense pathogens); Sidharth Chopra et al., Repurposing FDA-Approved Drugs to Combat Drug-
Resistant  Acinetobacter  Baumannii,  65  J.  ANTIMICROB  CHEMOTHER.  2598  (2010)  (antibiotic-resistant  bacterial 
infections); Henry C. Ou et al., Identification of FDA-Approved Drugs and Bioactives that Protect Hair Cells in Zebrafish (Danio 
Rerio) Lateral Line and Mouse (Mus Musculus) Utricle, 10 JARO. 191 (2009) (hearing loss); Syed Ahmad et al., Potential 
Repurposing  of  Known  Drugs  as  Potent  Bacterial  β-glucuronidase  Inhibitors,  17  J.  BIOMOL  SCREEN.  957  (2012)  (severe 
diarrhea).  
282 See Ekins et al., supra note 252 (“From research published in the last six years we have identified 34 studies that 
have screened libraries of FDA-approved drugs against various whole cell or target assays. These studies have each 
identified one or more compounds with a suggested new bioactivity that had not been described previously.”); 
Chong & Sullivan, supra note 146; Mark S. Boguski et al., Repurposing with a Difference, 324 SCIENCE 1394 (2009); 
Muthyala, supra note 281; Ekins & Williams, supra note 274; Telleria, supra note 275. 
283 Cf. Wermuth, supra note 119, at 161 (stating “there is only a limited chemical universe of small molecules that can 
be safely administered to humans,” and “this universe can be adequately covered with currently available drugs”).  
284 See Telleria, supra note 275 (noting that many researchers are now hoping that repurposing old drugs for new 
indications will soon “convert cancer into a treatable chronic disease”). 
285 See Corbett et al., supra note 276, at 835-44 (discussing a variety of promising candidates for repurposing for the 
treatment of Alzheimer’s disease).  
286 See Muthyala, supra note 281, at 71 & 75 (“Some believe that the more obvious winners have already been 
found.”).  
287 Ironically, we know less about the underlying mechanisms of action – and, therefore, the other therapeutic uses – 
of the drugs that have been on the market the longest.  See Mizushima, supra note 251, at 499 (explaining “when such 
[older] medicines were developed, it was difficult, if not impossible to investigate the molecular mechanisms of action 
that give rise to their main effects and side effects, due to a lack of analytical technology” and, as a result, “the 
mechanisms underlying how these drugs achieve their clinical effect have not been examined.”). 
288 See  Bernard  Munos,  A  Forensic  Analysis  of  Drug  Targets  from  2000  to  2012,  CLINICAL  PHARMACOLOGY  & 
THERAPEUTICS (2013) (“[D]rug repurposing opportunities continue to appear in the literature, and increasingly in 
the clinic … . This suggests that we are getting better at designing our drugs rationally, but perhaps the increasing 
focus  on  this  approach  is  causing  us  to  miss  important  therapeutic  innovations  that  happen  to  lie  within  our 
knowledge gaps.”).     47 
 
B.  Losing the Most Efficient Way to Develop New Medical Treatments 
Developing new uses for FDA-approved drugs is far-and-away the most efficient route for 
producing new medical treatments.289  New indications take only a fraction of the time, cost and 
risk involved in developing new drugs.  This makes it possible to deliver new medical treatments 
to  the  public  faster,  to  pursue  treatments  for  smaller  populations  that  otherwise  would  be 
unprofitable, and to pursue treatments for more challenging pathologies or novel drug targets 
that involve a higher risk of failure.  
Developing  new  uses  for  existing  drugs  is  generally  much  faster  and  cheaper  than 
developing a novel drug compound.290  It allows firms to skip the drug discovery and preclinical 
development stages,291 which typically constitutes between one third and one half of the cost and 
time of developing a drug.292  In some cases, firms can also skip the early clinical development 
stages.293  This dramatically reduces the cost of bringing a new medical treatment to market.294  
                                                              
289 See Michael  J.  Barratt  &  Donald  E.  Frail,  Introduction,  in  DRUG  REPOSITIONING:  BRINGING  NEW  LIFE  TO 
SHELVED ASSETS AND EXISTING DRUGS 1 (Michael J. Barratt & Donald E. Frail, Eds. 2012); Dakshanamurthy et 
al., supra note 271 (“The most effective way to move from target identification to the clinic  is to identify already 
approved drugs with the potential for activating or inhibiting  unintended targets (repurposing or repositioning).”); 
Asher Mullard, Could Pharma Open Its Drug Freezers?, 10 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 399, 400 (2011) (referring to 
the development of new indications as “a route to cost-effective drug development”).   
290 See, e.g., Boguski et al., supra note 282, at 1394 (“New uses of existing drugs cost much less to develop compared 
with de novo drug discovery and development.”); Corbett et al., supra note 276 (“The established safety of the 
candidate compounds provides several advantages compared with the development of novel therapeutic compounds. 
The time and cost required to advance a candidate treatment into clinical trials can be substantially reduced because 
in  vitro  and  in  vivo  screening,  chemical  optimization,  toxicology  studies,  bulk  manufacturing  and  formulation 
development have, in many cases, already been completed and can therefore be bypassed.”); Spyros N. Deftereos et 
al., Drug Repositioning and Adverse Event Prediction Using High-Throughput Literature Analysis, 3 WIRES SYSTEM BIOLOGY & 
MED. 323 (2011) (“New uses of existing drugs, on the other hand, cost much less to develop compared with de novo 
drug discovery, mainly due to the accumulated data on their preclinical properties and their established safety 
profiles.”);  Patricia  Fitzpatrick  Diamond,  Drug  Repositioning  Gains  in  Popularity,  30  GENETIC  ENGINEERING  & 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (2010) (noting that compared to de novo drug development, developing new indications 
has the benefit of “entailing lower costs and taking less time”); Qu et al., supra note 251 (“Drug repositioning – the 
use of established drugs for new indications – represents a promising avenue for the development of therapeutics 
based on its relatively low cost and ready availability of extensive data and knowledge from prior research and 
development efforts.”). 
291 See  Mullard,  supra  note  119,  at  1  (noting  that  when  firms  develop  new  indications  for  drugs,  they  “have 
leapfrogged over 6 or 7 years of preclinical and early-stage research and $30 million or so of investment with these 
compounds — that’s where the time saving is”).  
292 See supra note 40.  
293 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 143-148; see also Chong & Sullivan, supra note 146, at 645 (“Because 
existing drugs have  known pharmacokinetics and  safety profiles and are often  approved by regulatory agencies for 
human use, any newly  identified use can be rapidly  evaluated in phase II clinical trials”); Oprea & Mestres, supra 
note 144 (“The other advantage is that the NME subject to repositioning is an already-approved drug, and thus, 
there is no need to conduct phase I and phase IIa clinical trials.”).   
294 See Chong & Sullivan, supra note 146, at 645 (stating, with respect to new indications, that “drug developers can 
bypass almost 40% of the overall cost of bringing a drug to market by eliminating much of the toxicological and 
pharmacokinetic assessments.”).    48 
Whereas  de  novo  drug  development  typically  costs  in  excess  of  $1.2  billion  per  drug,295 the 
development of a new indication for an existing drug costs on average $300 million or less.296  
Moreover,  while  de  novo  drug  development  takes  an  average  of  12  to  16  years, 297 
pharmaceutical companies can almost always develop a new indication within 12 years, and it 
often take as little as three.298  
Developing  new  uses  for  an  existing  drug  is  also  much  less  risky  than  de  novo  drug 
development.299   High  failure  rate  in  developing  new  drugs  is  one  of  the  largest  hurdles  in 
pharmaceutical  innovation.300   Much  of  this  risk  stems  from  the  difficulty  predicting  the 
pharmacological properties of untested drug compounds, including how patients will absorb the 
active ingredient and whether it has an acceptable toxicity profile.301  The risk of failure is much 
lower when developing new indications for established drugs, since pharmaceutical companies 
                                                              
295 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 39-43. 
296 See Sahoo, supra note 115, at 28.  
297 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 38. 
298 See Ashburn & Thor, supra note , at 673 (“The advantage of the indication-focused approach, by contrast, is that it 
has the potential to move the compounds very quickly through clinical trials on the basis of previously collected 
data.”); Dudley et al., supra note 251, at 303 (“The drug development cycle for a repositioned drug can be as short as 
3–12 years compared to the traditional 10–17 years required to bring a new chemical entity to market.”); Elvidge, 
supra note , at 8; THOMSON REUTERS, supra note 270, at 1 (“drug repositioning has a number of R&D advantages 
including a reduction of R&D timelines by up to 3-5 years”). 
299 See Diamond, supra note 290 (noting that “because the drug is already known, it entails less risk that studies will 
fail”); Liu et al., supra note 271, at (“Because the safety profiles of these drugs are known, clinical trials for alternative 
indications … carry less risk than de novo drug development.”); Oprea & Mestres, supra note 144, at (“The large 
body of clinical data and experience accumulated in phase III (efficacy) and phase IV (post-marketing) trials for the 
drug in question offer a good understanding of its profile in terms of adverse events, long-term and chronic toxicity, 
as well as on- and off-label effects. In general, a large literature corpus for a particular drug is regarded as beneficial 
since, despite potential shortcomings, the clinical observation and monitoring required (in particular in high-risk 
situations) is manageable. When repurposing an older drug, it is generally anticipated that costs associated with its 
synthesis  (including  potential  hazardous  waste)  have  already  been  addressed,  which  turn  the  therapeutic 
management of the new indications economically attractive.”).  Cf. François Chast, A History of Drug Discovery, in THE 
PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 53 (Camille G. Wermuth ed. 3d Ed. 2008) (“Drug discovery remains an 
uncertain, hazardous, and unpredictable adventure! This is probably why most of drug ‘hunters’ largely share the 
opinion of Nobel laureate James Black who famously declared: ‘The most fruitful basis for the discovery of a new 
drug is to start with an old drug.’”).   
300 See Scannell et al., supra note 250, at 199 (“R&D costs are dominated by the cost of failure. Most molecules fail. 
Most research scientists spend most of their time on products that fail.”).   
301 See Youssef L. Bennani, Drug Discovery in the Next Decade: Innovation Needed ASAP, 17S Drug Discovery Today S31, 
S36 (2012) (“Currently, the greatest contributors to preclinical and clinical NME failures remain toxicology and 
translational biology for efficacy. Striking the right therapeutic window, with a safe profile is often a challenge in 
discovery settings. Much research is being applied to bring value from the toxicology standpoint … . [However,] the 
field is still plagued by clinical idiosyncratic toxicities.”); Matteo Colombo & Ilaria Peretto, Chemistry Strategies in Early 
Drug  Discovery:  An  Overview  of  Recent  Trends,  13  DRUG  DISCOVERY  TODAY  677,  677  (2008)  (“Currently,  the 
fundamental issue in the drug discovery process is the high failure rate in clinical trials, mainly due to liabilities 
related to poor pharmacokinetics, poor efficacy and high toxicity.”).    49 
start with a chemical compound known to be safe and therapeutically effective in humans.302  
Indeed, a recent study found that the likelihood of success in late-stage clinical trials is several 
times greater for drugs in their second or third indication than a novel drug compound in late-
stage trials for a first indication.303  
The time, cost and risk advantages of developing new therapeutic uses for existing drugs 
(as  opposed  to  new  drugs)  could  allow  pharmaceutical  companies  to  pursue  critical  areas  of 
medical  research  that  they  currently  neglect.304   Pharmaceutical  companies  are  frequently 
criticized for ignoring diseases that affect smaller or poorer populations, where they would have 
greater difficulty recovering the substantial costs of de novo drug development.305  They are also 
criticized for not pursuing potential breakthrough drugs aimed at novel disease targets because 
they have a higher risk of failure.  The lower cost and risk involved in developing new indication 
makes  treatment  of  diseases  that  are  especially  challenging,  or  affect  smaller  or  poorer 
populations, more attractive to pharmaceutical companies.306  This is a boon to diseases like 
Alzheimer’s for which no treatment is known and the risk of failure is otherwise astronomical and 
cost-prohibitive.307  It would also be beneficial for rare cancers and other serious but uncommon 
conditions.308   At  the  same  time,  the  faster  development  period  offers  hope  to  patients  with 
                                                              
302 See supra note 299; THOMSON REUTERS, supra note 270, at 1 (2012) (explaining that “drug repositioning has a 
number of R&D advantages including … the repositioned drug will have passed a significant number of toxicology 
and safety assessments and so the chances of failure are greatly reduced”); Kui Xu & Timothy R. Coté, Database 
Identifies  FDA-Approved  Drugs  with  Potential  to  be  Repurposed  for  Treatment  of  Orphan  Diseases,  12  BRIEFINGS  IN 
BIOINFORMATICS  341  (2011)  (“Repurposing  FDA-approved  products  has  practical  advantages  over  novel 
compounds” because “safety data are far better developed for approved products that have been in the marketplace,” 
and  because  “[w]ith  the  tested  dosages  and  formulations,  approved  products  have  demonstrated  their 
pharmacological  activity,  have  known  toxicity  profiles  both  in  animals  and  in  humans  and  have  well-studied 
pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics.”).  
303  See  Joseph  A.  DiMasi  et  al.,  Clinical  Approval  Success  Rates  for  Investigational  Cancer  Drugs,  _  CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS _ (2013 forthcoming) (“If a second indication is pursued and the first indication 
is  a  success,  then  marketing  approval  of  a  second indication  is  more  likely  than  not.”);  Michael  Hay  et  al., 
BIO/BioMedTracker  Clinical  Trial  Success  Rates  Study,  BIO  CEO  &  Investor  Conference,  Feb.  15,  2011,  at 
http://insidebioia.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/bio-ceo-biomedtracker-bio-study-handout-final-2-15-2011.pdf.   
304 See  Hemphill,  supra  note  203,  at  6-7  (“This innovative  approach  to  developing  cost-effective,  timely  new 
pharmaceutical therapies is necessary to eliminate the backlog of untreated diseases—biomedical researchers have 
successfully identified the causes of nearly 4,500 diseases but have created new therapies for only 250 of them.  This 
situation is exacerbated by the time and money required to develop a new drug compound—up to 14 years and up- 
wards of $1 billion to move a drug from discovery to commercialization.”).  
305 See, e.g., Erdmann, supra note 149, at 1492 (“But even when clinical researchers seek pharmaceutical sponsorship, 
they can find support difficult to secure. If a company has a promising drug to treat lung cancer but an academic 
researcher wants to test that drug for a rare leukemia, the company may fund only data management and ask the 
institution to pay for imaging and patient monitoring and to hold the IND.”).   
306 Cf. Oprea & Mestres, supra note 144 (“When repurposing an older drug, it is generally anticipated that costs 
associated with its synthesis (including potential hazardous waste) have already been addressed, which turn the 
therapeutic management of the new indications economically attractive.”). 
307 See Corbett et al., supra note 276.     50 
rapidly advancing conditions that may not survive the duration of a de novo drug development 
project.309  The hole in the incentives for developing new indications of FDA-approved drugs 
delays or forecloses these opportunities to improve the odds for these populations.  
 
C. Losing a Solution to the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Productivity Crisis 
For much of the past decade, the pharmaceutical industry has faced a productivity crisis. 
After years of increased R&D spending with no commensurate increase in drugs reaching the 
market, and a persistently high failure rate in expensive late-stage trials, many industry executives 
have  concluded  that  their  current  business  model  of  de  novo  drug  development  is 
unsustainable.310  If pharmaceutical companies were given a viable drug development strategy 
based  on  establishing  new  indications  for  FDA-approved  drugs,  it  would  help  revitalize  a 
struggling industry that the public depends on to produce life saving medications.311  
Tremendous advances in the scientific fields underlying drug discovery and development 
over the past half century created the hope of a new golden age of pharmaceutical innovation, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
308 Cf. Xu  &  Coté,  supra  note  308  (“Repurposing  FDA-approved  products  has  practical  advantages  over  novel 
compounds …. [P]revious knowledge and experience can save costs and development time for the new indication…. 
This can be good news for both patients with rare diseases and for orphan drug developers.”).  
309 See Francis S. Collins, Mining for Therapeutic Gold, 10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 397 (2011) (“Approved 
drugs  and  many  abandoned  compounds  have  already  been  tested  in  humans,  and  so  detailed  information  is 
available on their pharmacology, formulation, dosing and potential toxicity. This can enable the rapid testing of new 
clinical hypotheses, leading to remarkable health outcomes.”); Scott J. Weir et al., Repurposing Approved and Abandoned 
Drugs for the Treatment and Prevention of Cancer through Public-Private Partnership, 72 CANCER RES. 1056, 1056-57 (2012) 
(“First and foremost, repurposing approved and abandoned drugs for cancer represents an opportunity to rapidly 
advance to patients promising drug therapies by capitalizing on existing data and experience.”).  
310 See John  C.  Reed,  NCATS Could Mitigate Pharma Valley of Death: National Center for Advancing Translational Science 
Essential to Capitalize on Basic Research, 31 GENETIC ENG. BIOTECHNOL. NEWS 6 (2011); Fabio Pammolli et al., The 
Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NAT REV DRUG DISCOV. 428 (2011); AJAY DHANKHAR ET AL., ESCAPING 
THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES: TOWARD A NEW FUTURE FOR PHARMACEUTICAL R&D 3 (2012) (“Recent years have 
seen a collapse in the industry’s R&D productivity and a loss of faith in its innovation model. … A recent McKinsey 
analysis calculates that the average economic return on R&D has dropped from between 13 and 15 percent in the 
1990s to between 4 and 9 percent in the past decade. This suggests that much of the current investment in R&D is 
not creating value. We estimate that cumulative success rates have fallen by as much as 50 percent as the number of 
drug development programs and the cost per program have doubled.”); Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D 
Productivity: the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grand Challenge, 9 NAT REV DRUG DISCOV. 203 (2010) (“The pharmaceutical 
industry is facing unprecedented challenges to its business model. Experienced observers and industry analysts have 
even predicted its imminent demise.”); ANDY PASTERNAK ET AL., BRIDGING THE SHAREHOLDER RETURN GAP IN 
BIG PHARMA: MEANINGFUL COST TRANSFORMATION CAN DELIVER RESULTS 1 (2012). 
311 See Boguski et al., supra note 282, at 1394 (“One response to the productivity gap is drug “repurposing” or 
“repositioning”—terms  that  refer  to  the  identification  and  development  of  new  uses  for  existing  or  abandoned 
pharmacotherapies.”);  Nair,  supra  note  270,  at  2431  (“The  benefits  of  drug  repurposing  to  pharmaceutical 
companies  facing  drying  pipelines  and  expiring  patents,  to  nonprofit  organizations  seeking  cures  for  rare  and 
neglected diseases, and to patients battling intractable conditions need no overstatement.”). Cf. Baratt & Frail, supra 
note 289,  at  1  (“Against  this  backdrop  of  escalating  costs  associated with increased development timelines and 
requirements, along with growing regulatory and reimbursement pressures, drug repositioning has emerged as a 
lower cost and potentially faster approach than de novo drug discovery and development.”).    51 
but the reality has been a disappointment.312  While the pharmaceutical industry invested heavily 
in R&D to take advantage of new scientific opportunities, their increased R&D spending did not 
yield commensurate increases in new drugs reaching the market.313  Indeed, a recent study found 
that, since the 1950’s, the number of FDA-approvals for new drugs per inflation-adjusted dollar 
of R&D spending has fallen by half approximately every nine years.314  The market capitalization 
of  pharmaceutical  companies  has  declined  in  concert  (by  $550  billion  between  2000  and 
2010),315 with  the  inevitable  result  of  facility  closures,316 job  cuts317 and  reductions  in  R&D 
investment as firms become more risk averse.318  
                                                              
312 See C.M. Colvis et al., Partnering for Therapeutics Discovery, 93 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 24, 25 
(2013) (“[D]espite the recent technology and knowledge advances in biomedical research, the number of drugs that 
make it to the market every year remains roughly the same.”); Kenneth I. Kaitin, Deconstructing the Drug Development 
Process: the New Face of Innovation,  87  CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY THERAPEUTICS.  356  (2010)  (“In  the  area  of  drug 
discovery, new technologies such as high-throughput screening, combinatorial chemistry, and a host of “omics” tools 
(including pharmacogenomics, proteomics, and metabolomics) were supposed to usher in a new era of innovative 
drug discovery, leading to newer and better medicines for many diseases for which treatment was inadequate or 
lacking…. Despite the industry’s concerted efforts over the past two decades to effect substantive improvements in 
performance and efficiency in the area of drug development, the metrics suggest that few or no gains have been 
made.”).  
313 See Bennani, supra note 301, at S33 (“It is now undeniable that increased investments in R&D have not resulted in 
increased numbers of new molecular entities.”); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), 
NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS 
HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 2 (2006) (“Significant scientific advances have raised new hope for the 
prevention, treatment, and cure of serious illnesses … . However, over the past several years it has become widely 
recognized throughout the industry that the productivity of its research and development expenditures has been 
declining; that is, the number of new drugs being produced has generally declined while research and development 
expenses have been steadily increasing. Similarly, FDA and analysts reported that pharmaceutical research and 
development  investments  were  not  producing  the  expected  results  and  that  innovation  in  the  pharmaceutical 
industry had become stagnant.”).  
314 See Scannell et al., supra note 250, at 191 (“R&D efficiency, measured simply in terms of the number of new drugs 
brought  to  market  by  the  global  biotechnology  and  pharmaceutical  industries  per  billion  US  dollars  of  R&D 
spending, has declined fairly steadily. We call this trend ‘Eroom’s Law’, in contrast to the more familiar Moore’s 
Law (‘Eroom’s Law’ is ‘Moore’s Law’ backwards). Moore’s Law is a term … used more generally for technologies 
that improve exponentially over time. The data [reported herein] show that the number of new US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)-approved drugs per billion US dollars of R&D spending in the drug industry has halved 
approximately every 9 years since 1950, in inflation-adjusted terms.”).  There is some evidence of recent turn-around 
in the industry.  See Munos, supra note  (“A review of the drugs approved since the turn of the millennium suggests 
that pharmaceutical innovation may be recovering from the slump that brought us patent cliffs and declining sales. 
The last couple of years have seen an encouraging rise in new drug approvals, including many based on novel modes 
of action.”).  
315 See DHANKHAR ET AL., supra note 310, at 3 (“In the past 25 years the industry has created in excess of $1 trillion 
of shareholder value, but destroyed around $550 billion of value during the “decade of doubt” from 2000 to 2010. 
That value destruction coincided with a 60 percent increase in the R&D spending rate from 10 to 16 percent of 
sales, and with an even higher increase in absolute spend as worldwide sales grew from $200 billion in 1995 to $800 
billion in 2009.”); Jean-Pierre Garnier, Rebuilding the R&D Engine in Pharma, HARV. BUS. REV., May 1, 2008 (noting 
that the 15 largest pharmaceutical companies lost approximately $850 billion dollars in shareholder value between 
2000 and 2008).  
316 See, e.g., Andrew Jack, Innovation: Pharmaceutical Groups Become Victims of their Own Success, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jun. 19, 
2013 (“In the UK alone, Pfizer has been winding down its historic postwar Sandwich R&D site in Kent and, earlier 
this year, AstraZeneca announced the closure of its Alderley Edge complex.”).   52 
Many commentators and industry-insiders attribute this productivity crisis to a severe – 
and perhaps irreparable – breakdown in the pharmaceutical industry’s primary business model of 
de novo drug development.319  Firms spend in excess of one billion dollars on R&D to deliver a 
single new drug to the market,320 but their products are not generating that much revenue.321  
Even  back  in  2004,  commentators  realized  that  the  industry’s  current  R&D  model  is 
unsustainable.  
It could be argued that the prospects for satisfying unmet medical needs, however, have 
never been brighter. … Yet, despite the promise, it increasingly seems that these hopes 
will  not  be  realized  without  dramatic  changes  in  the  way  that  new  medicines  are 
discovered and developed.  The cost of drug development is so great that new medicines 
are in danger of becoming unaffordable for … manufacturers to develop.322  
Much of the pharmaceutical industry’s current troubles stem from the scientific hurdles 
involved in de novo drug discovery.323  Firms spend hundreds of millions of dollars creating and 
optimizing novel drug compounds to maximize a drug’s chance of success in clinical trials.324  
Nevertheless,  the  vast  majority  of  the  compounds  entering  clinical  trials  fail  to  reach  the 
market,325 usually because of problems related to their safety and efficacy.326  Medicinal chemists 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
317 See, e.g., Bennani, supra note 301, at S31-32 (reporting “dramatic numbers of job losses over the past three years” 
as well as “increasing rates of mergers and acquisitions”); Oprea & Mestres, supra note 144, at (citing an “overall 
reduction of in-house workforce”).  
318 See Ben Hirschler, Drug R&D Spending Fell in 2010, and Heading Lower, REUTERS, Jun. 26, 2011 (“The global drug 
industry cut its research spending for the first time ever in 2010, after decades of relentless increases, and the pace of 
decline  looks  set  to  quicken  this  year….  The  fall  reflects  a  growing  disillusionment  with  poor  returns  on 
pharmaceutical R&D. Disappointing research productivity is arguably the biggest single factor behind the declining 
valuations of the sector over the past decade.”); Martin Grueber, 2012 Global R&D Funding Forecast: Stable Growth of 
U.S. R&D, R&D MAGAZINE, Dec. 16, 2011 (citing the pharmaceutical industry as an industry reassessing its R&D 
spending, with “increased scrutiny of R&D spending versus limited productivity and weak pipelines for blockbuster 
drugs. In response, many pharmaceutical companies are not only dampening their projections for R&D expense, but 
are announcing annual cuts of $1 billion or more over the next few years”); Jack, supra note 316 (stating that “much 
of the new millennium has been overshadowed by investor skepticism, with pharmaceutical companies collectively 
valued at little more than the future cash flows of their current drugs. In other words, their pipelines of experimental 
treatments have been judged to offer few prospects of success. The industry in turn has cut back sharply the size and 
scope of research.”); Reed, supra note 310.  
319 Shelley DuBois, Novartis CEO: We Need to Re-Think the Blockbuster, CNN MONEY, Mar. 4, 2013 (“Big Pharma is still 
big, but its business model is dying. For years, the game in pharmaceuticals has been to research, discover and then 
fiercely defend billion—dollar drugs … .  The old concept of a blockbuster has generally been one drug to treat one 
disease that affects a large population. Because blockbusters are so profitable, companies scramble to squeeze as 
much money out of them as possible, arguably in a way that detracts from efforts to research and develop novel 
treatments…. The old blockbuster—finding strategy hasn't been sustainable.”); Bennani, supra note 301, at S32.  
320 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _-_.   
321 See supra note 310. 
322 See Michael D. Rawlins, Cutting the Cost of Drug Development, 3 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 360, 360 (2004).  
323 See supra notes and text accompanying notes 300-301.  
324 See supra note .  
325 See supra note .  
326 See supra note 301.   53 
now recognize that it is extremely difficult to design a compound that can be safely administered 
to patients in a therapeutically effective dose.327  Many believe that the universe of potentially 
safe  and  efficacious  drug  compounds  is  quite  limited,  and  a  significant  percentage  of  those 
compounds are already known.328   
An  obvious  solution  to  these  problems  plaguing  their  industry  would  be  for  firms  to 
develop new uses of FDA-approved drugs.329  As noted in Section V.B. above, developing new 
indications is cheaper, faster and less risky than de novo development.330  It also allows firms to 
take advantage of the extensive body of knowledge from prior research and clinical experience 
with existing drugs.331  New indications for existing drugs could offer firms a pipeline of attractive 
business opportunities that would help revitalize the pharmaceutical industry while providing the 
public with a wealth of new medical treatments.332  However, the patent system fails to provide 
almost any meaningful protection over new indications developed after a drug’s initial FDA-
approval.333  As a result, the development of new drugs not previously approved by the FDA 
remains the dominant business model, with virtually no investment in new indications for off-
patent FDA-approved drugs.334  
                                                              
327 Finding compounds with drug-like properties has become a key challenge in drug discovery, because the potency 
needed for the prospective drug to be efficacious conflicts with the characteristics of a compound that successfully 
functions as a drug in humans (e.g., absorption, distribution, metabolism, excretion and toxicity). See Bennani, supra 
note 301; Michael M. Hann & György M. Keserü, Finding the Sweet Spot: the Role of Nature and Nurture in Medicinal 
Chemistry, 11 NAT REV DRUG DISCOV. 355 (2012) (stating with respect to “analyses comparing compounds that have 
become  marketed  drugs  with  those  that  failed  during  development  …  it  is  apparent  that  a  key  challenge  for 
successful drug discovery is finding a balance (or ‘sweet spot’) between two aspects: acknowledging the constraints on 
the physicochemical properties of drug candidates imposed  by the higher risks of compound-related attrition outside 
the ‘drug-like space’; and maintaining sufficient potency to provide an efficacious dose.”).  Moreover, medicinal 
chemists  still  struggle  to  predict  the  pharmacological  properties  of  new  drugs  before  costly  clinical  trials.    See 
Colombo & Peretto, supra note 301, at 677; Kaitin, supra note 312, at (“[T]he greatest challenge confronting the 
research-based industry involve bringing promising new drug candidates out of discovery and into development. … 
[I]n the absence of appropriate validation tools that would allow researchers to identify molecules having the greatest 
likelihood of successful development, [new drug] discovery technologies merely added time and cost to the R&D 
process  without  providing  any  appreciable  benefits.  Despite  the  industry’s  concerted  efforts  over  the  past  two 
decades to effect substantive improvements in performance and efficiency in the area of drug development, the 
metrics suggest that few or no gains have been made.”).  
328 See Mizushima, supra note 251, at 499; Muthyala, supra note 281; Wermuth, supra note 119.  
329 Nair, supra note 270, at 2431 (“The benefits of drug repurposing to pharmaceutical companies facing drying 
pipelines and expiring patents … need no overstatement.”).  
330 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _ -_. 
331 See Qu et al., supra note 251, at S4.  
332 See Boguski et al., supra note 282, at 1394 (“One response to the productivity gap is drug “repurposing” or 
“repositioning”—terms  that  refer  to  the  identification  and  development  of  new  uses  for  existing  or  abandoned 
pharmacotherapies. New uses of existing drugs cost much less to develop compared with de novo drug discovery and 
development.”).  
333 See supra section IV.  
334 The pharmaceutical industry does develop new indications for failed drug compounds that were abandoned 
before receiving FDA approval and, therefore, never marketed. See supra notes, and text accompanying notes, _ to _.    54 
 
D. Losing  an  Opportunity  to  Bridge  the  Valley  of  Death  in  Biomedical 
Research 
For the past decade, the NIH has struggled to overcome a pervasive failure to translate 
discoveries from basic research into new medical treatments.335  NIH-funded research has helped 
to  identify  hundreds  of  potential  new  drug  targets  for  pharmacological  intervention. 336  
Unfortunately,  much  of  this  research  languishes  in  the  so-called  valley  of  death  between 
academia and industry,337 where neither public nor private funding is available to advance the 
research.338   These  failures  to  translate  breakthroughs  in  basic  science  into  new  medical 
treatments represent a fundamental challenge to the NIH’s core mission of reducing the burdens 
of illness and disability.339  The NIH’s leadership has made it a top priority to overcome this 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
The number of such FDA approvals is increasing but does not represent a large portion of new approvals. See James 
Netterwald, Recycling Existing Drugs, _ DRUG DISC DEV 16 (Jan. 2008). 
335 See Elias A. Zerhouni, US Biomedical Research: Basic, Translational, and Clinical Sciences, 294 JAMA 1352 (2005); Moses 
& Dorsey, supra note , at 1333; Nancy S. Sung et al., Central Challenges Facing the National Clinical Research Enterprise, 289 
JAMA 1278 (2003).  
336 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _-_; see also Meredith Wadman, The Bridge Between Lab and Clinic: Q&A 
Francis Collins, 468 NATURE 877 (2010).   
337 See, e.g., Declan Butler, Translational Research: Crossing the Valley of Death, 453 NATURE 840, 841 (2008) (“[T]here is a 
growing perception that the enormous resources being put into biomedical research, and the huge strides made in 
understanding disease mechanisms, are not resulting in commensurate gains in new treatments, diagnostics and 
prevention. … The pharmaceutical industry, which for many years was expected to carry discoveries across the 
divide, is now hard pushed to do so. The abyss left behind is sometimes labeled the ‘valley of death’ — and neither 
basic researchers, busy with discoveries, nor physicians, busy with patients, are keen to venture there.”);  Mary 
Carmichael, Desperately Seeking Cures, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2010 (“But frustration is growing with how few seemingly 
promising  discoveries  in  basic  biomedical  science  lead  to  something  that  helps  patients,  especially  in  what  is 
supposed to be a golden age of genetics, neuroscience, and biomedical research in general. … [J]udging by the only 
criterion  that  matters  to  patients  and  taxpayers—not  how  many  interesting  discoveries  about  cells  or  genes  or 
synapses have been made, but how many treatments for diseases the money has bought—the return on investment 
to the American taxpayer [from spending on biomedical research] has been approximately as satisfying as the AIG 
bailout. … More and more policymakers and patients are therefore asking, where are the cures?  The answer is that 
potential cures, or at least treatments, are stuck in the chasm between a scientific discovery and the doctor’s office: 
what’s  been  called  the  valley  of  death.”);  FASTER CURES,  CROSSING OVER  THE VALLEY  OF DEATH  (2009)  at 
www.fastercures.org.  
338 See Muthyala, supra note 281 (discussing the “pharmaceutical valley of death between drug discovery and clinical 
trials”); Press Release: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, NIH Announces 
New  Program  to  Develop  Therapeutics  for  Rare  and  Neglected  Diseases,  NIH  NEWS,  May  20,  2009,  at 
http://www.nih.gov/news/health/may2009/nhgri-20.htm  (describing  the  “valley  of  death”  in  the  context  of 
moving academic discoveries about potential therapeutic effects of a molecule or chemical through the preclinical 
process); Nuala Moran, Public Sector Seeks to Bridge ‘Valley of Death’, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 266 (2007); Reed, supra note 
310.  
339 See National Institutes of Health (NIH), Mission (2013), at http://www.nih.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited on 
Sept. 25, 2013); see also Butler, supra note 337, at 840 (“‘NIH stands for the National Institutes of Health, not the 
National Institutes of Biomedical Research, or the National Institutes of Basic Biomedical Research.’  This jab, by 
molecular biologist Alan Schechter at the NIH, is a pointed one.  The organization was formally established in the 
United States more than half a century ago to serve the nation’s public health, and its mission now is to pursue   55 
problem,340 but progress is painfully slow.341  Testing older FDA-approved drugs against newly 
discovered drug targets is thought to be one of the most promising solutions to the valley of death 
in biomedical research.342  However, the absence of effective monopoly protection for these new 
indications largely forecloses this strategy.343    
Historically,  when  researchers  uncovered  a  new  drug  target,  they  could  rely  on  the 
pharmaceutical industry to invest in discovering and developing novel drug compounds to hit 
that target.344  These new drug targets often provide the best opportunity for a true breakthrough 
in medical treatments because they represent an entirely different avenue for treating a disease.345  
However, since those targets have never been clinically validated, they have a much higher rate 
of  failure.346   After  years  of  declining  productivity  and  diminishing  returns  on  their  R&D 
investments, pharmaceutical companies are increasingly reluctant to pursue these opportunities 
for  breakthrough  medical  treatments.347   At  the  same  time,  support  from  the  public  sector 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
fundamental knowledge and apply it ‘to reduce the burdens of illness and disability.’  So when employees at the 
agency have to check their name tag, some soul searching must be taking place.”).   
340 See Elias Zerhouni, The NIH Roadmap, 302 SCIENCE 63 (2003); Francis S. Collins, Reengineering Translational Science: 
the Time is Right, 3 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 90cm17 (2011).   
341 See, e.g., Shirley S. Wang, Sanofi’s Zerhouni on Translational Research: No Simple Solution, WSJ HEALTH BLOG, May 20, 
2011 (“When former NIH head Elias Zerhouni ran the $30 billion federal research institute, he pushed for so-called 
translational research in which findings from basic lab research would be used to develop medicines and other 
applications that would help patients directly. Now the head of R&D at French drug maker Sanofi, Zerhouni says 
that such ‘bench to bedside’ research is more difficult than he thought. … ‘At the end of the day, there’s a gap in 
translation,’ he said.”); Scott F. Roberts et al., Transforming Science Into Medicine: How Clinician-Scientists Can Build Bridges 
Across Researcher’s ‘Valley of Death,’ 87 ACAD. MED. 266, 268 (2012) (reviewing some of the continuing barriers to 
translational research).  
342 See Collins, supra note 309 (“Indeed, drug rescue and repurposing research overall offers a key opportunity to 
learn from our collective past as we shape our future—a future in which translational science is more efficient and 
effective at delivering therapies and diagnostics to patients.”); Elie Dolgin, Nonprofit Disease Groups Earmark Grants for 
Drug Repositioning,  17  NATURE  MED.  1027,  1027  (2011)  (“With  an  increasing  academic  focus  on  translational 
medicine, nonprofit research organizations are also looking to encourage new uses for old drugs.”); Muthyala, supra 
note 281.   
343 See Weir et al., supra note 309 (discussing the importance of public-private partnerships for repurposing known 
drugs for new indications, but noting that “[a] particular development challenge exists in repurposing off-patent 
drugs” because “regulatory approval often requires expensive and complex clinical trials, but limited returns on 
investment  make  it  difficult  to  attract  private  sector  financing  and  expertise.  New  paths  to  exclusivity  and 
pricing/reimbursement strategies are needed to promote private sector engagement.”).   
344 See Butler, supra note 337.   
345 See  Brian  W.  Metcalf  &  Susan  Dillon,  Preface,  in  TARGET VALIDATION IN DRUG DISCOVERY  vii  (Brian  W. 
Metcalf & Susan Dillon Eds. 2007).  
346 Id.; Amy P. Patterson, Target Selection and Validation: A More Strategic and Collaborative Approach, December 8-9, 2011 
Advisory  Committee  to  the  Director,  National  Institutes  of  Health,  5-8  at 
http://acd.od.nih.gov/reports/TargetValidationReport_122011.pdf.  
347 See Butler, supra note 337, at 840; Metcalf & Dillon, supra note 345; Patterson, supra note 346; Reed, supra note 310  
(“[P]rivate companies and venture capitalists are increasingly reluctant to fund the crucial early stages of preclinical 
development—the  research  necessary  to  “translate”  promising  discoveries  made  in  laboratories  into  optimized 
candidate therapeutics ready for testing in clinical trials.”).    56 
remains insufficient to advance the research to the stage where it is viable candidate for industry 
development.348  As a result, there is growing concern that “many basic discoveries barely get to 
start the journey down the therapeutic development pipeline,” and instead “get stuck in an ever-
widening gap in funding and support for the kind of research that moves basic science down the 
path toward treatments.”349  
This valley of death is the result of two fundamental limitations on the public sector’s 
drug  development  capabilities,  both  of  which  could  be  bypassed  if  industry  had  adequate 
incentives to develop new indications for FDA-approved drugs.  The first limitation is that the 
NIH  and  NIH-funded  institutions  (which  includes  universities  and  other  non-profit  research 
centers) are poorly equipped to conduct de novo drug discovery and preclinical development.350  
For example, these institutions generally lack the capacity and funding to carry out the medicinal 
chemistry necessary to optimize drug compounds, the exploratory pharmacology necessary to 
evaluate their drug-like properties, and the rigorous preclinical toxicology testing necessary to 
advance a novel drug compound into clinical trials.351  The NIH can sidestep its shortcomings in 
these areas by developing new indications for existing drugs, since those drugs have already 
progressed through the stages of research and testing outside its capabilities.352   
                                                              
348 See supra note 338; Moran, supra note 337; FASTER CURES, supra note 337; Roberts et al., supra note 341.   
349 FASTERCURES, supra note 337, at 3.   
350 See, e.g., Muthyala, supra  note 281  (“Academic  investigators  and  disease  foundations  usually do not have the 
required infrastructure and expertise to develop drugs.”); Declan Butler, Lost In Translation, 449 NATURE 158, 158-
159 (2007) (“Academic institutions are often naive about what it takes to develop a drug, she says, and much basic 
research  is  therefore  unusable.  That’s  because  few  universities  are  willing  to  support  the  medicinal  chemistry 
research needed to verify from the outset that a compound will not be a dead end in terms of drug development”); 
Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS), National Institute of Health (NIH), NIH Blueprint for Neuroscience 
Research Grand Challenge: Developing Novel Drugs for Disorders of the Nervous System (U01), RFA-NS-12-002 (2011) (“[M]ost 
promising compounds identified through basic research are not sufficiently drug-like for human testing. Before a new 
chemical entity can be tested in a clinical setting, it must undergo…. activities [that] are largely the domain of the 
pharmaceutical industry and contract research organizations, and the necessary expertise and resources are not 
commonly available to academic researchers.”); Stephen Frye et al., US Academic Drug Discovery, 10 NAT REV DRUG 
DISCOV. 409 (2011) (reporting the results of a survey regarding obstacles to public sector drug development, wherein 
“68% identified some aspect of funding (such as amount and stability) as an obstacle. A lack of expertise in medicinal 
chemistry, a lack of understanding of drug discovery in academia or a poor fit between the more individually 
oriented conventional academic career paths and the team efforts required for drug discovery were also identified as 
obstacles by 25% of respondents.”); George J. Brewer, Drug Development for Orphan Diseases in the Context of Personalized 
Medicine, 154 TRANSLATIONAL RES. 314 (2009); Hann & Keserü, supra note 327.  
351 Reed, supra note 310 (“This gap [in the NIH’s research capacity] includes many steps in the drug discovery and 
development process, including assay development, high-throughput screening, medicinal chemistry, exploratory 
pharmacology, and rigorous preclinical testing of drug efficacy and safety in animal models of disease.”); Woodcock, 
supra note , at 19-20 (describing the pharmaceutical industry’s core competencies as “Rigor; Medicinal chemistry; 
High  throughput  screening;  Lead  optimization;  Manufacturing  and  scale  up;  Late  phase  development;  [and] 
Marketing  and  distribution,”  while  describing  academia’s  strengths  as,  “Molecular  biology  of  target;  pathways; 
pathogenesis; Animals and in vitro models and testing scenarios; in depth disease understanding; Relationships with 
relevant patients; [and] Proximity of patients and laboratory”).   
352 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _-_; Huang et al., supra note 260 (noting that the development of new 
indications for existing drugs “obviate[s] the need for NME development, a long and expensive process.”).   57 
The second limitation is the NIH’s lack of capital to fund the later, more costly clinical 
trial  phases353 and  the  FDA-approval  process.354   With  adequate  funding,  the  NIH  could 
establish  new  indications  for  FDA-approved  drugs  without  support  from  private  industry.355  
However, as discussed in Section III.E., government funding for these clinical trials is always (and 
increasingly)  in  short  supply.356   Consequently,  researchers  note  that  “[d]espite  the  current 
enthusiasm [for testing old drugs for new indications], there remains an unmet critical need to 
fund repurposing projects into phase IIb and phase III.”357  The NIH and academic researchers 
typically must find industry sponsors to run these trials.358  Pharmaceutical companies only make 
these investments when the sales revenue from the new indication is expected to cover the cost of 
those clinical trials and FDA approval.  The inability to earn significant revenue from developing 
a new indication for an off-patent, FDA-approved drug makes it difficult or impossible to attract 
                                                              
353 See Oprea et al., supra note 143, at 61 (“Although the number of clinical studies required when repurposing drugs 
appears smaller, the petitioner must nevertheless conduct clinical trials with respect to efficacy (e.g., for the novel 
indication), and sometimes for safety as well (e.g., when doses higher than the approved ones are needed). The 
financial burden placed on the petitioner, whether an academic unit or any other (non-profit) organization, exceeds 
the million-dollar range.”); Oprea & Mestres, supra note 144 (“Despite the current enthusiasm, there remains an 
unmet critical need to fund repurposing projects into phase IIb and phase III. The burden of proof remains with the 
petitioner, be it academic or industrial, which implies that any claims for clinical effectiveness against disease have to 
be demonstrated in clinically controlled conditions”); Weir et al., supra note 309, at 1056 (explaining that academic 
drug development still relies on the for-profit sector to take drugs through the more expensive later-stage clinical 
trials, giving the example of auranofin for chronic lymphocytic leukemia).  
354 See, e.g., Brewer,  supra  note  350  (explaining  that  government  support  is  often  insufficient  to  cover  even  the 
administrative  support  necessary  to  meet  the  FDA’s  recordkeeping  requirements  for  documenting  clinical  trial 
studies). 
355 See Rai, supra note , at 491-92; Dolgin, supra note 342, at 1027.   
356 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _-_.  Moreover, there might be significant advantages to partnering 
with pharmaceutical companies even when the NIH does not need private sector funding for the necessary clinical 
trials. See Butler, supra note 350, at 158-159 (“translational research requires skills and a culture that universities 
typically lack, says Victoria Hale, chief executive of the non-profit drug company the Institute for OneWorld Health 
in San Francisco, California”); Colvis et al., supra note 312, at 25 (“The culture of therapeutic development needs to 
change. We cannot afford to work in silos of academia, government, and industry when the need for new treatments 
is so pressing. The ultimate stakeholders are the patients who are waiting for treatments.”); Muthyala, supra note 281 
(stating with respect to the NIH and NCATS, “[t]hey are making comprehensive and conscious efforts to identify … 
potential partners, and mak[e] data and resources available to the pharma industry”); Nair, supra note 270, at 2431; 
Woodcock, supra note , at 19 (noting that from the FDA’s perspective, studies funded by pharmaceutical companies 
are superior to academic studies in their “rigor”). 
357 Oprea  &  Mestres,  supra  note  144;  Weir  et  al.,  supra note  309,  at  1056-57  (explaining  that  academic  drug 
development still relies on the for-profit sector to take drugs through the more expensive later-stage clinical trials, 
giving the example of auranofin for chronic lymphocytic leukemia); Brewer, supra note 350.   
358 See supra  notes  and  text  accompanying  notes  _-_;  Boguski  et  al.,  supra  note  282,  at  1394-95  (“Uliana  and 
Barcinski’s point about the ‘cost of repurposing projects’ underscores the real need for novel business models and/or 
regulatory and legal reforms in order to capitalize on the candidate drugs that are identified.  This is especially true 
in the case of generic drugs or drugs that cannot otherwise be patented.”); cf. Oprea et al., supra note 143 (“Although 
the number of clinical studies required when repurposing drugs appears smaller, the petitioner must nevertheless 
conduct clinical trials with respect to efficacy (e.g., for the novel indication), and sometimes for safety as well (e.g., 
when doses higher than the approved ones are needed). The financial burden placed on the petitioner, whether an 
academic unit or any other (non-profit) organization, exceeds the million-dollar range.”).     58 
industry sponsors for these R&D investments.359  This second, critical limitation on the NIH’s 
efforts to translate breakthroughs in basic science into actual medical treatments for the public is 
similarly addressed if industry had adequate incentives to develop new indications for FDA-
approved drugs.   
The NIH leadership still believes repurposing known drugs is one of the most promising 
strategies for bridging the valley of death in biomedical research.360  Indeed, drug repurposing 
has become a cornerstone of the NIH’s translational research program.361 Not only is it investing 
in screening technologies that can identify new indications of known drug compounds.362  The 
NIH also created a new institute for translational research, the National Center for Advancing 
Translational Research (NCATS), with a major initiative for funding early-stage clinical trials on 
new indications for known drug compounds.363  However, because pharmaceutical companies 
will not invest in new indications for drugs once generics are on the market, the NIH largely 
restricts its repurposing efforts to failed drug candidates that never received FDA approval.364  It 
is focusing on these failed drug candidates instead of FDA-approved drugs because the failed 
drug  candidates  are  still  eligible  for  effective  monopoly  protection  against  generic 
manufacturers,365 and therefore may attract industry sponsorship.366  Unfortunately, failed drug 
candidates are statistically far less likely to prove safe and effective for a new indication.367  The 
                                                              
359 See Mullard, supra note 289, at 400 (“In the case of the abandoned and off-patent products — for which lack of 
patent protection can make commercialization of an eventual product difficult — the NIH faces the inverse problem 
of attracting private partners who will run with POC [proof of concept] data to the finish line.”). 
360 See Collins, supra note 340.  
361 See Collins, supra note 309 (stating that drug repurposing “will be an important focus of the NIH’s proposed 
National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS). Indeed, drug rescue and repurposing research 
overall offers a key opportunity to learn from our collective past as we shape our future  — a future in which 
translational science is more efficient and effective at delivering therapies and diagnostics to patients.”); Cimmino & 
Aifantis, supra note 275, at 976 (“Repurposing existing drugs for the treatment of different diseases is part of a new 
initiative by the NIH to speed up the translation of research findings into new treatment regimens.”); Muthyala, supra 
note 281 (“[T]he National Institutes of Health (NIH) Chemical Genomics Center (NCGC) is acting as a national 
resource for the translation of information found in the genome into biological insights and to new therapeutics, 
particularly for Rare and Neglected Diseases.”).   
362 See Huang et al., supra note 260; Collins, supra note 340; Dakshanamurthy et al., supra note 271, at 6832.   
363 See Nair, supra note 270, at 2431; Colvis et al., supra note 312, at 24-25; Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH’s Secondhand Shop for 
Tried-and-Tested Drugs, 332 SCIENCE 1492 (2011) (explaining the NIH is focusing its translational research on drugs 
not previously approved by the FDA due to patent protection concerns); Mullard, supra note 119.  
364 See supra note 363.   
365 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _-_ (Section IV.A.)  
366 See Diamond, supra note 290; Smith, supra note 85 (“Previously shelved APIs [active pharmaceutical ingredients] 
can provide some of the most attractive opportunities for repositioning because under the right circumstances they 
can offer excellent product exclusivities and protection from generics and modified versions of the product.”).    
367 DiMasi et al., supra note 303 (finding that “success in reaching the marketplace for second indications pursued 
was highly correlated with whether the first indication pursued reaches the marketplace. If a second indication is 
pursued and the first indication is a success, then marketing approval of a second indication is more likely than not. 
However, if the lead indication fails, then the likelihood of success for a second indication is only 2.5%. The results   59 
NIH has been forced to direct its R&D investments toward these much less promising medical 
treatments because firms have no effective form of monopoly protection over new indications of 
FDA-approved drugs.   
 
E.  Conclusion 
Each of the problems discussed above is the direct result of the government’s failure to 
offer enforceable patent protection over new indications of off-patent drugs.  In recent years, it 
has become clear that the social costs of this hole in the incentives for pharmaceutical innovation 
are  immense.    There  are  now  thousands  of  FDA-approved  drugs  that  are  off-patent,  and 
screening  technologies  have  allowed  researchers  to  identify  hundreds  and  even  thousands  of 
potential new uses for those products.  The number of off-patent drugs will continue to grow over 
time, as will researchers ability to identify potential new uses.  As a result, this already severe 
problem will only get worse.  
 
 
VI.  SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF NEW USES 
The problems discussed in Sections V all stem from the same informational barrier in the 
pricing infrastructure of prescription drugs.  When pharmacists fill a prescription for a drug that 
has more than one indication, pharmaceutical companies do not know which of those indications 
the drug was prescribed to treat.368  Without this information, they cannot enforce a new-use 
patent over a particular indication, and therefore lack the economic incentive to develop new 
indications for drugs once generics are available.   
This section will show that, with the growth of electronic prescribing (“e-prescribing”) and 
electronic  health  records,  we  can  now  overcome  this  information  problem  under  most 
circumstances.369  Physicians can submit the indication for a drug when they write a prescription, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
are qualitatively similar for third indications. If a third indication is pursued, then likelihood of success for that third 
indication falls from 42% to less than 2% dependent on whether the first indication is a success.”).   
368 Tewodros  Eguale  et  al.,  Enhancing Pharmacosurveillance with Systematic Collection of Treatment Indication in Electronic 
Prescribing,  33  DRUG  SAF.  559  (2010)  (discussing  the  absence  of  information  available  on  the  indication  for  a 
prescription and consequences thereof). 
369 There is an expansive literature on the potential benefits of e-prescribing, but none of it mentions the use of 
indication reporting to facilitate the enforcement of new-use patents or differential pricing by indication. See, e.g., 
Eguale et al., supra note 368, at 560 (“Mandatory documentation of treatment indication at the time of prescription 
has several potential advantages, including the opportunity to generate diagnosis-based reminders for drug selection 
and  follow-up,  to  incorporate  clinical  guidelines  into  the  decision  process,  provide  pharmacists  with  critical 
information  for  safe  dispensing  of  drugs  and  appropriate  patient  counseling  and  to  create  longitudinal  drug 
treatment history (e.g. treatment failures by indication and their reasons). It will also enhance capacity for new 
automated  pharmacosurveillance  methods  to  be  developed  that  assesses  safety  and  effectiveness  of  drugs  by 
treatment indication. Moreover, using such data will allow evaluation of the magnitude of off-label prescribing and 
its  determinants  with  the  associated  safety  and  economic  implications.”);  Maria  A.  Friedman  et  al.,  Interoperable   60 
and pharmaceutical companies could often verify the reported indication (along with insurers) 
with limited access to patients’ (de-identified) medical records.  With a few minor policy changes, 
the government could transform e-prescribing and electronic medical records into the needed 
infrastructure for enforcing new-use patents, thereby closing a critical gap in the incentives for 
pharmaceutical innovation.  
 
A.  Reporting Indications Through E-Prescribing Software 
The first step in permitting pharmaceutical companies to enforce patents on new uses for 
drugs  is  to  establish  an  infrastructure  for  physicians  to  report  the  indications  for  their 
prescriptions with minimal disruption to their practice.  In the past, this type of reporting was 
impractical.370  However, in a world where physicians write their prescriptions electronically, 
they can easily record the indications for their prescriptions.371   
E-prescribing  software  enables  the  electronic  transmission  of  prescription  information 
from the prescriber’s computer to a pharmacy computer.372  Most U.S. physicians already use e-
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Electronic Prescribing in the United States: a Progress Report, 28 HEALTH AFF. 393 (2009); Ed. J. Fotsch, Electronic Health 
Records: the New Vehicle for Drug Labeling, Safety, and Efficacy, 91 CLIN PHARMACOL THER. 917 (2012); Joy M. Grossman 
et  al.,  Transmitting and Processing Electronic Prescriptions: Experiences  of  Physician  Practices  and  Pharmacies,  J.  AM.  MED. 
INFORM. ASSOC. (2011) doi:10.1136/amiajnl-2011-000515; Robert H. Miller & Ida Sim, Physicians’ Use of Electronic 
Medical Records: Barriers and Solutions,  23  HEALTH AFFAIRS  116  (2004);  R.  Lamar  Duffy  et  al.,  Effects of Electronic 
Prescribing on the Clinical Practice of a Family Medicine Residency,  42  FAMILY MEDICINE  358  (2010);  E-PRESCRIBING: 
BARRIERS  AND  OPPORTUNITIES,  CENTER  FOR  HEALTHCARE  RESEARCH  AND  TRANSFORMATION  (2011) 
at http://www.chrt.org/assets/policy-papers/CHRT_E-Prescribing-Barriers-and-Opportunities.pdf;  Erika  L. 
Abramson,  Electronic  Prescribing  Within  an  Electronic  Health  Record  Reduces  Ambulatory  Prescribing  Errors,  37  JOINT 
COMMISSION JOURNAL ON QUALITY AND PATIENT SAFETY 470 (2011); Kevin B. Johnson et al., Showing Your Work: 
Impact of Annotating Electronic Prescriptions with Decision Support Results, 43 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 321 (2010); Jesse 
C. Crosson et al., Early Adopters of Electronic Prescribing Struggle to Make Meaningful Use of Formulary Checks and Medication 
History Documentation, 25 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 24 (2012); Robyn Tamblyn et al., The Development and Evaluation of 
an Integrated Electronic Prescribing and Drug Management System for Primary Care,  13  J. AM. MED. INFORM. ASSOC.  148 
(2006).  
370 See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) Memorandum Report: Ensuring that Medicare Part D 
Reimbursement Is Limited to Drugs Provided for Medically Accepted Indications 1-2 (OEI-07-08-00152) (2011).   
371 See Eguale et al., supra note 368 (“Our study shows that physicians can document treatment indication with high 
accuracy at the time of prescribing using an electronic prescribing system. This process can be integrated into their 
work-flow.”);  Julie  C.  Jacobson  Vann  et  al.,  Pharmacist  and  Physician  Satisfaction  and  Rates  of  Switching  to  Preferred 
Medications Associated with an Instant Prior Authorization Program for Proton Pump Inhibitors in the North Carolina Medicaid 
Program, 16 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 250, 252 (2010) (describing the growing use by insurers of “instant 
approval process (IAP) [as an] … alternative to traditional PA [prior authorization] for managing access to specific 
types  of  prescription  drugs”);  Tamblyn  et  al.,  supra  note  369,  at  153  (finding  that  with  two-weeks  experience, 
physicians became adept at quickly entering indications with their e-prescriptions).   
372 See Electronic Prescribing: Web Definitions, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/electronic_prescribing (last accessed 
Sept. 22, 2013).  The U.S. government publications typically define electronic prescribing as “a prescriber’s ability to 
electronically send an accurate, error-free and understandable prescription directly to a pharmacy from the point-of-
care.”  Centers  for  Medicare  &  Medicaid  Services  (CMS),  E-Prescribing,  at  www.cms.gov/Medicare/E-
Health/Eprescribing/index.html; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, What electronic prescribing 
capabilities  will  I  need  to  implement?,  at 
www.hrsa.gov/healthit/toolbox/HealthITAdoptiontoolbox/MeaningfulUse/whaterxcaps.htlml    61 
prescribing, although its adoption is not yet universal.373  Congress is encouraging the transition 
with  financial  incentives  for  physicians  to  use  e-prescribing  instead  of  handwriting  their 
prescriptions.374  The Department of Health and Human Services is pushing to achieve its goal 
of nationwide, universal e-prescribing adoption by the end of 2016.375  
Many  scholars  argue  that  the  government  should  take  advantage  of  e-prescribing’s 
capabilities to record and track the indications for prescriptions for independent reasons.376  E-
prescribing  software  can  –  and,  in  some  cases,  already  does  –  require  physicians  to  list  the 
indications of prescriptions.377  It can also transmit that information to pharmacists to use at the 
point  of  sale.378   Commentators  note  that  this  information  could  help  pharmacists  avoid 
medication  errors  and  allow  insurers  to  track  and  discourage  inappropriate  off-label 
prescribing.379  It could also be used to inform physicians of treatment alternatives and guideline 
recommendations at the time of prescribing.380   
This literature on e-prescribing overlooks what is almost certainly the greatest potential 
benefit of such a system: creating incentives for firms to develop new uses for off-patent drugs.  If 
physicians must report the indications for their prescriptions to pharmacists,381 those pharmacists 
                                                              
373 Fotsch, supra  note 369  at  917  (reporting  that,  as  of  November  2011,  “more  than  50%  of  community-based 
providers were using e-prescribing”). 
374 See Seth B. Joseph et al., E-Prescribing Adoption and Use Increased Substantially Following the Start of a Federal Incentive 
Program,  32  HEALTH AFFAIRS  1221  (2013)  (describing  the  financial  incentives  provided  by  the  government  for 
physicians  to  adopt  e-prescribing  and  the  impact  of  that  incentive  program);  Fotsch,  supra  note  369,  at  917 
(attributing the “record pace” of the adoption of e-prescribing to the “HITECH Act and the tens of billions of 
dollars in federal payments to health-care providers it offered to encourage adoption of EHRs and utilization of e-
prescribing”); Maria A. Friedman et al., Interoperable Electronic Prescribing in the United States: a Progress Report, 28 HEALTH 
AFF. 393 (2009).   
375 See 78 FED. REG. 21308, 21311, 42 C.F.R. part 411, Apr. 10, 2013.    
376 See, e.g., Eguale et al., supra note 251, at 781 (“Electronic prescribing should document treatment indication to 
monitor  off-label  use.”);  PETER  KILBRIDGE,  E-PRESCRIBING  32  (2001)  (noting  that  reporting  indications  to 
pharmacists through e-prescribing software can enhance patient safety by allowing pharmacists to guard against 
mistaken dosages or other contraindications).    
377 See Eguale et al., supra note 368; Tamblyn et al., supra note 369, at 149-51; C. Douglas Monroe et al., Kaiser 
Permanente’s Evaluation and Management of Biotech Drugs: Assessing, Measuring, and Affecting Use,  25  HEALTH AFF.  1340 
(2006) (describing the success of existing electronic health records systems employed by some health insurers to track 
indications reported at the time of prescription); MICHAEL VAN ORNUM, ELECTRONIC PRESCRIBING: A SAFETY 
AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE  63  (2008)  (“Some  e-prescribing  applications  allow  the  prescriber  to  identify  the 
indication  for  the  prescription  during  the  prescribing  process.    Others  allow  entry  of  problems  or  diagnosis 
independent of the prescribing process.”).  
378 See VAN ORNUM, supra note 377, at 155-156.  
379 See supra note 376.  
380 See VAN ORNUM, supra note 377, at 66 (“Driving drug selection by indication is an opportunity for professional 
organizations to collaborate on specific therapy suggestions that span multiple disease states.  Their suggestions could 
be incorporated into the e-prescribing application to help the prescriber find the right prescription the first time.”).   
381 Although mandatory indication reporting would take up physicians’ time, U.S. physicians might eagerly embrace 
such a system because it could replace the burdensome paperwork-based prior-authorization systems now used by 
many  insurers.    See  CENTER  FOR HEALTH TRANSFORMATION, ELECTRONIC PRIOR AUTHORIZATION  AND ITS   62 
would have a legal obligation not to infringe any new-use patents by dispensing low-cost generics 
for  patented  indications. 382   And  if  pharmaceutical  companies  had  access  to  this  same 
information  about  the  prescribed  indication  (minus  any  personal  information  about  the 
individual patient to protect his or her privacy), they could enforce their new-use patents against 
the pharmacists.383  Pharmacists would be required to dispense the pharmaceutical companies’ 
more expensive, brand-name drug instead of a low-cost generic when physicians prescribe that 
drug for a patented indication.  Alternatively, the pharmacist could dispense the low-cost generic 
and then report the sale to the patient’s insurer and the pharmaceutical company, allowing the 
pharmaceutical company to bill the insurer directly for the sale.384  In either case, pharmaceutical 
companies could charge insurers when physicians prescribe an off-patent drug for a patented 
indication, thereby providing the financial incentive to develop those new uses.  
Although no country has ever implemented a nationwide system of e-prescribing that 
included the reporting of indications, recent pilot programs suggest such a system is feasible.  
Tewodros Eguale and co-authors studied the adoption of such a system among primary care 
physicians in Quebec.385  They report a high level of accuracy (97%) in the indications submitted 
by physicians through e-prescribing.386  
Most e-prescribing software programs lack the functionality to record indications along 
with  each  prescription  and  transmit  that  information  to  pharmacists,387 but  the  government 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
POTENTIAL  IMPACT  ON  HEALTHCARE:  HOW  PAPER-BASED  PRIOR  AUTHORIZATION  IMPEDES  ELECTRONIC 
PRESCRIBING (2012) (discussing how e-prescribing software that requires indication reporting can also operate as 
electronic prior authorization, thereby avoiding the time-consuming process of paper-based prior authorization).   
382 See supra  notes  and  text  accompanying  notes  _-_  (explaining  that  pharmacists  would  be  liable  for  indirectly 
infringing a new-use patent if they knowingly fill a prescription with a low-cost generic for a patented indication).  
Since the pharmacist would not be liable for indirectly infringing a new-use patent unless it knows of that patent or is 
willfully blind to its existence, pharmaceutical companies may need to notify pharmacists of their new-use patents to 
enforce them.  See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. __ (2011).  Alternatively, the government could 
require that pharmacists’ e-prescribing software notify them when a prescribed indication is covered by a new-use 
patent.  Since pharmaceutical companies generally must list those patents in the FDA’s Orange Book, pharmacies’ e-
prescribing software could link to that information.  See Caraco Pharm. Labs. v. Novo Nordisk, 566 U.S. ___ (2012).   
383 See supra notes and text accompanying notes _-_ (explaining how pharmaceutical companies could enforce their 
new-use patents if they knew the prescribed indication for each sale).  Pharmacists would presumably demand 
indemnification from insurers for liability under these circumstances.  Consequently, the real parties of interest in 
these disputes would be the pharmaceutical companies and insurers.  See supra note _.    
384 To  protect  patients’  privacy,  pharmacists  could  transmit  information  about  the  prescribed  indication  to  the 
relevant pharmaceutical company without identifying the individual patient.  
385 See Eguale et al., supra note 368, at 559. 
386 See id. at 566 (reporting the success of physician e-prescribing at “correctly identifying the treatment indication 
was 97.0% (95% CI 94.2, 98.6). Among the ten false positives, errors in selection (clicking a different indication than 
intended) is a probable cause in three cases since the correct indication was just above or below the incorrect 
indication”). 
387 See VAN ORNUM, supra note 377, at 155-156 (“The practice of including indications on prescriptions is gaining 
momentum among prescribers, but is less consistent than it could be.  The diagnosis or indication could easily be 
added to prescriptions but many applications have not developed tools for this.  Most e-prescribing applications 
allow the entry of a problem or diagnosis in the patient’s profile.  Others go so far as to link the drug to the problem   63 
could easily correct this problem.388  As noted above, the government is already using various 
incentives to expedite the transition to universal adoption of e-prescribing by physicians.389  It 
would only need to alter its specifications for qualifying software to require a feature where 
physicians  report  the  indication  for  their  prescriptions.390   Software  vendors  could  easily 
incorporate this functionality into their systems.391  Once the nationwide transition to electronic 
prescribing is complete, pharmaceutical companies and insurers could use this system to link 
reimbursement rates for drugs to the reported indication on each prescription.  
 
B.  Allowing  Firms  to  Verify  Reported  Indications  with  Electronic  Medical 
Records 
The second step in permitting pharmaceutical companies to enforce patents on new uses 
for drugs is to give them access to patient-level information that will allow them to verify the 
accuracy of reported indications.  Needless to say, pharmaceutical companies would be reluctant 
to develop a new indication for an older drug if they think physicians will falsely report their 
prescribed indication to avoid the higher price.  Although the Eguale study found a high level of 
accuracy in the reported indications through e-prescribing,392 the risk of fraud will be greater if a 
drug’s price depends on the listed indication.393  To police the accuracy of submitted indications, 
both insurers and pharmaceutical companies would need access to patients’ electronic medical 
records, although that access could be greatly restricted to protect patients’ privacy.  
The government already provides insurers with access to patient’s health records394 to use 
for  their  coverage  determinations.395   As  discussed  in  Section  III,  most  insurers  limit  their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
or diagnosis within the application.  In a tragic lack of foresight, the crucial piece of information—the reason for 
which the drug is prescribed—often fails to reach the pharmacy.”).   
388 Indeed,  the  government  already  requires  physicians  and  pharmacists  to  report  the  indication  with  the 
prescription under Medicare Part B, though this information is not shared with the pharmaceutical firm.  See Ankur 
Ramesh  Shah,  et  al.,  Adding  Diagnosis  Codes  to  Prescriptions:  Lessons  Learned  from  a  Quality  Improvement  Project,  15  J 
MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 508 (2009) (stating that “CMS [Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services] currently 
requires prescribers and pharmacies transmitting outpatient prescriptions for Medicare Part B to include a diagnosis 
code  on  the  face  of  the  prescription  and  in  the  National  Council  for  Prescription  Drug  Programs  (NCPDP) 
standardized claim transmission field.”). 
389 See supra note and text accompanying note 374.   
390 See 21 C.F.R. § 1311.205 (listing the required elements for an e-prescribing software program to qualify for 
federal incentive benefits).   
391 See Eguale et al., supra note 251 (noting, with respect to linking a prescribed drug to an indication, “vendors could 
easily incorporate this feature into EHR [electronic health records] systems”). 
392 See supra text accompanying note 386.   
393 Cf. Shah et al., supra note 388, at 508 (“physicians were worried that entering diagnosis codes on prescriptions 
could lead to denial of claims for “off-label” indications. Some physicians were so convinced that public and private 
payers might deny coverage for medications written off-label that they proposed writing only the labeled indication 
on the prescription regardless of the patient’s condition.”).   
394 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2).     64 
coverage for prescription drugs to indications that are approved by the FDA or listed in one or 
more of the pharmaceutical compendia.396  Insurers often enforce these coverage restrictions by 
requiring  physicians  to  submit  prior  authorization  forms  listing  the  indication  for  their 
prescription.397  Although physicians could misreport indications on prior authorization forms to 
skirt  insurers’  coverage  restrictions,  these  actions  constitute  fraud,398 and  insurers  can  check 
patients’ medical records to verify physicians’ reported indications.399  Insurers report that, in 
most  instances,  their  prior-authorization  requirements  are  extremely  effective  at  stopping 
physicians  from  prescribing  expensive  drugs  for  non-covered  indications.400   Their  success 
suggests that insurers can generally deduce the actual indication for a prescription when they 
have  access  to  patient  health  records.    It  also  suggests  that  having  access  that  information 
effectively deters most fraudulent reporting of indications.   
If pharmaceutical companies also had access to patients’ medical records, they would be 
in the same position as insurers to verify reported indications for prescriptions.  This information 
would allow pharmaceutical companies to more reliably enforce their new-use patents, creating 
an incentive to develop those new indications.   
Of course, patients’ have legitimate privacy interests in their medical records that should 
be  protected  under  such  a  system.    The  government  could  limit  pharmaceutical  companies’ 
access to patients’ medical records by requiring de-identification of the records.401 It could also 
prohibit pharmaceutical companies from using those medical records for anything other than 
billing.    If  government  believes  these  privacy  safeguards  are  inadequate,  it  could  expand  its 
existing HIPAA framework to include pharmaceutical companies as “covered entitities,” which 
would  impose  strict  regulations  on  pharmaceutical  companies’  use  of  patients’  confidential 
medical information.402   
Admittedly, pharmaceutical companies could not depend on patients’ medical records to 
prevent physicians from misreporting indications under all circumstances.  Some diagnoses are 
hard to distinguish from others based on the information contained in a patient’s medical records 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
395 See Mark A. Rothstein, Access to Sensitive Information in Segmented Electronic Health Records, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 394, 
396 (2012).   
396 See supra note and text accompanying note 135.   
397 See supra note 237.   
398 See  Reminder: Physicians Must Verify Medical Necessity Before Signing Certification Forms,  Texas  Academy  of  Family 
Physicians (2012), at www.tafp.org/news/stories/12.02.21/medical-necessity.   
399 See CENTER FOR HEALTH TRANSFORMATION, supra note 381, at 13.  
400 See Wright, supra note 136, at 5 (“The PDP [prescription drug plan] sponsors indicated that prior authorization is 
the best tool they currently have to compare the diagnosis provided by the prescriber to the medically accepted 
indications contained in the compendia,” and they have “had great success at preventing payments for drugs not 
provided for medically accepted indications by using prior authorization when permitted”). 
401 Indeed, pharmaceutical companies are already allowed to purchase such de-identified patient-level health records 
for research purposes.  See supra note 235.   
402 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d.     65 
(e.g., many psychiatric conditions),403 leaving room for fraudulent reporting not susceptible to 
audit.  In these cases, enforcing new-use patents may be cost-prohibitive, and pharmaceutical 
companies may remain unwilling to develop these new indications.   
However, in most circumstances, this system should allow pharmaceutical companies to 
enforce  new-use  patents  over  new  indications  –  as  evidenced  by  the  success  of  insurance 
companies  policing  coverage  restrictions.    Pharmaceutical  companies  could  distinguish  many 
indications based on the prescribing physicians’ specialty or records of concomitant and follow-
up treatments.  When physicians use laboratory and imaging tests to diagnose a condition, those 
test results are available for review in patients’ medical files, clearly signaling the indication in 
most cases.  As diagnostic technology advances, such testing will become increasingly common, 
making it easier to verify reported indications.  When pharmaceutical companies can detect 
fraud  easily  through  access  to  patients’  medical  records,  physicians  would  be  reluctant  to 
misreport indications, allowing pharmaceutical companies to enforce their new-use patents.   
 
C. Conclusion 
With these two simple changes, we can address one of the most critical problems facing 
biomedical research.  The government only needs to modify the specifications for qualifying e-
prescribing software and establish privacy rules allowing pharmaceutical companies restricted 
access  to  patients’  health  records.  Pharmaceutical  companies  would  then  have  the  necessary 
information to enforce new-use patents. 
The  implementation  of  this  new  infrastructure  provides  the  government  with  an 
opportunity to reassess the appropriate incentives for investment in new indications. For example, 
the  government  may  wish  to  revisit  the  rules  governing  when  new  uses  can  be  rendered 
unpatentable by prior disclosures, or create regulatory exclusivity periods that could similarly be 
enforced against pharmacists and insurers.404  It is also possible that, given differences in the 
development  times  for  new  indications,  a  uniform  20-year  patent  term  provides  too  much 
protection for some and too little protection for others.405  The government might beneficially 
clarify the standards for indirect infringement to allow a cleaner line of enforcement against 
insurers.406  
Using this approach to providing monopoly protection over new indications would also 
benefit  people  in  need  of  these  treatments  in  the  developing  world.    This  paper  outlines  a 
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proposal that will permit pharmaceutical companies to enforce patents over new indications after 
a drug has gone generic.  However, the proposal can only be implemented in countries that are 
sufficiently developed to maintain a sophisticated IT structure for the delivery of healthcare. E-
prescribing must be nearly universal and pharmaceutical companies as well as insurers need 
access to electronic health records.  In other words, this form of monopoly protection will only be 
enforceable in wealthier countries.  In most developing countries, patients would have the benefit 
of access to the new indications, while paying only the generic price.  Moreover, by encouraging 
pharmaceutical companies to finance more of the clinical trials for new indications, this approach 
could also free up NIH funding for research in tropical diseases.  
Government  funding  for  clinical  trials  of  new  indications  will  always  be  critical,  but 
getting  industry  to  contribute  is  also  essential.  With  an  infrastructure  that  can  support 
enforcement of new-use patents, pharmaceutical companies will have much stronger incentives 
to develop new uses for existing drugs. E-prescribing was never intended to accomplish these 
goals, but if implemented properly, this could be its most important legacy.   
 